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PREFACE
The essays in this volume are concerned with the culture of
a period of profound change. They are intended to serve the
practical purpose of estimating what is the present state of our
culture, what are its potentialities, and what are the major
obstacles to the achievement of a good life. They deal above
all with the problem of the character and the enemies of our
industrial culture, in the hope of counteracting pessimism caused
by desire for immediate perfection.
The author is aware of the fact that the attempt to handle
so vast a problem exposes him to the accusation of presumptuousness. His temerity may be excused on the ground that the
confused times lead one to seek answers to vital questions. While
many conclusions must remain tentative, the studies will have
achieved their aim if they provide any stimulation or assurance
to those who are wandering in the twilight.
While no attempt is made to supply footnotes or a bibliography, anyone acquainted with the recent literature in the
Social Sciences and the Humanities will recognize the sources of
many of the author's ideas. A few names should be mentioned,
however, as those of writers to whose works the author is particularly indebted. These are: Lewis Mumford, Peter Drucker;
the authors of the current edition of several volumes in the
Cambridge Economic Handbook series; the authors of a considerable number of studies published by the League of Nations
and the United Nations; Frank H. Knight, Jacob Viner, Barrington Moore; the authors of a number of publications of the
Museum of Modern Art; Thorstein Veblen, Franz Neumann,
Ralph Turner, Caroline Ware, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney,
Emil Kardiner and Elton Mayo. The author wishes to express
his gratitude for the help and encouragement given by associates, both faculty and students, at the University of Nebraska.
In the case of one person, his obligation exceeds the possibility
of formal acknowledgment. That person is his wife.
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Chapter I

THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH
We live in a period of such cultural diversity as man has never
known. Within the past half century or less we have participated in
the destruction of almost all the social organizations surviving from
the Old Regime of the Eighteenth Century; we have seen develop and
function the systems of Communism, Fascism and Nazism, together
with numerous other authoritarian variants; we have grown acutely
aware of the existence of primitive societies in Europe as well as elsewhere, of societies composed of almost self-dependent agricultural
localities; we have experienced the unique process of industrialization
and seen the elaboration of the social and institutional bases for a
culture of freedom such as not even the Athens of Pericles could have
imagined. Industrialism, two world wars, and a world economic depression have brought these cultures into such intimate contact that
an understanding and evaluation of each type becomes not merely an
intellectual exercise but a practical necessity.
Supplementing the variety of cultures in the modern period has
been the diversity of speed of action. Events have never proceeded at
a faster tempo. The machine process, power politics and war and revolution have accelerated the rate of change to a degree to which so far
man has been unable to adapt himself and remain in control of the
course of events. Some parts of the transformation, like that of the
establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, escaped the influence of the overwhelming majority of society; before man was
aware of the fact, a new and hostile culture had been founded. Man
has acquired his habits of social behavior in the slow, even tempo of
an agrarian culture. While crises did occur in that kind of society,
they came at infrequent intervals and allowed much more time for
adjustment than we have had at our disposal. One of the most
startling facts about our age is the contrast between the social implication of the peaceful, steady, slow rate of change of a Victorian
England and that of the furious rate of cultural crisis like the one of
this century. We have to recognize the basic significance of rate of
change in conditioning the character of a situation. There is such a
thing as a cultural crisis, and it evokes qualities and types of action
different from those of a peaceful period.
1
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The presence of these cultures in conflict arouses in us the desire
to judge the relative merits of each, the sources of strength or weakness and the ways of dealing with each regime. Industrialism and
modern democracy are both of such recent origin and so different from
anything in history that we are still at the beginning of their development. We have scarcely advanced beyond the threshold of the culture
of industrialism; we do not fully understand what the material resources can contribute to social and spiritual life. It appears to be
true that technology is more easily improved than the mores; but even
in the latter area we can perceive some outlines of possible future accomplishments. It should be a useful adventure to muster and evaluate
the present means that with proper care can enable us to achieve the
ideals of a free, peaceful, democratic society. Unless we begin to think
along these lines, to set our objectives not according to the limited
material and experience of an agrarian culture but with an appreciation of the wealth of resources of industrialism, we may fail to exploit
our unique opportunity. We therefore need to assess from time to
time where we are and where we are going. Are we allowing the
machine process to guide us, or are we putting it in the service of
society and under human leadership? How should we deal with the
opponents or declared enemies of our culture? How can we win to
our way of life the peoples of localism, the peoples remaining caught in
the moral and intellectual ways of the Old Regime? These are all
practical problems which have to be faced and to which each member
of a free society must find an answer.
To satisfy our need for knowledge about contemporary cultures
requires a method of analysis different from the customary one. Since
the cultures differ so widely in basic structure and character, they
should first of all be analyzed for what they are without consideration
of why or how they arose. The traditional historical approach will not
suffice here; built around politics or economics, it does not take into
account the full variety of factors. A generation which has experienced Nazism, communism, and other ways of life can no longer accept the limitations to understanding imposed by a political or econnomic evaluation of social action. History has been so busy trying to
explain causes and results that it has failed to identify that with respect
to which it has been seeking the causes and the results. It has tended
to level all historical periods out to a chronological sequence, so
successfully keeping everything in motion through time that we are
unable to acquaint ourselves with the characteristics of a particular
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event or period in operation. It has inclined toward becoming an
exercise of the memory rather than of the intellect; and the individual
social sciences have not been much more successful. Since each social
science has tended to go its own way alone, it has offered only a partial
analysis of a part of the problem with which we are concerned. The
economist emphasizes certain aspects, the political scientist certain
others, the psychologist still others. How may one analyze the total
culture and supply a meaningful answer to our questions? The methodological issues are put to us at present with special force.
These chapters are written in accordance with what may be called
the situational approach to the study of society. The main types of cultural situations as they appear in our modern western world are
analyzed on both an individual and a comparative basis. For selfevident reasons the cultures of the Old Regime, of free industrialism,
and of Nazism and communism are selected for discussion. A situation
of a different character is also treated, that of a cultural crisis, because
of the fact that our modern society has been and continues to be profoundly conditioned by crises of this kind. Each of these situations reveals a particular characteristic which permeates the whole: in the
Old Regime and its modern vestiges the characteristic is localism; in
free industrialism, there are the phenomena of bigness and process;
in authoritarian regimes, there are power and rigidity; and in a cultural crisis, the phenomenon of crisis. The essays are concerned with
the analysis of each situation in terms of its particular basic character
structure. In this way the functional interrelationship of the parts
and aspects of a culture are revealed; the basic characteristic is perceived to permeate the institutions, personalities, and mores of each
situation.
There is nothing artificial about the situational approach. It
merely recognizes the fact that a culture of freedom has a different
institutional organization and operates in an entirely different way
from one of dictatorship, that conditions of peace can be distinguished
from those of war, that a time of crisis affects human beings in a way
not to be confused with that of normality. The approach can be used
with respect to an entire culture or to any part of it, large or small.
It is as relevant to the analysis of an event as to an institution, to a
personality as to a habit, to a concept as to the rate of change. It
assumes that the object under analysis has a unity of its own and that
it exists in operational relationship with other objects. The primary,
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in fact, the sole rule in using this approach is to begin with the object
itself, the Ding-an-sich to find out what it is, in a functional way to
work in all directions from this center, and to learn about the object
by studying its relations with the other objects in its world.
The situational approach offers the advantage that it enables both
unity and diversity, stability and change, to be studied in the intimate
relations characteristic of life. An object gains contours and an outer
limit by means of the fact that its functioning is followed into all areas
necessary to reveal its role in society. The object is observed not as
a static thing, but as active in life, as being in motion and affecting
and being affected by all other objects around it. This procedure
makes it necessary to know the relative importance within the culture
or the situation of the various institutions, groups, and ways in the
society. It requires the knowledge of how the culture functions and of
the role which each element plays within it. Some forces encourage
and press for change; others are conservative. Some provide direction
for policy-making while others merely follow; and still others may
according to circumstances temporarily participate in both groups.
The approach enables the object under consideration to be evaluated as far as possible by objective norms. A set of standards can be
developed by the comparative study of various types of cultural
situations. Communists, National Socialists, the Old Regime, free
democracies have had problems to solve which are common to any
culture: for instance, how numerous and varied are the opportunities
for the development of personality; how much division of function
and how much cooperative interdependence exist; what degree of freedom and what sense of social responsibility are allowed the members;
how much emphasis is placed upon creative activity of the individuals
as contrasted with destructive or with conservative activity? The way
in which each culture and each situation answers these and related
questions will reveal its quality and efficiency, and enable one to judge
which offers the most propitious conditions for the utilization of the
human being, the most basic of all resources.
The advantage of beginning with the Ding-an-sich is that the object may set its particular standard. Communism states its values in
dogmatic form and proceeds to institutionalize them and to shape the
habits of the people in harmony with them. So does Nazism. Democracy postulates certain truths as self-evident, as supported by nature.
Each culture tries to create a unified society in accordance with its
ideals. In this way each offers criteria by which one can judge whether
J
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it is fulfilling its functions and how it is affecting others. The patterns
of behavior can be studied with respect to the entire society: if they
recur in various institutions, if they are repeated in the behavior of
personalities in various occupations, insight will have been gained into
the structure of the entire culture. For example, we shall see how in a
free society the principle and practice of representation are to be
found in almost all large-scale institutions, thereby dominating in that
respect the thinking of individuals. Representation belongs to the
basic character structure of the culture, just as dictatorship does to
that of Nazism or communism.
Each culture purposes to be unique, distinct from and superior
to the others. If anyone of its values fails to permeate all aspects of
the society, we can assume that its degree of social efficiency is lower
than that of one which succeeds in accomplishing this integration.
The extent to which it is able to shape the different aspects of society
to its pattern of behavior will provide assistance in estimating its
probable duration and historical significance. If most of the society
refuses to accept its ideals in organization and practice, one may assume that the regime will have increasing difficulty in maintaining itself. The same criterion holds true for an institution or an individual.
The importance of each can be measured only by a study of the functional relations of the thing or person with the total society. To what
extent does it affect others; to what degree is it affected by others?
The balance should reveal its relative significance.
In order to find in a cultural situation the common patterns of
behavior and the deviants from each, one should be equipped with
the knowledge essential for analyzing that situation. The amount and
spread of the necessary knowledge will vary according to the nature
of the subject. In one, an understanding of science may be essential;
in another, of religion; in another, of literature. In almost all cases
the investigator should be acquainted with both the humanities and
the social sciences, for since he is dealing with social and individual
data he should possess those insights that pertain to cultural analysis.
In current literature the concepts and methods for the analysis of
a cultural situation have been worked out only in part, and have been
applied to even a less extent in the portrayal of a modern western
culture. It is impossible at present to state which ones even among
those that have been developed are most useful. Few students of
society possess the requisite range of insight and the interest in
synthesizing a total culture. Our knowledge remains too fragmentary
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for us to perceive the significance of all the factors in a situation. We
lack monographs which analyze the Ding-an-sich in its functional
setting and which show with precision the relationship between two
or more well-defined objects. The truth is that we do not yet know
how to compare cultures; we do not know how to place an institution,
event, person or idea, not of primitive but of modern western society,
in its total cultural setting. The most that one can say at present is
that humanistic knowledge is as important for this purpose as social
scientific, that for many subjects a knowledge of science and technology
is as relevant as the others. One must look in a cultural situation for
both the unique and that which it possesses in common with others.
The practical need for a method of cultural analysis is revealed to
us from every side. For example, we are at the present time embarking
on a vast program of armament and we need to be aware of how military training and all its concomitants will affect our way of life. Is
military organization compatible with democracy, or is the military
by the nature of its function undemocratic? The evidence of history
should cause us deep concern. We should analyze the behavior patterns of the military, as seen in its organization and methods of institutionalizing power, and compare these with the ones essential for
democracy. We should take special precautions of an institutional
nature to prevent the military attitude from being transferred to
other aspects of society. We should work out plans either to democratize the military, if its purpose will allow such action without destroying the ability to achieve that purpose, or we must build counter-forces
to it of a strong and enduring character.
The analysis of a period of cultural crisis should enable us to perceive that the behavior of man will differ in such a crisis from that
in a period of peace and orderliness. We can therefore diagnose what
is needed to cope with a crisis in the way of action, institutions, and
organizations. We should know what to look for, what to anticipate.
We can understand what otherwise would seem to be erratic, irresponsible behavior, the coming of a Hitler, his attractiveness to the masses,
and the dangerousness of his type of person in that type of situation.
We should immediately devise means of counteracting this influence.
One cannot expect the forms of behavior of mid-Victorian Englishmen
from Germans who feel humiliated by the outcome of World War I
and the overthrow of the imperial regime, and are rendered desperate
by the World Economic Crisis. We should be able to judge communism
not merely in terms of its military strength but in terms of what it does
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to the personality of the people under its domination. Can it win their
loyalty and, if so, to what degree? Or is it subject to the ills of
absolutism which history records as having brought about the downfall
of the Old Regime?
These and many other problems can best be handled by the analysis
of a topic in its total cultural situation. Past, present, and future
seem to be so tightly interwoven in our period of history that one needs
a method of discussing them together. The approach involves one in
the evaluation of our society and in the weighing of imponderables.
It supports the view that no one set of social factors determines or
renders inevitable the course of events but that each conditions the
others. It reveals the presence of alternatives in any situation and the
crucial importance of human beings in deciding which alternative
shall win. While showing the way in which man's actions are affected
by institutional and ideological structure and the habits of a given
society, it supplies the evidence of man's being able, within wide limits,
to shape his own destiny.

Chapter II

THE SOCIETY OF LOCALISM
While modern industrialism, means of transportation and communication have radically changed western society, the impact has
been so recent that many examples of earlier conditions can still be
found. These examples may cover entire geographic regions or they may
have survived in certain patterns of behavior in areas which have become highly industrialized. The tendency has been for the characteristics of the pre·industrial society to be supplanted by others
appropriate to the culture of modern industrialism; but the process
of transformation has occurred so gradually that the contrast between
the two cultures has not been sharply evident; thus, special effort is
required to comprehend the ways and values of a society devoid of our
technological facilities.
The society prior to modern industrialism may be described as
localistic. Except along the sea coast and the navigable rivers, of which
Europe has many, the society depended upon the horse, the donkey,
the ox, and the human being to supply the power for connecting one
locality physically with another. The relations among communities
were limited by the bulk and weight which a human being and a fourlegged animal could carry or draw and by the speed with which they
could travel. Transportation and communication were both thereby
restricted, and bad roads or no roads at all augmented the handicap.
The conditions of transportation and communication limited the
activity of the pre-industrial society in every essential respect. Government, economy, social organization, intellectual and religious life
were all subject to the material dominance of this common factor.
The negative impact seems clearer to our present society than the
positive. It is easier for us to perceive what the society of the Old
Regime (a term used to designate the society of localism in modern
Europe from the beginning down to the present, irrespective of the
century) could not do than to comprehend the benefits it may have
derived from localism. The benefits, which must have been largely
moral and aesthetic, could not have out-weighed the material or
technological shortcomings and the import of these institutions and
forms of behavior. It is the latter which will be discussed in this chapter.
8
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In the culture of localism each community had to be almost entirely
self-sufficient. It had to provide most or all of its own food and clothing, its own medicaments, its own technical knowledge and equipment.
It had to rely upon its own resources in case of fire, epidemic, or some
other natural calamity. It had to manage its own affairs. As commerce
developed, local self-sufficiency grew less essential. The larger the town,
the more it had to depend upon outside sources and the more it became subject to outside influences; but the villages continued well
into the nineteenth century and in many areas remain at the present
day fundamentally local is tic in character. Transportation over bad
roads was too limited and too uncertain for the community to risk
curtailing its self-sufficiency. Prior to modern industrialism, large
towns dependent upon the frail resources of communication were
few in number and constituted a relatively small percentage of the
population. They formed the exception, not the rule; and the change
from the Old Regime to the society of industrialism may be traced in
the quantitative increase in the number of these exceptions until they
set the pattern of a qualitatively new culture.
Commerce among communities and regions was restricted to commodities which were not perishable, for example, grain, wool, cloth,
those small in bulk and costly like spices and silk, those which could
furnish their own motive power like horses and other livestock, those
needed in small quantities for food like salt, or for religious purposes
like wax. In the case of bulky objects, commerce was confined to
regions with a Roman road or with natural means of easy transportation, a river, the sea and only a few places could thus qualify. The
nonessential nature of commerce for most of the population is revealed
in the ability of communities to do without money by practicing local
barter. Money was so scarce that as late as the eighteenth century a
king would pay high interest for the sake of having it on hand. He
might store it in kegs and keep it in a fortress as a kind of insurance.
The use .of money was a function of the expansion of commerce and
the spread of its employment indicated the diminution of cultural
localism.
Since transportation and communication encountered such difficulties, the price and the availability of a given product like wheat
or rye varied widely from region to region. Within the range of a few
miles the differential might be large. Hunger or starvation in one
region of a country as advanced as France in the eighteenth century
was occasionally present alongside a plethora of grain in other regions,
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and a merchant able to transport commodities to a place in need might
make a fortune. The leveling out of these variations was not completed
until far into the nineteenth century and marked the development of
national economic unification and of international economic interdependence.
The predominance of agriculture as the occupation of local selfsufficiency limited the size of the population that could be supported.
As Malthus showed, the population tended to increase beyond the food
supply, and since surplus food in other regions could be known about
and imported only with such difficulty even over a short distance, the
number of the population of each locality depended upon the ability
of that particular locality to raise sufficient food. Apart from the few
towns and cities with access to outside sources any surplus population
had to starve or migrate to an area where it could establish new
localistic communities. The process of demographic adjustment is
revealed in the agricultural societies of Eastern Europe, Southern
Italy, Spain, and elsewhere in the present century. Both the birth rate
and the death rate remain excessively high. Hidden unemployment
in the rural areas means that agriculture is forced to use far more
persons than are needed. Poverty and hunger, the absence of sanitation and of medical and other professional services, the weakening of
resistance to disease result in a high death rate, nature's method of
keeping the size of the population in proportion to the amount of
available food.
In most communities the society of localism tended to reach and
maintain a state of equilibrium as the social reflection of the economic
self-sufficiency. The limited numbers precluded any extensive division
of function, a restriction accentuated by the fact that in agriculture,
even up to the present time, each worker whether head man or common laborer performs about the ,game kinds of tasks. The absence of
the possibility for changing occupations in the community deprived
individuals of the economic basis of social mobility and assured the
preservation of status. These conditions persisted until commerce and
especially modern industrialism enabled the urban population to increase in number and make possible the movement, not from one
localistic village to another similar in social and occupational structure, but from village to town or city, where a diversity of cultural
opportunities was to be met.
The static community appears to have been characterized by two
fundamental social patterns. One is seen in the relations between

THE SOCIETY OF LOCALISM

11

the noble family and the peasantry. The other is provided by the
family.
The relationship between the lord and his family on the one hand
and the peasantry on the other was that of superior and inferior.
Although they showed some common elements, each possessed a
distinctive culture of its own. The power of the lord and his family
consisted not merely of legal and economic authority but of superior
intellectual, spiritual, and social achievements as well. The upper
class disposed of a wider range of sources of prestige and influence
than the peasantry. Being situated at least one rank above those who
lived at the bottom of the social hierarchy, the members were accustomed to handling not solely crops and oxen but human beings.
They had traditional techniques of authority which the peasantry had
no opportunity to develop. Their contacts with others of the upper
classes enabled them to acquire personal and social qualities known
to the peasantry only when manifested by superiors. Except on rare
occasions of peasant uprisings the noble lord was free from competitors.
As long as the community remained local is tic, no one else had comparable experience in governing; no one possessed the knowledge
necessary to be able to judge the actions of the lord from the point
of view of service to the community. The static nature of life enabled
the persons in power to continue to rule; and the self-sufficiency of the
community allowed a wide range of incompetence on the part of the
ruling family without endangering the life of the whole.
Among the institutions of the community the family played the
most important role. It provided the basic unit of economic organization and operation. An unmarried peasant responsible for maintaining a farm was almost inconceivable. Wife and children performed
essential economic functions for which a substitute could hardly be
found. In view of this fact one would rightly expect the governance
of the community as a whole and of the peasant village as a part to be
patriarchal. The lord acted as a kind of father over adult children.
He, his wife and children had specific functions to perform, the most
important of which consisted of controlling and guiding the community; and the peasants had an equally specific role. The face-to-face
relations preserved a high degree of personal understanding and giveand-take among the members. Patriarchalism in governance did not
necessarily mean autocracy. The members were so dependent upon
each other that the destruction or even the appreciable reduction of
the sense of responsibility and initiative of each individual necessary
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for keeping the community running in the accustomed way might be
dangerous. When the lord moved to court, left the community in the
hands of a bailiff, and became interested solely in extracting revenues
from the peasants, his authority waned and in time his social and
economic position was lost. He had disturbed the pattern of community life of the Old Regime and he suffered the consequences of
a change to a culture organized on other lines than those of status
and the family.
Within the village itself the peasantry consulted among themselves
and reached decisions informally but according to tradition. Political
institutions remained simple; formal elections would have no purpose
in a community of few families where matters could be settled by
private discuss~on. The scale of operations was too small for special
machinery of government to be required. The term democracy does
not fit the organization of such a village community any better than
the concept autocracy; and to call it authoritarian underestimates
the traditional necessity for the head man of the village to consult
with his people before making decisions. Government within the
village can best be described as the adaptation of the familial pattern
to the conduct of village affairs.
In this highly personalized society abstract ideas about governance
or new kinds of organization were irrelevant. The members lacked
the experience necessary for conceiving the reality of an abstract term
like the state, the nation, or government. They knew the lord of the
manor as a specific person of a specific family; the peasant head of the
village could be seen and talked to; neither had anything abstract
about him. Each was as real as a field of wheat or an ox; each had
definite responsibilities within a definite community. The church
might have inculcated the sense for general concepts; but as a believer in theistic religion it encouraged the peasant to picture God
and the figures of religion as specific beings, each with a personality
of its own. These communities lacked a professional intelligentsia
and a middle class with wide commercial interests which might have
perceived the reality of general concepts like credit, market, state,
nation, as expressions of their own interests and experiences. For the
peasantry, and even for the landed nobility in a localistic society, the
concepts held no meaning.
The character of the means of transportation and communication
made it difficult for outside stimuli to reach the individual communities. Few channels into a locality for alternative or competing con-
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ceptions were available, and the opportunities for utilizing new
knowledge and ways were so limited that psychological as welI as
material blocks to doing so prevailed. The nobility, the central government, the military, the church, education and commerce offered
possible means; but except in the case of the development of a few
large urban centers not one proved effective in breaking up the
local is tic way of life until modern technological industrialism offered
the facilities and the inducement for doing so.
The nobility maintained outside contacts. It associated with its
peers in other localities; it went to court; it had intelIectual and artistic
interests; it served in the army; it purchased articles brought in by
merchants from other regions. Whether any of this experience affected
the ways of the peasants in the village or the character of the relations
between lord and peasant seems doubtful. The introduction by the
nobles of reforms in agricultural methods in the eighteenth century
did affect directly the peasants, their habits of work, their material
prospects. It seems to have stirred some of them to thinking outside
the traditional forms of economic and social relations. But in the
main the nobility's wealth and superior status prevented any of this
experience from being absorbed by the peasantry.
The facilities at the disposal of the central government did not
ordinarily reach into the community except through the nobility and
did not tend to disrupt the ways of localism. In an age of such slow
transportation and communication the problem of developing a
system of local government directly and quickly responsible to the
central authority proved to be insoluble. Throughout Europe the
institutions of local government in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth centuries were similar. Whether in Spain, Russia, France,
Prussia, Austria, or England, the geographic unit of local government
had to be smalI enough for an official to govern it on horseback. It had
as a rule to be placed in the hands of a local nobleman who could attend to matters of concern to the central government and to the locality
while managing his own estate. In France the central government
tried to create a pro'fessional class of intendants and to prevent them
from taking root in the area; but the large number of instances in
which the intendant remained in the same locality for years shows the
difficulty of enforcing this rule for maintaining central control. In
almost every case irrespective of country the local noble official, the
Landrat, the Corregidor, the Justice of the Peace, defended local
interests against the central government and acted in behalf of the
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latter in the capacity of a local patriarch, a local ruler tied closely to
his peers in the county and shielding the existing order against
menacing innovations. A monarch would have had to be constantly
in the saddle to check these officials. Frederick the Great and Peter
the Great possessed the energy and the will to try to do so, but no
Bourbon did and scarcely a Hapsburg. Even Frederick, in spite of the
small size of his state, was sometimes deceived. The small towns and
villages under the county official remained in the static condition
of localism.
Military service and war did not affect sufficiently large numbers
of the population to offer experience making for change in the communities. Even though the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries enjoyed few years free from wars somewhere, the size of armies composed
solely of foot soldiers and horsemen continued to be relatively small
and the area of fighting localized. The size was limited by the ability
to live on the country or to carry one's own food; in either case, with
the existing facilities for transportation, an army could scarcely number more than a hundred thousand men except in regions of dense
population and unusually good means of transport. One can thereby
understand why so many wars occurred in the Low Countries. A major
problem of strategy arose with the question of how to move armies by
different routes over long distances in such a way as to concentrate
all units in time for battle, a problem much simpler to solve with
railroads and motor vehicles than with animal locomotion. Certain
areas remained almost inaccessible to war because they were equally
inaccessible to anything else. Russia was so backward and so far removed from the populous centers of Europe that in spite of its size
it could not exert an influence in international affairs commensurate
with its resources. Napoleon's march to Moscow proved the difficulty
not merely of winter but of logistics in Russia. The Czars suffered
from similar troubles in assembling their troops for fighting outside
the country. The frontier seemed far away. Unless the war became
chronic with armies living on the country for years, few of the population would be affected irrespective of the country. Goethe remained
at Weimar undisturbed in his writing during the Battle of Jena a few
miles away.
When a soldier returned to his native town or village, he was in
the main able to relate stories about having seen merely other towns
and villages like his own. Occasionally he may have reached a city;
but even some or most of the so-called cities consisted of a cluster of
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small towns and villages. Ris experience offered little or nothing of
a character to undermine the acceptance of localism and the status quo.
Re had no alternative to recommend as an improvement on existing
ways.
In the course of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries war
affected the local community in a roundabout way. From too much
fighting over too many years governments became bankrupt and had
to expand the tax basis and reform the methods of collecting and
handling public funds. The public financial difficulties of the French
monarchy in the eighteenth century helped to bring together the
peasantry and the middle class and make the revolution possible.
International competition for power forced a state to emulate the
most efficiently organized society, and led to social, economic, and
political reforms which began the process of overcoming localism in
favor of nationalism. Both Prussia and Russia, for example, had in
the nineteenth century to initiate this transformation. The need
for additional revenue induced the government to press the peasants
into the use of money, the first major step in the creation of a nation
in place of an agglomeration of localistic societies.
The church offered few if any influential facilities for outside
forces to enter and modify the community. Whether Protestant or
Catholic, the Church concerned itself far less with the improvement
of this life than with saving souls for the next world. Its interest lay
in moral goodness and church conformity rather than in the increase
of individual and social efficiency within the community. Like other
institutions a church could not overcome the material handicaps of
its environment. Except for occasional communications about church
affairs, a priest or pastor remained as localistic as a peasant. The
Protestant pastors stood under the control of the local lord and helped
to maintain social stability, and one would hesitate to assert that a
Catholic priest fared much better. Not merely the local lord but
the bishop as well belonged to the status-minded order of nobility.
An occasional encyclical and an occasional pilgrimage merely deepened
the general imprint. If a son or daughter of the community entered
the church as pastor or priest, monk or nun, he or she fitted into a
society of localism or retired from the world.
Education might have proposed means of introducing change into a
community. Books and printed matter of lesser size were relatively
cheap, and the vicarious experience that they offered might have had
some social impact. Transportational difficulties played a relatively
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minor role in conditioning the degree of their social effectiveness;
rather, the great difficulty lay in the absence of social outlets for the
practical employment of knowledge. The churches in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and even in much of the nineteenth continued
to control education, especially at the lower levels, and to shape it for
their purposes. A peasant could do nothing practical with information
he might have obtained in books; an ordinary burgher in a small
town did not have much more use for such learning. The occupational
distribution of the population precluded the development of much
knowledge closely related to practice, such as the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were to produce. Professions were few in number
-a churchman, a lawyer, occasionally an engineer or scientist working
primarily for the army. A barber-blood-letter needed no more special
training from books than a midwife or a blacksmith-tooth puller.
Editions of books were limited to a few hundred or a few thousand,
for the market was restricted mainly to those who read for pleasure_
Under prevalent standards illiteracy proved to be no particular
handicap to earning a living_
The middle class and the nobility took the lead in acquiring knowledge from printed matter. Besides reading for pleasure they developed some practical interest in knowledge from books. The middle
class needed for their business some training in geography, languages,
mathematics, and law; the nobility began to read about improvements
in agricultural methods. The spread of this habit of acquiring practical knowledge from books varied in speed and extent according to
area. The most developed regions economically speaking, like France
and the Low Countries in the eighteenth century, provided the
greatest market for books. Even the peasantry and the clergy began
to read them. The age of the Enlightenment disclosed one of the most
extraordinary phenomena in history: large numbers from all classes
in society in many countries found ideas so exciting in themselves that
they ceased to accept the standards of the Old Regime and underwent
an ideological revolution before the political, social, and economic
revolution occurred. The power of an idea in a static, localistic society
had a special intensity of impact because of the absence of means of
testing the validity of the idea in practice and because of the lack of
acquaintance with any competitor. The idea came to middle and
lower classes with the force of a revelation; a miraculous insight into
reality seemed to be offered. Time after time in the course of the
eighteenth century in France and the nineteenth century in Germany,
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the peasantry would be immediately won to liberalism by a single
speech or a single pamphlet. The people were ready to accept an
alternative way of life as soon as it was shown to them. Once the
upper classes began to use ideas in a practical way, the lower classes
were prepared to follow. The introduction of a working relationship
between knowledge and reality marked the change from a static to
modern dynamic society. When this point was reached, the Old
Regime had come to a close. The ability to spread ideas over a wide
area and the presence of receptivity to these ideas meant the overcoming of localism in favor of liberalism, nationalism, and other common standards. Expanding commerce, the expanding role of the
state in a highly competitive state system, the increase in population,
all these factors and others, began to break down caste distinctions and
to develop dynamic institutions and ways of life.
The small size of centers of population and the isolation of most
of them from each other preserved conditions in which cruelty and
brutality characterized much social behavior. Opportunities were
lacking for the division of labor in which scientific and technical
knowledge could be developed and applied for relieving human hardship. The stir of minds with diverse interests was so handicapped and
the means of earning a livelihood while seeking to apply knowledge
to the solution of some practical problem so limited that few individuals could indulge in intellectual activity. These few had to
have private means, pursue their studies during their leisure time, or
be fortunate eQough to find employment in the rare jobs utilizing
such interests. The overwhelming fact was that nature treated man
cruelly and that man tended to transfer the characteristics of his
basic relationship with nature to his social contacts. Physical insecurity from starvation, disease, war, and accidents enhanced the
insecurity and emotionalism resulting from the necessity of hard work.
Few and inadequate tools and long hours of labor required to keep
hunger away caused excessive fatigue and irritability or stolidity. The
fatalistic acceptance of nature's brutal and cruel treatment of society
as a whole shocks a present-day individual living in the intellectually
and technologically advanced western society more than any other
single fact of the Old Regime. Religion and art abounded in references
to fiery hell and malignant devils while folk ballads and children's
stories of cruelty and tragedy reflected the reality of man's struggle
for survival.
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The universally prevalent variations in the ways of control, in legal
relations, property rights, tax burdens, standards of living, in fact in
everything of a cultural nature, did not as a rule bother the Old
Regime. Inequality was accepted for lack of any kind of practical
substitute. In a localistic society the extent of it was scarcely realized:
one knew about it in one's own community; but one had little or no
way of contrasting one's situation with that in other communities.
As long as comparisons could not be made on a broad geographic and
social scale common standards could not prevail, and tradition would
continue to justify the status quo. Local isolation tended to prevent
the development of individuals who might have acquired the necessary
knowledge and experience for defying the existing order. Mental
inflexibility and fatalism grew out of the local experience, and these
traits were not conducive to social criticism and concerted action on a
sufficiently wide scale to make criticism constructive. If a person did
try to criticize the inequality and act as a leader of revolution, he
suffered from the almost insurmountable difficulty of having to operate
on a local basis with the small number of local people, few if any of
whom had the necessary experience to do other than blindly and
angrily revolt. Such revolts could easily be crushed, for they were
isolated and inconsequential.
Whenever the traditional sanctions of the society of localism
weaken, one may expect an accentuation of brutality in social relations.
The lower elements in the local population become aware of alternative ways of existence which are being withheld from them. If the
area is particularly backward, like parts of Spain eveh at the present
time, the ruling group will think that it can maintain control by the
exercise of force and the suppressed groups will respond in accordance
with the methods of behavior set by the upper classes. The absence
of a middle class betwen the two extremes, a class which can keep
action and ideal in some kind of practical relationship, deprives the
locality of a means of preventing violence. The countries in which
localism has persisted into the age of industrialism have been and
continue to be centers of revolutionary action. When peasants entered
the Duma after the revolution of 1905, they behaved with the awkwardness to be expected of persons of their restricted native environment. They had had no opportunities for the variety of experience
necessary for success in their new role. They were unable to adapt
themselves to a swiftly changing and diversified society. They were
accustomed to the slow and inarticulate ways of Mother Earth, not to
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the mobile ones of a complicated and inclusive society. In consequence
they proved incompetent for the new function; they could not defend
and further those objectives which they had been elected to achieve.
The ruling groups were able to take advantage of this ineptitude and
made it likely that violence would again be resorted to on both sides.
The results have been disastrous. Wherever the ways and habits of
the localism of the Old Regime, in politics, economics, society, and
intellectual affairs, have been preserved with some degree of strength
into the age of modern industrialism, conflict between the two types
of culture has occurred. All too frequently, these conflicts have been
cruel and bloody affairs.
One cannot regard the term localism as a causal explanation of the
Old Regime or of the conflicts of the past hundred and fifty years.
Forces bringing about change were manifestly present in localistic
society: otherwise that kind of culture would still obtain. The concept,
however, provides a convenient means of designating the limitations
and handicaps, from our point of view, under which that society lived.
The analysis of the cultural pattern of localism may contribute to
understanding the interrelatedness of the parts, and to the appreciation of the difficulties facing those individuals and groups who seek
to bring about useful or essential reforms. The process of cultural
change is seen to be far more complicated than standard political
history would make it appear.

Chapter III

THE NATURE OF A CULTURAL CRISIS
Modern history reveals certain periods in which the transformation
of medieval into modern European society occurred slowly and almost
imperceptibly and others in which the change quickened into a crisis.
Tlie contrast may be seen in the difference between the character of
eighteenth·century England and of Revolutionary France. This chapter
is concerned with the latter type of period and proposes to establish
two points: that in the critical periods a structural change in the whole
culture was involved, and that the common situation of cultural crisis,
irrespective of the time at which the crisis occurred, imposed upon
these societies, certain common forms of behavior. The evidence has
been drawn mainly from the periods of the Baroque (the late sixteenth
and the first half of the seventeenth century), of Romanticism (the
French Revolution), and of Expressionism (the twentieth century).
The phrase "cultural crisis" indicates that the whole culture was
implicated, political, economic, social, ideological, and institutional,
and that the change occurred with great speed. The situation was
characterized by sharp conflict between the forces supporting the
existing structure of society, or even looking to the past, and the
forces seeking to introduce a new culture in place of the old. The
crisis involved those elements in society in which habits, ways, and
values are preserved and expressed, namely the institutions and the
laws. The old social forces were losing control and no specific set of
new ones had yet established its authority. An unusual amount of
energy was released, both in defence of the status quo and for the
advancement of the new society in the making.
The swift structural transformations meant the expansion of
ideological differences into wars and revolutions. In every case civil
wars and foreign wars merged. The first half of the seventeenth
century, the great age of Baroque, experienced the Thirty Years War,
the Fronde, and the Civil War in England. The period of the French
Revolution manifested similar phenomena, and coincided with the
expression of the content of Romanticism. The twentieth century
has, for thirty-five years or more, been fighting or preparing to fight;
and Expressionism may, without abusing the original meaning of the
term, be applied to the culture of the entire period. In each one of
20
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the three periods cited, the movement for change began peacefully
and in small ways, but expanded until it came into bitter conflict
with the forces of order, and war resulted. The issues were so crucial
that they appeared to be soluble only by the employment of force.
The alternative of life or death brought the cultural change to a crisis;
action had to be decided on speedily, for where life was at stake, the
time factor took precedence.
The three periods under consideration faced problems of basic
similarity. The age of the Baroque witnessed the battle among the
three main religions, with ideological and military weapons. The sup·
porters of absolutism opposed a variety of interests hostile to them
and often hostile to each other. The peasantry was being subjected
to intensified control by the lords; the townsmen were angry over
their precarious commercial, political, and, frequently, their religious
position; the Baroque art, literature, and social forms were supplanting
those of the High Renaissance. The French Revolutionary period
manifested the conflict between absolutism and liberalism or democracy, between social classes, between economic ideals and practice,
between the aesthetic, intellectual, and moral values of the Enlightenment and those of Romanticism. The new Thirty Years War in the
twentieth century has shown such a diversity of hostile elements that
it is superfluous to mention more than a few essential ones-authoritarianism versus free democracy, communism versus Nazism, proletariat
versus upper classes, peasantry versus noble or other big land owners,
nation versus nation, capitalism versus collectivism, agriculture versus
industrial capitalism, religion versus religion, aesthetic standards of
the past versus those of various individuals and groups in the present.
In each period, the character of the basic institutions, laws, habits,
and ways was at stake. One cannot equate a cultural crisis with a
political crisis; but one may say that the latter grew out of, and expressed the conflict between the old system with its values and the
new ones struggling for dominance with the old and among themselves. When the issues implicated the structure of the society as fixed
in institutions and laws, they carried the controversy into the realm
where ultimate force held sway. Aesthetic and moral differences, social
and economic difficulties, the change from one culture to another, all
culminated in political controversy; and since politics has traditionally
implied the use of power, the cultural crisis has been characterised by
war.
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The areas in Europe in which cultural crises have occurred in
modern times have been those which preserved powerful elements of
the old culture and produced vigorous forces of opposition to them.
Usually more than two hostile forces have been present, the critical elements being especially divided. Up to the twentieth century neither
side has manifested unity of objectives and policies; each has constituted a coalition around a tendency, the preservation of the old on
the one hand, the development of something new on the other. The
basic conflict has been fought between these two coalitions, each of
which has been drawn together by hostility to the other. As soon as
one has been defeated, the other has tended to fall apart again; but
those on the defensive have had more in common than the others,
for tbe existing institutions and ways have supplied them with a
tangible foundation for cooperation. The degree of unity among the
advocates of a new culture has depended upon the stage in the evolution of the new society at which they have arrived. In every case, they
have been deficient in experience about the new society they wish and
they have had to utilize ideas of varying degrees of generality or concreteness, depending upon their social and institutional experience,
to guide them into the future. In the absence of such experience to
serve as a realistic standard of conduct, the elements seeking a new
order have broken into competing groups as soon as their common
enemy has been eliminated. Each group has had its own set of ideals
and objectives, and believed in the superiority of its own method of
achieving them, and each group, therefore, has clashed with the others.
Some form of dictatorship has followed as a means of protecting the
inchoate new culture against the menace of a revival of power on the
part of the old order and as a means of consolidating gains and unifying the forces competing for leadership into the future. Differences
over the views about the stage at which the new culture has arrived,
about the methods which can be used, about what is now possible and
practicable have in this way been resolved.
Controversies about the desired organization of society have become increasingly complex and serious as one approaches the present.
With the expansion and diversification of experience and of the social
basis of ideas, various individuals and groups have envisaged the possibility of establishing a culture fundamentally different from not one
but a number of competitors. One can no longer divide the opponents
in a cultural crisis into two general camps, each of which is composed
of groups differing on questions of timing, method, and stage of
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realization but united on the general objective; and the future will
probably reveal an increase in the diversity of powerful cultural
competitors.
The cultures in which crises have occurred in modern Europe have
been distinguished by the presence of at least one party in the conflict which, in outlook and ways, was dogmatic and authoritarian.
The earlier crises, the change from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance,
the Reformation, and the Baroque, displayed these traits conspicuously on both sides. Theology and religion, feudal social and political
order, absolutism, caste, and the military all tended toward the expression of extreme views and action. Opposition required the employment of physical force and led to war. Habits of tolerance, reasonableness, and compromise were lacking. In the last century and a half,
theology and religion have ceased to be a powerful factor in making
for the use of violence; but wherever the others have survived with
power, cultural crises have occurred. These elements of the Old
Regime developed mores which made it impossible for them to adjust
gradually and gracefully to a new culture and, as conditions required,
to disappear entirely or to find a place on a new basis in the society.
The fact that the Russian, German, Spanish, and Hungarian revolutions of the past thirty years, to mention merely the outstanding ones,
occurred in those countries in which the Old Regime survived in the
most powerful form reveals how crucial the role of these forces has
been in bringing on a cultural crisis. In these countries the authoritarian, dogmatic elements of the Old Regime were supplanted by
authoritarian, dogmatic forces of a new type, new except possibly in
Fascist Spain, with a different cultural structure and ideology but
with similar habits of resolving basic controversies by physical force
and with even more efficient ruthlessness than their predecessors had
displayed.
Since norms in every phase of life were losing control in a crisis
and new ones were not yet established in authority, competition between old and new and among the new ones stimulated an outburst of
uncontrolled energy. The opposition to and defence of institutions,
ways, and personalities aroused social elements that normally were
passive and involved them in a swift-moving and dangerous struggle
for power. Social mobility became extraordinarily enhanced, with
opportunities for change in position throughout the culture. New
leaders arose, or attempted to do so, with new characteristics and new
types of ability; institutions and ideas and ways were changing; states
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suddenly discovered that the cultural crisis had affected basically their
position in the international system, that they had gained or lost in
the balance of power, and must stand the test of competitive struggle
like the individuals, social groups, institutions, ideas, aesthetic standards, and, in fact, everything of significance within their borders.
Nothing in the culture was allowed to stand still. Action was essential,
whether defensive or offensive or a combination of the two; and action
involved the preservation or introduction of things regarded as of
ultimate importance. The burst of released energy made for violence,
and those persons in the centers of action who sought to be neutral
could survive only by becoming nonentities.
Personal insecurity pervaded all levels of society, from king to
peasant. Kings and their families might be deposed and destroyed.
International and civil war brought the fear or the certainty of death
to soldiers and civilians. Political action culminating in the abolition
of laws and institutions in favor of new ones caused the loss of position
and occupation for some and gain for others, and reflected the shift in
power. Peasants might be serfs one day, free landowners the next, and
heavy debtors to the state the next. The opportunities for arbitrariness
increased with the disruption of the centers of traditional authority.
A law could raise a class to power and destroy another. A single battle
or other event might decide the fate of a society. The individual was
compelled to act for himself; otherwise he would be acted upon, possibly to his detriment. The situation forced those who were normally
passive into unaccustomed roles in self-defense. Insecurity seized hold
alike of Louis XVI and of Hermann and Dorothea.
Personal insecurity and the opening of many paths of social
mobility were accompanied by change in the relative prestige and
power of occupations. Politics and the army offered the two most
promising for the rise to authority, for they wielded most power in
the crisis in initiating action and in deciding the outcome. The
bureaucracy and private business or other economic activities ranked
next in importance. The elimination of officials of the Old Regime
and the changes in governmental apparatus offered enticing positions to new personnel. The shift in regimes accentuated the danger
to economic enterprise, but also augmented the chances of the quick
acquisition of wealth. The entrepreneurial spirit was at a premium.
Social and political ideas and connections undermined the standing
of a certain number of pastors and priests, and permitted the rise of
those who had sided with the groups coming into power. And since
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cultural standards were competing furiously with each other, the intellectual, the professor, the teacher, and the editor and other persons
concerned with disseminating news and inculcating values became
crucially important for the whole society and their occupations attracted personnel to an extent far beyond the normal. The role of
women expanded in proportion as widely as that of men. The organization of new groups in all fields, political, military, social, economic,
religious, educational, aesthetic, required the services of persons who
could not have been trained for these positions, since by and large the
groups and positions had not previously existed. Talent unfolded itself in every part of this society in flux. It did so irrespective of whether
the groups out of which it arose defended the Old Regime or supported the coming of a new one, for the defenders of the existing
order had to take on many of the attributes of their opponents or
perish. They could not rely upon the sacred prestige of tradition;
they had to organize and arouse new or additional leadership and act.
Although handicapped by their disinclination to assume these ways,
so distasteful to conservatives and so contrary to their mores, in a
cultural crisis even a conservative had to take the aggressive and fight
for his cause or go under.
In the conflict between the existing regime and the new culture in
the making, groups and individuals were involved in varying degrees,
depending upon their inclination and interest and their awareness of
the issues. Some might be geographically so isolated that they did not
participate at all. Others might succeed in effacing themselves even
in centers of activity and in surviving physically at the expense of
their moral freedom. Relatively few became leaders and preservers or
creators. But irrespective of the role they played during the crisis itself, all felt the effects in time of the profound transformation of the
structure and norms of society. Neutrality might be possible with
regard to participation in action; it failed in such a time as a means
of warding off the results of the action of others.
A cultural crisis entailed much destruction and much creativeness.
With the society in rapid movement, each side in the conflict destroyed
as much as possible of the other. Every law that was passed could not
apply to the existing situation except by compulsion, for conditions
changed too fast for the law to reflect actuality. It became creative for
the future or retrogressive. The situation encouraged a vital and
dynamic behavior, which tended to stimulate the individual to violate
social norms and to act with freedom. Productivity was thereby in-
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creased in all spheres of life, whether in politics, economics, aesthetics,
or otherwise; but in the absence of accepted standards it lacked system
and reflected the extraordinary wealth of stimuli and opportunities
for creativeness. Destruction of the Old Regime did not necessarily
mean a release of pent-up energy and values for a new culture, for in
certain instances destruction was pushed beyond the point of advantage
to the society. It caused so sharp a break with the past that instead of a
release of creative energy it led to chaos; and the extreme of chaos
was followed by the extreme of tyranny.
The emancipation of energy during the crisis led many participants
who were working to establish a new regime to believe that they were
living at the beginning of the great age of creativeness and human
happiness. The past was regarded as something to be destroyed as
quickly as possible. Thus these periods of crisis manifested extremes
of exaltation of humanity and the individual and of the most brutal
mistreatment of individuals. The dual attitude was taken by the
revolutionary not merely toward defenders of the past but toward his
own colleagues who disagreed with him. The conservative's low
estimate of mankind did not result at any time in more sadistic cruelty
toward opponents than that which characterized the behavior of some
revolutionary lovers of humanity toward their enemies or competitors.
In a crisis situation human life appeared to be cheap; talent was everywhere appearing, and competition became severe. The dogmatic belief in the rectitude of one's own views about ultimate objectives and
about methods arose as a means of overcoming a sense of insecurity.
In the absence of social norms, one set personal norms; and if others
disagreed with them, the dispute was settled by force. Compromise in
a crisis might mean the loss of the unique chance to try to impose
one's ideals quickly and completely upon society; and if one believed
in the indispensability of these ideals for social welfare, one might be
quite willing to sacrifice a few lives or even many lives for the sake of
possibly assuring mankind a state of happiness in the long run. In
such a period cruelty, excessive sexuality, and other forms of moral
laxity constituted standard manifestations of social behavior. They
were supplemented by the many acts of the purest idealism and unselfishness, and by even more acts which fell between the two extremes.
The actions of the revolutionary toward individuals who opposed him
were similar to those of conservatives and reactionaries. What one did,
the other did. The situation enha!lced to an unusual degree the
types of behavior which were found, on a limited scale, in a society
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at any time. The diversity of forms of behavior attracted more notice
because of the increased numbers involved and because of the
magnitude of the issues at stake.
The fundamental nature of the issues and the speed-up in action
brought about a shift in the relative significance of the instruments of
government. Each group sought to increase the power at its disposal
so that it could defend or further its interests. Power became essential
to self-preservation as well as to the achievement of one's ideals; and
as a means upon which all else depended it tended to be regarded as
a value in itself. One had to be able to focus it quickly upon any
problem that arose; and, since society suffered from a welter of norms
the advocates of which were fighting for control, immediate decision
had to be followed by immediate action. The executive authority in
government gained the dominant position, with the legislative playing a decidedly secondary role and the judiciary serving as an instrument of the first. In a situation making for ruthlessness the legislative worked too slowly and with too open a display of motives and
intentions, and judiciousness became a dangerous luxury. Reasonable
discussion and compromise, upon which legislative procedure depends,
appeared inappropriate. The executive acted without consulting the
other bodies of government. Power tended to concentrate at the top,
and absolutism or dictatorship emerged as a means of making and
enforcing decisions and re-establishing order. The centralized executive, being human, had to consult others; but it assembled a small
group of aides, each one often relatively isolated from the others by
mutual mistrust and all united by devotion to and dependence upon
the person with supreme authority.
The bureaucracy as the instrument of government found itself in
a crisis the object of attack from all sides. The defenders of the old
order accused it of incompetence, of stifling their initiative, of not
being firm against the forces of criticism and chaos. They might blame
it for having sapped the strength of the Old Regime. The proponents
of a new culture, irrespective of the kind of society they wished, condemned it as an obstacle to the realization of their ideals. They found
its motions too slow, too wound in ceremony. They dared not wait
for it to act for fear the moment favorable to the realization of their
plans would have passed. They wanted action, quick action, not the
deliberate procedures of bureaucratic machinery. They distrusted it
as being occupationally inclined to support the old order and hostile
to cultural change. Criticised and suspected by everyone, the bureau-

28

PROCESS VERSUS POWER

cracy found itself ill-adapted to a crisis situation; but it quickly recovered authority. Although personnel and organization might change,
as soon as the authoritarian phase of the crisis began, the bureaucracy
proved almost immediately to be indispensable as an instrument of
control.
In view of the acceleration of social process, problems of relationship assumed an acute form. With norms in flux and structure in
transformation, the position of the individual unit in the whole was
uncertain. The question of what constituted one's proper function
concerned not merely the individual person, but each institution,
each idea, each group, in fact everything. The role of God and
religion was debated along with that of education and the school, a
poem or a piece of music, politics and a political act. Questions of
objectives, criteria and methods took on crucial significance for everyone and everything. Not even the peasant and the soil he tended were
exempt. Although the peasant might be as passive as the earth, both
found their function radically changed. The peasant might be made
a free citizen with entirely new responsibilities, the soil might be expected under a new system of ownership and tillage to produce an
amount of materials needed to raise the level of living in accordance
with new humanitarian ideals. These problems of function involved
the relationship of each thing with all the others in the total culture.
The relation between the individual and the group concerned not
merely human beings, but plants and animals and matter. It involved
questions of institutional organization, of social structure, of the structure of matter as well as of the animate world. The connection between
ideas and reality, action and inaction-these issues became as vital as
those of the relation of the individual and nature and each with God.
The concepts most used in a cultural crisis expressed facets of the
common situation. They all denoted a sense of process, that is, of
functional change with a high degree of unity. They all implied the
essential importance of relationship, whether by way of preserving
the old or of introducing new ones. The popularity of such terms as
transformation, polarity, dialectic, equilibrium, opposites, totality,
organic, pantheism, dynamic, integration, revealed the concern of the
society to work out some social system capable of effective operation.
While certain terms, like equilibrium and opposites, seemed rather
static in nature, in the minds of the persons using them they referred
as much as the others to a society in movement. The theory of
equilibrium expressed an ideal which tried to give form to change.
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The conception of opposites was used to explain how change came
about. Certain terms appealed particularly to the advocates of the
Old Regime; others satisfied the needs of the supporters of a new
culture. In every case, the terms signified an acknowledgment on the
part of each side of the essential fact of fast cultural change. Whether
the group liked this transition or not, it had to contend with it and
to use concepts which applied to the actual cultural process. Each term
implied a look backward as well as forward and all around. Each
referred to the entire culture in operation. The defenders of the old
order were by force of circumstances integrated with that order to an
unusual extent and in a variety of new ways. The proponents of the
new found themselves dependent upon the assistance of others for the
realization of the new ideals to such an extent that they had to employ terms with the import of close, functional relationship. The
exigencies of the situation brought each group to employ similar or
even common terminology.
Social concepts borrowed from biology proved to be especially
satisfying. The term organism was applied both to the individual
person and to a wide range of groups, and set for the latter the ideal
of unity characteristic of the former. The idea of organism met the
need for differentiating among degrees and kinds of integration: some
groups were functionally more intimate than others. Some might be
excluded as alien or hostile organisms. The striving for group unity
capable of sustaining and protecting the members meant a division
of function among the members along with equality by virtue of
belonging to the group. The concept of democracy carried this
multiple meaning of individuality, equality, and functional differentiation. So did nationalism. In each was implicit a sense of socialism, and
this sense might in the most acute and dangerous phase of the cultural crisis become explicit. Depending upon leadership and doctrine,
even a stronger form of collectivism, like communism, might emerge.
Undoubtedly society was more closely integrated, and more acutely
aware of that fact, than it was at any other time in its development.
The cry for unity might reach a crescendo in the claim of one
individual to represent or even personify the desires and will of the
whole group. The ultimate expression of the organic or the functional
theory of society would then have been achieved.
The emancipation of individual ability plus the powerful sense of
interrelatedness led to a new conception of individuality. The individual might be a person, a group, an institution, a building, a
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picture, a flower, a waterfall, God. It might be an event or an attitude.
It could be anything, large or small, natural or supernatural. Similar
characteristics were attributed to each, for the experience of crucial
action led the participants to perceive the importance for their fate
of the totality of qualities, physical, emotional, intellectual, and
spiritual. A person of strong physique, even with well developed
rational faculties, could be overcome by one of less endowment in
these respects but of richer emotion and spirit. The fullest development of them all provided the most power and the most security and
influence. The crisis itself, with its display of action, aroused the emotions, stirred up the mind, required physical endurance and the
capacity to out-think competitors. It forced each individual to regard
himself as a unit in a larger total and to depend upon the group. When
an act occurred, the individuals involved perceived how intimately
they were related to the physical environment; the latter assumed
human qualities as a participant in the act, whether of battle or housebuilding or the composition of a poem. Individual persons were so
hyper-sensitive to relations with the whole that they included nature,
institutions, supernatural powers in the range of their vision, and gave
to each an individuality of its own. Thus individuals became parts of
larger individuals, and so on, until the whole might be called God.
The human and the non-human, the animate and the inanimate, the
natural and the supernatural, the finite and the infinite were made
to reflect the experience of the individual person in discovering in the
crisis the wealth of his own qualities and the dependence of his own
welfare upon that of other persons and things.
With the character of the whole culture at stake, each part or aspect
of the conflict became significant for the future of the whole. The
society was shedding one personality, one cultural structure and set of
ways, and developing another. Each person, whether artist, businessman, official, politician or pastor felt compelled to take sides and to
show in his own occupation that he was doing so. Each committed
himself by the way he handled his own job and utilized the opportunities of the situation. Each felt dependent upon the action of
others; each had friends or enemies. While many succeeded in being
acted upon rather than in acting positively, even those drab persons
'had to reveal some color, especially as the institutional facilities for
social control grew in number and efficiency. Thus, any and every act
had real or potential significance for the distribution of political power.
An aesthetic theory, the form and subject-matter of a lyric poem, could
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disclose the author's attitude toward the competing regimes as fully
as a political tract, a military deed, or the way one conducted a business. In a cultural crisis the split occurred through the whole culture,
and positions could be lost and heads topple over differences that in a
well-ordered society would arouse no interest. The content of politics
expanded to cover, potentially, everything.
The increase of opportunities for action in all fields of culture enabled an extraordinary variety of personalities and of social groups
and institutions to come forth. The disruption of the status quo released a diversity of types, some of which looked to different past ages
for a model of personal behavior and social organization and some of
which let their imagination roam into the future. The enhanced
emotionality of the situation and the breaking of rational and institutional controls made certain that many individuals would play an
historic role who otherwise would never have risen above the common
level. Neurotics, eccentric figures, male and female, and equally
eccentric institutions appeared. A greatly expanded sense of the ego
was reflected in such statements as Cogito, ergo sum. Living was
regarded as having powerful feelings, and danger as a condition most
conducive to the richest living. The participants revealed the psychological conditions of the crisis in which they lived.
The areas of knowledge and of aesthetic creativeness were broadened and deepened. The enormous variety of experience, actual or
potential, called for expression, and unless the crisis became ruthlessly
destructive, it greatly expanded the number of persons seeking to be
intellectually or spiritually active. Proponents of past ways, of the
status quo, of a diversity of plans for the future engaged in ardent
expression of their views. Since the culture was changing rapidly, ideas
and their various media constituted essential weapons of conflict. The
past had to be defended by ideas; the future could be envisaged solely
by way of ideas. Policies had to be formulated, criticised, and executed;
and any statment of policy had to assume ideological form. Individuals
were forced to handle ideas and concepts who would ordinarily never
have expected to do so. A rich imagination was required to conceive
the reality of the existing situation and the probabilities and possibilities of future development. The imagination took its place among
the essential practical tools.
Education became the object of intense interest. The advocates of
each conception of society sought to win the educational facilities for
their interests. They understood that in a period of rapidly changing
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values and social organization, education afforded a powerful instrument for shaping the future. It would embody the ideals of the society
and make them part of the mores. The statement that whoever controls
the schools controls the future came nearer to being correct than at
any other time in history. An outpouring of plans for educational
reform occurred, and some of these plans, varying in quality from
ones of pure anarchy to ones of practical idealism, led to actual experimentation. All of those persons seeking change tended to emphasize the necessity of freedom for the individual to develop his
personality; they rejected traditionalism in favor of experimentation,
and they regarded education as essential for enabling the individual
and the society to realize their potentialities. Intelligence and imagination were alike considered necessary for finding one's place in a
society in the making. New ways and new opportunities and situations
called for new skills and new kinds of training. Fundamentals had to
be worked out and elaborated in order for society to find some new
common standards. Problems of general education were acute; problems of the kinds of needed specialized training became equally acute.
The educator gained a position of social power and prestige which
he possessed at no other time.
Since a crisis implied the conflict of fundamental values, one would
rightly expect those subjects concerned with problems of values to be
especially studied. Philosophy flourished in all forms, as the thinkers
struggled with the meaning of the issues involved in the crisis. Each
individual had to take a stand on many questions of value which at
other times he would have ignored as irrelevant. He could no longer
depend upon the validity of values embedded in the social structure
and mores; he had to decide for himself. Many persons wrote philosophic works of an amateur sort, while the number of professional
philosophers increased in response to the same social need. The
questions of philosophy became topics of ardent popular and learned
- discussion and bitter controversy, and because of the practical significance of the issues led to actual physical battles and persecution.
Metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and ethics became as important
as political and economic theory. One wished to know what kind of
world this is, good or bad. The conservatives said it was bad, the
advocates of reform rejoined that it was good. What is the nature of
being? What is the basis of knowing? One side gave a pessimistic
answer, and built upon it the belief and practice of traditional
authoritarianism; the other side supported its desire for freedom and
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change by a comparably optimistic reply. The one party believed
that man could acquire real knowledge of ultimates; the other asserted
that he could not, that he had to derive it from a higher power by
revelation. The one thought that man's ability to gain true knowledge
fitted him for a life of individual responsibility; the other declared
that his dependence upon revelation for true knowledge made it
dangerous for him to act with such self-confidence and justified the
conservation of traditional discipline. The one developed a philosophy
of process and emphasized instrumentalism, the significance of the
means of change, the how as well as the what. The other formulated
a philosophy of status.
The concept of time gained social importance from the fact of
change. Each person felt alone and adrift in a rapid current, and each
had a powerful desire to learn how he came to be in that situation,
what heritage he possessed for use in the present, what others had
done in similar circumstances, and where the process of events was
taking him. Each desired arguments in favor of his proposals and his
line of conduct. Therefore, the study of history acquired significance
as a social force, for the experience of mankind as handed down from
the past plus the capacity for philosophic thought in terms of ideals
and standards provided man with the two sources for self-identification
and justification of his deeds. Man's profound concern with the present
and future led him to study the past; his conception of the present
and future was reflected in his views of the past. Both conservative and
reformer turned to the study of history, each for his own purpose, just
as they did to the study of philosophy. Each had to deal with the profound questions of change, process, development, the one to try to
diminish the social significance of change, to reduce the speed, to
show the futility of much of change, and the inability of man to understand how change occurs and to affect its course in any way, the other
to stress the decisive role man plays in change, the intimate relation
between this role and that of supernatural forces, the reality of speedy
development and of structural transformation, the reality even of
progress as an expression of divine and human achievement. Each
side turned to philosophy and to history as essential aids to action.
Theology and religion shared with philosophy and history the increased interest, for they also are concerned with ultimate questions
of human conduct. They tended to be used more by the conservatives
than by the reformers, since they inclined to discourage social initiative
and action on the part of sinful man and to stress the need for authority
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in this world as a shield against sin. The hoped-for rewards would
come, not in this world but in the next. Nonetheless, the reality of
the popular concern with theology was manifested, among others, in
the conception of fate. Since unforeseen events of decisive import for
the future of the individual were happening every day, man came to
hold a profound belief in fate. Irrespective of his own activity, he
might prosper or be destroyed. The conservative felt that this fact
should lead him to accept the status quo and to cease struggling for
change; but in a crisis the conservative dares not practice what he
preached. The reformer used the sense of fate as a stimulus to the
achievement of his objectives; for, he argued, since the unforeseeable
may strike one at any moment, one must struggle courageously as long
as one can. Success or failure may be one's lot; one has an equal
chance at either, and in either case one is not to be entirely blamed
for the outcome. In the meantime the opportunities for action are
manifold, and it is better to act than to be acted upon. The sense of
fate stimulated each side to strenuous effort.
The conflict of norms was manifested in the area of aesthetics. The
wealth of experience and of opportunities stimulated individuals to
creativeness who might not have been interested at other times or
might not have regarded their reactions as of any significance. Since
individual experience took on special meaning in a period of competing norms in all aspects of life, no one individual, group or party
could claim a monopoly on what was important. New subjects for
aesthetic creativeness arose out of actual experience so novel that the
actors felt compelled to put it in enduring form. And who could know
what was real and what not? A situation of such intense emotionalism
-a fight, the loss of one's family, the performance of an heroic act, the
sudden rise to fame, the sense of intimacy with nature, the awareness
of forces outside one's control, the presence of supernatural elements
in a natural experience-these and similar facts demanded expression.
The world of reason and of emotion, the natural and the supernatural,
seemed inseparable in every act. The outpouring of social energy
occurred in the case of the aesthetes as well as of the political figures,
the military, and others. Life and power had to be expressed in
aesthetic form. Experiments were made in relating forms to content.
The old forms might be preserved but used to express thoughts and
reactions for which they were not intended. New experience required
new forms and new combinations of forms of expression. The
vocabulary increased to describe the new experience with words of
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extreme meaning particularly popular. Literalness and rich detail
embellished a highly emotional subject, and gave it actuality and
power. Technique seemed to be admired for its own sake; ability to
sing higher than anyone else and to sustain a note longer commanded
admiration comparable to that evoked by the exploits of a warrior.
The outburst of hot emotions appeared in aesthetic form along with
the materialization of the purest ideal. Like the course of political
or military events, the change of emotions and moods was accepted as
fact, enhanced and exploited for aesthetic expression. A poem or a
piece of music was an act. It might deal with politics, economics, war,
a pastoral scene, a storm, the relation of man to God, the reality of
demons or with any of the diverse questions that plagued the individual in a crisis. No artist could be unconcerned about social
topics, political or scientific ones, religious or metaphysical. He sensed
the interdependence of society and nature and the supernatural. The
creative person sought to clarify what is real and how realities function
with respect to each other. Poets turned philosophers, scientists became musicians, artists entered politics. The aesthetes were involved
in the midst of the conflicts, whether physically or imaginatively, and
expressed the richness and confusion of the situation. They shared
in the creativeness, and, like their contemporaries in politics, economics. social organization and every other phase of life. they created
a wealth of forms and ideas and norms from which the future generations would draw until the wealth was exhausted and a new culture
appeared.
The impending cultural crisis was first reflected in the works of
aesthetically creative individuals. These persons acted as the antennae
of society; they felt the change coming and expressed it in their media
well before the change involved economics and politics and became
an actual crisis. Being most sensitive to shifting values. they perceived
the transformation of emotional life; and they expressed the developing
revolution in mores as no one else could. In the crisis. they might
lose contact with the public because of their sensitivity to change in
values. for in the crisis the public ceased to possess any common norms
and became confused. To which norms should or could the artist
appeal? As the crisis continued and experience became richer and
more varied. the artist might reflect an increasing confusion or even
chaos of forms and subjects. an increasing pessimism. He might give
such an accurate expression of the social reality that few persons
would understand him. He might reflect conditions of spirit which
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the other members of society refused to acknowledge. He gained and
he suffered from the cultural crisis as he expressed its heroic and its
tragic qualities. And as it declined in favor of some other form of
social organization, the artist's creative powers might also decline.
These powers flourished in the conditions of freedom and optimism;
they might diminish with the diminution of the richness of experience
and opportunities to express it.
When the conservative faced a cultural crisis, he acted' according
to the standards of tradition. He had a low opinion of mankind in
general and of all individuals in particular, except those who had
proved their value to him or who had traditional power. His form of
behavior ran counter to that of persons working for cultural change.
He disapproved of rationalism as a standard just as he did of emotionalism; he stood for cool calculation and poise. In evaluating a person
or situation he took both reason and the emotions into consideration,
but he placed emphasis less upon judiciousness in analysis than upon
the preservation of existing forms of social control. He stressed the
essentiality of preserving and obeying the law, knowing that thereby
he put forth his strongest moral claim to right's being on his side.
Individuals might be ousted and replaced by competent ones, he stated;
but the system, the structure, should not be touched. It had withstood the test of time. It had preserved the tradition; and if it were
undermined, evil man would wreck the good in society and violate the
will of God. The moral law required authoritarianism and opposed
any manifestation of wilfulness and egoism on the part of sinful man.
One must have faith in the validity of tradition as a guide for conduct,
and if the tradition met with serious criticism and rebellion one had
the moral duty in the name of God and the law to crush by force the
efforts toward structural change. The conservative's manner of thinking and acting conformed to the pattern of his total way of life. As a
believer in the old order he could not accept defeat without a fight.
To him it was total war, and only under physical compulsion administered in a decisive military conflict was he willing to accept the
inevitability of compromise which marked the beginning of the end
of his way of life. The conflict might be in the form of a revolution
or civil war, or it might consist of a foreign war, for the loss of which
his way of life was held responsible. It might and usually did consist
of a combination of the two. It was also true that economic selfinterest helped to undermine the patriarchal or authoritarian way of
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life to which the conservative was accustomed. But in every case, the
final coup was applied by physical force. The Old Regime died hard.
The opponents of the conservatives consisted of a motley array of
individuals and groups upholding a diversity of standards; but all had
to substantiate the validity of their ideals for the future by appealing
to some ultimate authority. Some emphasized the role of reason, and
some of revelation as the source of knowledge; but all of them adhered
to a set of complex criteria for true knowledge and action which
ranged from reason to intuition and fantasy. For them, knowledge
could no longer be compassed by rationalism; they saw irrational
actions every day by others and by themselves. The emotions guided
them and enriched and stimulated the operations of the mind, and
pressed them on from intellectual activity to the deed. In the absence
of norms, they had to feel their way into one strange situation after
the other. The heart appeared to offer a surer guide than the pure
reason, for the other individuals were also behaving in a highly emotional manner. So they had to trust often to instinct, and they learned
that it was wise to do so. Rationalism ceased to be attractive or convincing in its bare form, whether Marxian or that of the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment. The connection between reason and emotion
led to a view of reason as part of a total process of thinking which
included them both plus imagination. The world seemed full of
fantastic actions and beings; the fantasy received stimuli of novel kind
and intensity. The supernatural appeared as real as the natural.
Mystery, the infinite, the divine were manifested in the actions of man
and society keyed to superhuman efforts by the exigencies of the crisis
situation. Individuals performed miracles of valor, of leadership, of
production in the endeavor to create a new culture to last for centuries. The divine seemed to enter into man and enable him to
achieve the impossible. Emotion provided so rich a source of stimulation and assurance that man came together with man and with the
transcendental forces for a period of almost pure activity. Some of it
was destructive, some was creative; but for a time the individuals
formed a social unity in a condition of relative freedom from institutional compulsion. The situation brought them together in voluntary
effort. The emotional ties were so powerful that for the time being
they did not need institutional bonds. The heart united them more
firmly than any conservative compulsion would be able to.
As soon as the common pressure of the situation of danger was
released, the emotional attitudes became varied, the individuals fell
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apart, the objectives became as diverse as the hearts and instincts. In
the absence of some common denominators, some universals, some
institutions of general acceptance, some rationalistic standards, the
unity of individuals gave way to chaos. A dictatorship was established
as the means of achieving some kind of order. And since the emotional outburst had led to extreme activity and daring and creativeness
beyond human expectation, it was curbed by the exercise of force of
an equally extreme character. The dictator fought emotion with emotion, heart with heart, instinct with instinct, until he calmed the outburst and established institutional controls. Then the future depended
upon whether the dictator had the statesmanship to relax his power
as social structure became once more strong and to turn over the
controls to society; or whether power begat fear of reprisals and evil
actions on his part, and led him to ever more repression and the use
of brutality. In the latter case society would be destined to stagnate
except in those areas of significance to the dictator, or another revolution would have to occur to overthrow the dictator set up to curb the
anarchy and violence of the first revolution. Society might then
oscillate between two revolutions, one against a dictator, after which
another dictatorship had to be established in order to overcome the
chaos. The oscillation would apparently be stopped only when a
dictator had the statesmanship to lead his society back to a peaceful,
well-adjusted, free culture.

Chapter IV

THE SOCIETY OF BIGNESS
As used in these studies the concept bigness refers not merely to
something quantitative but to something qualitative. Size alone may
enable an institution to be called large-scale, but in its complete form
bigness implies a wide-spread participation of human beings. Thus as
we shall see, it is most fully realized in the society of process, where
every individual shares actively in the conduct of affairs; and it is
achieved only in part in the societies of power and rigidity wherein
most human being are subordinated to the dictates of an elite. In
the former all appropriate organizations become large, whereas in the
latter bigness is restricted to instruments of authoritarian control and
is not tolerated in those areas of life which among free people constitute the main realm of social activity. From some areas it is excluded by the nature of things: love and family life cannot be gauged
by magnitude; but wherever large-scale activity becomes established
in an industrial culture it tends to expand into all aspects, and can
only be prevented from doing so by physical force.
The characteristic of bigness gives our culture a unique position in
history. Almost any civilization of the past offers a few examplesa king or emperor, a bureaucracy, an army, even a busines!, enterprise; but none was permeated by its ideals and practices. None was
able to rise above the limits imposed by the fact that its constituent
elements were small and that bigness consisted of control by one
individual or body over a great diversity of little units. The Roman
emperor commanded a large empire; but, apart from some interdependence through commerce and defence and superimposed government, the empire remained an accumulation of almost self-sufficient
localities. The thinking of the populace was concentrated upon the
small units of life of which each person was a part, and tended to
consider the imperial action not as emanating from something large
which each should strive to copy but as imposed upon its small world.
Bigness meant for peoples prior to our culture the exception, that
which affected their lives from outside, not something of which they
were an integral, functioning part, not something which they should
try to achieve in their own social relations. It offered no set of insti39
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tutions and ways for the organization of all elements of society, no
objectives for each individual.
In contrast, our own culture has institutionalized bigness to such
an extent that every individual is affected by it with respect to the
essentials of his way of life. Each person tends to wish to be something
on a large scale and to belong to something of similar Size. Each feels
the impact of bigness within himself, psychologically and materially.
We do not consider the essential forces in our lives to be restricted to
our locality or area; we know that large institutions and forces affect
us to a far greater extent than the local ones are able to do. We find
the criterion of size so embedded in our thinking that we have the
greatest difficulty in imagining the nature of living in any other kind
of society, and have to develop special techniques in anthropology,
sociology, and psychology for studying the strange and curious behavior of a so-called primitive, a non-big, people.
The cultural pattern of bigness has developed with the machine
process. The existence of the one depends upon that of the other, and
follows it in point of time as fast as the machine creates the appropriate
material conditions. The relationship explains why this almost universal devotion to large size among us remained unknown to earlier
cultures. The modern power-driven machine is able to produce a vast
number of identical articles and thus makes quantity production possible. This requires the acquisition of quantity materials for the machine and the distribution of the masses of finished goods turned out
by the machine. The machine institutionalizes quantification and
creates opportunities for more and more people to exist. People can
find work providing materials for the machine, planning, improving,
manufacturing, tending the machine, selling and distributing the machine's products. The number of human beings that can be supported
by this quantifier depends upon the ingenuity of man in utilizing the
services of the new instrument, and in this respect man has to his
credit a large degree of success.
The machine process cannot exist without bigness. Machines are
costly: they require large amounts of capital and entail the expansion
of existing and the formation of new organs of credit. Banking and
insurance corporations develop to meet this need. Instruments are
created which draw together funds from millions of small sources.
Individuals are tied to the organization and ways of bigness by little
sums which in the aggregate provide the vast amounts needed by the
machine. Circulation and turn-over of goods and of money are
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speeded up. The machine renders functional material, space, and
time. It makes bigness possible not merely by the increased use of
materials, the increased exploitation of a. given unit 9f space, but by
the accelerated utilization of a given unit of time. Thus it helps to
supply its own resources by augmenting the instances of turn-over, by
opening up the possibility of profit at each instance and the accumulation of greater funds for its own use and for the advantage of society.
The institutional result is bigness.
Our machine culture inherited the instruments of bigness which
had emerged out of medieval society. Three, the national state, the
government and the army, were of special importance, with a fourth,
the church, occupying in our culture a much lesser role. The three
all pertain to the field of politics and political power, and have proved
adept at taking advantage of the facilities provided by economic and
technological bigness. That they alone were unable to permeate society
with the ways of bigness must be apparent. Except in times of crisis,
which lasted only for a few years, they were incapable by themselves
of supplying the means for creating patterns of social behavior in the
mould of bigness. Without the resources and habits engendered by the
machine process they would have remained instruments of domination
by the few over the indifferent many. Once the machine assured the
existence of these resources, psychological as well as material, the
political elements were able to make vigorous use of them; but in
doing so, as we shall see, they have run the risk of becoming themselves
transformed.
Irrespective of the area or purpose, bigness requires a certain type
of organization. Government, army, industry, bank, commerce, trade
union, press, education, social clubs, church-once they expand beyond
the local level with face-to-face relations among the members, they
must develop institutions for handling quantity. The larger they grow,
the more need they feel for the organization of these functions. This
fact creates the bases for common patterns of behavior.
The participation of large numbers in a common enterprise
necessitates interdependence of the units, a decrease in the degree of
self-dependence, and an increase in the amount of division of function.
The fact of interdependence precludes the possibility of each person's
deciding all matters for himself and creates common problems of
governance. To solve them bigness has developed two means: the
profession of leadership and the bureaucracy. The first continues the
tradition of earlier cultures set by kings, aristocrats, priests and the
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like, but elaborates the occupational range of leadership and the kind
of professional training required. The other acts as the leaders' instrument of operation in acquiring information, formulating plans, and
executing agreed·upon policies. It tends to expand its functions pari
passu with the elaboration of the structure of society; for, as the parts
of a society become interdependent, they place increasing responsibility upon the central administrative agency.
In any culture of bigness the term "division of labor" does not
accurately describe the relationships. It stresses the separateness of the
parts. It applies to a pre·machine industrial age more than to our
present one. A concept like the commonalty of labor or functional
interdependence expresses the characteristics of our society by emphasizing the necessity of cooperative activity in large organizations.
The term division of labor could be used without the participants
being conscious of the mutual dependence of all members of the
group, irrespective of the role which they have in it. The phrase
functional interdependence describes the reality, and recognizes the
necessity for functional diversity within the framework of the totality.
Thus, some are policy-formulators, some are managers, some are
bureaucrats, some are technicians, some are unskilled workers: while
e'ach contributes his essential part, each depends upon the reliable
and efficient performance of the others. All act as members of an
interdependent society, whether it be an industry, a bank, a university,
a trade union, a state, a world culture.
The extent to which bigness entails planning may be clarified by a
comparison with the situation in a society of simple relations and
problems like that of a Swiss forest canton. In such a canton each
family is able to fill almost all its basic needs, and few problems remain
for common action by the entire citizen body. When these few problems arise, the citizens meet together, solve them, and once more disperse to their separate ways of life. In the society of bigness the machine process requires guidance; its quantification of society creates
numerous social and political problems which can only be resolved by
planning, and thus the ways o'f planning permeate the entire culture.
Large-scale production of goods brings about a comparable increase
in the size of the population, which makes for social and political
complications requiring the services of expert personnel to plan and
administer affairs for them. The process of bigness tends to impose its
patterns of organization and action upon all the major aspects of life.
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The structure of organization which bigness has developed as appropriate to its needs is that of hierarchy. Two conditions appear to
make it necessary: one is the complexity of function; the other is
policy-making or planning. Since the two act as parts of one process,
they create a hierarchy as an instrument which reflects the variety of
interests of the group involved and at the same time enables plans and
policies to direct the action of all members of the group. It would be
difficult if not impossible to conceive of a large organization built upon
principles of absolute equality: the two terms seem utterly incompatible. Wherever bigness obtains, a chain of command becomes essential
to hold it together, and chain of command means hierarchy.
Whether the hierarchical order of superior-inferior is employed as
a necessary means of organizing bigness for efficiency of operation or
whether it is allowed to degenerate into an instrument of authoritarianism, poses a fundamental question. Experience seems to show that
either line of action is possible. The Nazis and communists and some
of our own leaders have taken the way of authoritarianism; but the
nature of bigness seems to incline in the other direction. A certain
degree of discipline appears to be as essential in group action as a
certain amount of monotonous routine. They both enhance the
economy of operation. It makes a great difference in the happiness of
the persons and in the efficiency of the organization, however, whether
the discipline is largely self-imposed by the individual or whether it
is enforced by police or other coercive means. There is no reason why
in a free and efficiently-run society the former should not be the case.
The point appears to be decisive when the role of the system of
representation is considered in relation to bigness. The distinction
must again be drawn between a society characterized throughout by
large-scale, functional organizations and one in which certain aspects
are so organized while others consist of agglomerations of isolated
units under one instrument of control. In the former case the principle
of representation must be applied in order for the parts to operate
together. In the latter case the principle will not be applied except as
a cover for the concentration of power, and some form of authoritarianism will obtain.
Our kind of society could not exist without bigness. We could not
support our population; we could not govern ourselves; we could not
maintain our cultural facilities. Large size not merely enables us to
supply the material resources for our way of life; it also provides us
with the social, cultural, and political institutions and mores of
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democracy. That it can be abused for other types of culture does not
detract from the fact that in its absence we could not survive.
The basic advantage of bigness for our society is derived from the
fact that the machine process enables output to be expanded while up
to a shifting limit cost is being reduced. The little man is able to afford
goods which formerly the elite of society alone could buy. Mass production has created the economic foundation of democracy. The
raising of the standard of living of the masses to unprecedented
heights has been accompanied by the great improvement in economic
security. Famines and the like no longer occur except in crises induced
by other than economic forces; and even unemployment has ceased
to be the nightmare that it was in the earlier years of modern industrialism. A combination of activities by government, corporations,
and trade unions can assure the individual against the hardships of
unemployment, sickness, and old age. Bigness in economic institutions
has become able to exercise a stabilizing influence upon the economy
by virtue of its interest in planning, in anticipating and providing
means to overcome economic disturbances, and by virtue of its material
resources to carry out these policies. Small industries could never set
these objectives as realistic and achievable, for they lack the economic
power. As for indulging in nostalgic wishes for the return of the days
prior to bigness, we would not accept the price in sacrifice of other
things that we should have to pay. We have given demographic and
material hostages to the fortune of large-scale production.
The favorable judgment is confirmed by a consideration of the
social implications of bigness. The usual social condemnation is based
upon two counts: one, that any large-scale enterprise, whether in
business, government, army, or what not, imposes ypon all the members except a few at the top a change from a position of independence
to one of dependence, that it forces a relation of superior-inferior upon
its participants; two, that in the name of rationalization and reduction
of cost it destroys the psychological satisfaction of individual work and
requires the members to endure monotony and routine. These criticisms are based on absolute standards of value which do not consider
the factors of time and potentialities and avoid the question of realistic
alternatives.
The condemnation on the ground of monotony may be countered
by a glance at history or at any contemporary society remaining in
the happy condition of pre-industrialism. The amount of incredibly
hard work, of monotonous repetition of simple necessary acts, the low
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position of women or of men, the exploitation of child labor, these
and many more signs explain why, apart from a few exceptions with
vested interests, peoples in such condition adapt themselves with
enthusiasm to the materials of a culture of bigness. Neither man nor
woman of such cultures objects to the aid of a labor-saving machine
or to the stir and stimulation of urban life. What they do object to
is poverty and wretchedness in the midst of plenty; but one cannot
blame bigness for the existence of conditions, which man as a rational
being can abolish.
It cannot be denied that modern industry and office have preserved
in a new form a great deal of routine and monotonous work. They
have done so for the sake of economy of operations, which means reduction in cost, which in turn brings articles within the price range
of more people and makes living easier than before. A certain amount
of monotonous routine seems to be necessary in any line of work, from
preparing canvases for painting, to taking notes for writing a book,
to turning a screw in the manufacture of a car. 1£ we had the choiceand we do not-between living in a society in which shoes are made by
hand and one in which they are made by machines, we would scarcely
hesitate about a decision. Cobbling for fourteen or more hours a day
on a shoe, then starting another one tomorrow, opens up a tiresome
vista of making shoes for the rest of one's life. Handling a machine
for manufacturing shoes cannot be much more tedious, lasts only eight
or so hours a day, and may be changed for another job. Which is
preferable?
The other criticism, that of bigness's having substituted a condition
of dependence for one of independence, may seem at first sight to disclose a grave danger to democracy. The relation of superior-inferior
might destroy the social bases of our equality by developing in time
the habits of status, depriving individuals of the sense of their own
importance and destroying thereby the foundation of personal initiative. Such a situation of dependence could transform us into an
authoritarian society with a hereditary elite and a hereditary class of
subjects. Should this condition come to be, the sources of our way of
life would dry up and we should go down in history as another deadend culture.
1£ we allow our culture to degenerate in this manner, the fault will
lie with us; for bigness provides numerous kinds of inducement to
achieve the opposite result. In the first place, large-scale operations in
any field create occupations of unprecedented number and diversity.
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Members perceive a scale of ascent or descent before them which stimulates their activity as much as, or even more than, any peasant was
ever aroused by the possibility of purchasing a neighboring piece of
land. In our society occupational mobility is not merely possible;
it is essential. Competition in the form of Adam Smith's< days may
have declined, but it has been vigorously preserved within and among
the institutions of bigness. Bureaucrats, army officers, employees,
church officials vie with one another in their respective spheres for
advancement just as a big corporation or a small business does with
its competitors. In fact, the plums have as much richness and color
in a culture of bigness as they ever had in the days of kings, nobles,
and captains of industry, and they are far more numerous and definitely within reach of anyone with the necessary competence. Bigness
has placed a premium upon ability to an unprecedented extent. Since
it concentrates so much influence, since its actions are so loaded with
social significance, it has to nurse and cultivate talent and subject its
prospective leaders to the severest tests of competition.
Bigness in our culture of industrialism involves the exercise of
such pressure from within and without that it cannot remain static.
Members are constantly threatened by the loss of position and by decline. A comparison of the relative security of the position of a king
or nobleman in the Old Regime and of a corporation or a corporation
president in ours will reveal the difference. The machine process has
introduced a dynamic force into the essence of our culture. It keeps
the culture alive and subjects it to constant change. The main force
for change affecting the Old Regime, that of international power
politics, never had any comparable consistency and persistence. Its
pressure was usually sporadic and did not lead to requiring such
constant attention. The dynamic character of the large-scale machine
process offers constant inducement to improve the process, to exploit
it with more efficiency. It keeps alive competition among industries
and among existing leaders or aspirants for their position. The stir
which it makes causes change to be felt all down the line and affords,
at all levels of influence, the opportunity for potential ability to compete for advancement.
In the organizations of bigness of primarily a non-economic character, if one may use a term in a loose sense (for every organization
has more or less an economic aspect), organizations like those of a
government, trade union, church, and social groups, the competition
for position occurs as vigorously as in a corporation. Likewise various
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units within an organization compete with each other for influence
and personnel and expansion of function. It is a well established
method of handling a bureaucracy to assign a similar responsibility
to several agencies, and after observing the results of this interesting
civilian warfare to decide upon what needs to be done and who can
perform the work with most efficiency. A government bureaucracy in
the pre-industrial society could go gently to sleep and remain dormant
for centuries. Large-scale activity makes this condition of bureaucratic
bliss irp.possible. The machine keeps whirring, the materials continue
to be transformed, society keeps alive and dynamic, changes constantly
occur: the government and other institutions of bigness might like to
take a nap but they are not allowed to. They are at all times confronted with new situations, new problems, new opportunities; and
they are subjected to ever-new pressure from within and without to
employ their resources in the service of society. Ambition and individual initiative among their members press them into action from
within; the play of interests in search of assistance acts upon them
from without. Rugged individualism and laissez-faire competition
continue an active life within as well as among the organizations of
bigness. No such opportunities and incentives on so wide a scale have
ever existed in any other culture. Even the Athenians of Pericles' day
had slaves and the Metics.
The conditions of employment in big organizations tend to develop
traits of character which were much less essential for success in a preindustrial culture. Are these traits of advantage or disadvantage to
the cultivation of a personality? The fundamental social fact in any
organization utilizing the services of large numbers is that the members must be able to cooperate with each other, with their equals in
the hierarchy, and, what is more difficult, with persons above and below them in rank. If one were to turn back to the Old Regime for
light on this problem, one would find that the nobles in particular
cultivated the art of living and working easily with colleagues. In spite
of profound differences between the aristocratic way of life and that
of a member of a modern large organization, one may deduce from
this aristocratic precedent the self-evident conclusion that the ability
to cooperate with one's colleagues may be regarded as a blessing to be
desired and cultivated. The coordination of function within our
modern organizations can therefore have a beneficial educational influence in favor of a well-balanced personality. Respect for the
qualities and the views of others can be inculcated by way of this ex-
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perience as much as, or even more than, in some small private business
or profession.
The indispensability of bigness for creating the foundations for
democracy may be most clearly seen in the case of the trade union.
Prior to our culture the history of the world had concerned itself
almost entirely with the elite. The little man acted the anonymous
part of slave, serf, laborer, craftsman, or trader. In case a society began
as a democracy, it soon ceased to be, for the citizens lacked the institutions and the material means of cooperating. The handling of common
problems, few in number because of local self-sufficiency, tended to
fall into the hands of a small group, particularly since these common
problems were chiefly of a political or military character and thus
were rarely acute. When they did become important, they would be
extremely so; and under ambitious or unscrupulous leadership they
could easily be used to augment authority and ultimately to overthrow
democracy. In consequence, democratic ways could be preserved only
in small societies like those of the forest cantons of Switzerland or of
towns and small cities where all citizens could come together in person
for the transaction of business.
The little man first became recognized as a positive historical
force when the political and social ideals of the Enlightenment prepared the way for his rise and modern industrialism began to create
more of his kind. The functional interdependence of our culture of
bigness has given importance to the lowest order of society and afforded its members the opportunity and the inducement to organize
into associations able to counter-balance the weight of the corporations
and other instruments of authority. The result has been the achievement of equality in certain essentials in a society of inequality in
other essentials. The ordinary worker knows that both the president
and himself are important to the corporation and to society. In past
cultures the little man might have felt materially secure as slave or
serf or as a member of the church hierarchy; but, apart from the last
named one, those positions all imposed upon the occupants a feeling
of dependence that must have hurt. One can see in Aristophanes'
The Wasps how hungrily the old men clung to a position of personal influence. Our culture has created something new in history by enabling
all pe?ple to achieve social security and social prestige on a free and
equalitarian basis. Through trade unions and political parties the
little man, the most endangered member of every society, has acquired
large stature. The psychological basis of democratic equality and
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individual actIvIty not merely within the union but in CIVIC and
political affairs is thereby maintained.
Prior to our own culture, none has ever been able to afford the
variety of services for the improvement of living that we have to offer.
Not even kings and nobles could obtain the professional assistance
that has with us become commonplace; and a cursory comparison between the conditions of life in" India and in Denmark will reveal the
striking fact that bigness in the exploitation of wealth has enabled
the geographically small and by nature poor state of Denmark to afford
for everyone medical and dental care, engineering, and numerous other
services which in wealthy but unorganized India remain the luxuries
of the few. The expansion of tertiary industry, to employ the technical
term which designates commerce, the professions and other forms of
service, depends upon the presence of organized facilities for the
exploitation of resources and the general increase and popular distribution of wealth. The close correlation between bigness in the utilization of those resources and the prerequisites for diffusing society with
the achievements makes it evident that large organizations afford the
essential means for turning the natural wealth of a country into forms
available to the people. A large population requires institutions of
proportionate dimensions to help it raise the standard of living. The
task must be done by self-help, not by imposition from above; and
large-scale instruments alone can enable the population to participate
in a common endeavor. Of course, bigness has to develop in accordance
with the ability of the people to utilize it; but it must develop, or the
society will be unable to support the tertiary industries.
Among these tertiary services may be listed education and research.
Magnitude and complexity in a culture render education more essential than ever before. Society can no longer depend upon natural
laws and rugged individualism to assure itself of sufficient intellectual
resources. Complexity entails intellectual planning, an interest in
education and research on the part of business, social organizations,
government, and so on. The dependence of each of these units upon
the welfare of the whole society imparts to them a concern with the
common denominator, the educational institutions. The latter reflect
the nature of the society in which they function; and in a culture of
t~ bigness they assume similar proportions because of the responsibilities
placed upon them. Thus, in our culture, schools and universities tend
to become big and to require large sums for maintenance. In a society
of social science, chemistry and physics and other expensive fields of
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study, the one-room country school is an anachronism. It survives
from the days when an education could be obtained from a few Greek
and Latin grammars. Under present conditions it is producing a
person who, except incidentally and through means outside of school,
is deprived of knowledge or experience of the major forces of our
world. The college or university which fails to accept the reality of
bigness, not necessarily in size of plant but certainly in curriculum,
remains at its level in a similar stage.
The significance of bigness for intellectual life may be observed
in the situation in a small country. A state like Norway lacks the
material resources, the personnel, and the wealth to emulate the educational and research activities of this country. Its industries cannot
provide the funds to support any such system or absorb the skilled
personnel which might be trained. Since the nation would have to
export its brain power, it prefers to forego the effort involved. It is
forced by the smallness of its size to rely upon the large-scale educational facilities of foreign countries or to cooperate with other small
ones and, like laborers in a trade union, to create a big organization
out of several little ones. One cannot conceive of our educational institutions being able to train professional personnel and other experts
without the market and the resources which bigness affords, and one
cannot imagine bigness surviving very long without this emphasis
upon intellectual activities. Magnitude in one necessitates the same
scale in the other.
It has been said that our industrial society is hostile to aesthetic
expression, and that the pre-machine cultures gave more encouragement to this aspect of man's life. An exact answer to this assertion
would be difficult to make, but the existing evidence appears to be in
favor of our present culture. Bigness has enormously increased the
stimuli to aesthetic activity. It has provided the artist with new subject matter, new materials, new outlets, new opportunities on an unprecedented scale. If a creative individual tires of the subjects, forms
and sounds of our age, he has the resources of history at his disposal.
If he seeks living reality of a different kind, by a few hours' travel he
can be in a pre-industrial society and like Gauguin refresh his soul
with the primitive.
Cultural achievement has heretofore been that of a small elite;
big industrialism has enabled individuals from all social and economic
levels with aesthetic talent to cultivate their abilities and to enrich
society. A large population of highly diversified interests and tastes
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offers a far greater number of potentially creative persons than any
preceding culture. If, as is probable, each age produces about as great
a proportion of potential artists as any other, a larger population
should at least supply a greater number of creators. Although the
multiplier principle of modern economics may not be entirely applicable to this field, one may venture the assertion that the greater
number of stimuli plus modern opportunities for development should
increase the number of persons of aesthetic ability by several fold.
\\lith the increase of wealth, the expansion of education, the
utilization of advertising, and the growth of the feeling of public
responsibility for the good life, the number of purchasers or other
supporters of aesthetic works has enormously increased. The market
for art works has expanded to such an extent that even trade unions,
ordinary workers and farmers occasionally or fairly frequently buy
something aesthetic or support artistic creativeness by way of taxation.
The days when an artist depended solely upon the support of a king,
noble or wealthy burgher, a church or a town government are past.
Anyone casually familiar with the half·servant position of Mozart will
appreciate the vast improvement in social prestige and in sheer material independence which creative persons enjoy in modern times.
The democratization of aesthetics, even if not complete, is occurring
and society is the richer for it. Bigness has won a victory in the area
in which it was not expected.
In spite of these gains the one field of life in which bigness has
accomplished least has to do with the practical utilization of the
humanities and the social sciences. The machine has improved material conditions; it has most likely reduced greatly the amount of
drudgery in life and monotony in the process of production. But it
has accomplished very little with respect to the use of leisure time. The
popular humanistic interest remains largely restricted to movies,
comics, the radio, and the beer parlor. Little opportunity is available
for the mass of the population to become aware of the possibilities of
creative activity. Metropolitan and even urban living in general sometimes exemplifies conditions at their worst. The possibilities of decentralization are known, but have scarcely as yet begun to be realized.
Nonetheless, bigness is enabling us to create facilities for improving
all those aspects of life. It produces enough wealth for us to afford
them, and it establishes agencies and trains persons with vested interests in achieving them. Business, government, trade unions, educational institutions, and all the other large groups of modern life
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show evidence of being astir in this work, each stimulating and competing with the other in experimentation; and there is strong reason
for hope.
Bigness in economic activity entails organization of commensurate
size in the area of political life. Not merely does large-scale economy
create numerous and complex situations for society which demand
action by a large-scale public authority, but big business requires
services from government of such magnitude that political bigness becomes necessary. The expansion of political responsibility occurs on
both a vertical and a horizontal plane, exactly like the economic expansion. The functions of government increase, and more bureaucracy
is added. At the same time the geographic coverage of political interest grows and expands. If a people are not politically united into a
national state, they become so; if they are, they may wish to acquire
colonies; if they are too small to become! colonial powers, they find
other means than through ownership of territory to expand their
interest abroad. Indeed, in a culture of bigness all states, large or
small, follow the extension of their multifarious interests abroad and
in so doing lay the foundations for the United Nations.
The field of power politics may be used as an example of the
interrelationship of political and economic bigness. National or state
defense has proved to be dependent upon the relative size of the
organizations within the state. Big business has become the bulwark
of military effort, as indispensable as a large population and army.
Subject to the degree of efficiency shown, the country with a large,
highly developed bureaucracy has as great an advantage over one without such an instrument of administration as a large state has over a
small one. Let any skeptic in doubt about the significance of magnitude reflect upon the recent fate of Czechoslovakia.
As large-scale organizations have developed they have tended to
assume responsibility and exert influence far beyond the limits of
their immediate interest. Political, economic, social, and cultural forces
can scarcely be separated from each other. Each expresses merely a
facet of a total culture, and merges so immediately into the others that
one has difficulty in distinguishing among them. As a few examples
will reveal, the dynamic character of bigness imposes a functional
interdependence upon the parts. A business may be said to be an
economic enterprise. If it remains small, it affects society primarily
in the economic sphere; but a large corporation employing hundreds
of thousands of persons, using the capital resources of several million
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individuals, turning out products essential for the maintenance of the
standard of living of an entire nation and operating on a budget of
hundreds of millions or possibly several billions of dollars, can scarcely
be regarded as purely or mainly an economic institution. It has constitutional and political problems within its own corporate limits
which are similar to those of government. Its decision to locate a
branch factory in a town or to remove it to another place may spell
prosperity or ruin to the community. Its policy on dividends may
affect the standard of living of a population the size of that of Belgium
or larger. Its salary and wage scale may determine whether its employees work in peace or in a state of potential or actual rebellion.
Its demands upon government for free services may impose heavy
burdens of general taxation. Its influence upon political parties may
be too powerful to withstand. It may support an orchestra and a
theater for its employees; it may increase the wealth of the community
to the point of enabling the people to afford exceptional schools and
entertainment. Is the corporation an economic, a political, a social,
or a cultural institution? The answer seems to be self-evident: it is
all of these, with its primary purpose being economic but with its
impact being total.
Perhaps one might argue that a trade union differs from a corporation in that its interest remains exclusively social, that is, concerned
with the social welfare of its members. We know from experience
during recent decades, especially in some European countries, that a
trade union depends for its success upon the welfare of the business
and of the nation, or the world, of which it is a part. It has economic
interests in common with business, and participates in politics along
with all other elements of a society. Its cultural enterprises may be
even more developed than those of a corporation. Again, one must
conclude that it operates within the total culture, has interests in all
aspects, and differs from the other elements, the corporation and the
like, solely in that it approaches the whole from the angle of labor.
A similar analysis of the role of a church, a consumers' organization, or a national association of club women would arrive at a similar
answer; and, as for the role of government, the evidence is so clear that
one may overlook the similarity between its interests and functions and
those of a trade union, a corporation, and the other kinds of big
organizations. The ease with which persons at all levels transfer from
employment in government to that in business, a trade union or other
large·scale institution tells its own story. Public interest and private
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interest can no longer be sharply separated; they express at most
differences in degrees, and we are in need of new terms to denote not
merely their differences but their commonalty.
The new concept of property or wealth may offer further evidence
of the intermingling of public and private affairs brought about by
bigness. Property formerly meant something tangible, a piece of land,
a house, a factory. For most people the term now refers to economic.
social, political or cultural rights in some enterprise. One may own
stocks in a corporation, bonds of private or governmental origin; one
may have pension rights from a corporation or social security claims
upon a government; one counts upon the right to free education and
other additions to real income; one enjoys certain material advantages
from membership in a trade union. In addition one may own a piece
of tangible property; but in the aggregate one counts all these sources
of material aid as property or its equivalent, and would hardly bother
to consider whether they belong in the category of private property or
derive from public sources. A pension remains a pension, whatever
anonymous organization, private or public, pays it.
International conflict has partaken of the character of the large
dimensions of our modern society, for war provides a frank and ruthless indicator of the nature of the societies involved. At the same time
that bigness has made possible these inclusive holocausts, it has established the foundation for international peace. We are still living in
accordance with the practices of international relations of relatively
small and, in comparison with our own, relatively powerless states.
What could an army of Louis XIV or Napoleon accomplish against
one trained and equipped in modern ways? Those relatively small
states lived in a sufficiently self-dependent manner to be able to go to
war occasionally and even profit from the outcome. In our culture of
bigness and interdependence; the continuation of practices from an
entirely different kind of society has proved to be ruinous. This fact
has pointed the way to a solution. The big state, the big corporation,
the big trade union have created the beginnings of a world society
without which the United Nations would be impossible. For the first
time in history mankind has the facilities for achieving world peace.
While national prosperity and national defence depend upon largescale activity, international organization and the foundations of peace
rest equally upon this solid structure, and by virtue of the inclusive
geographic and functional range of bigness the two interests, the
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national and the international, are becoming supplementary or even
identical.
The study of modern dictatorship lends evidence to the view that
these authoritarian regimes are established where the organizations
of bigness have not penetrated or where they have done their work
but partially. Russia, China, Spain, most of Italy, the new states of
Eastern and Southeastern Europe were all countries of agrarianism
and slight industrialization, of undeveloped tertiary services and
government. They had not created the institutions of bigness necessary to enable the population to utilize its own resources. The one
possible exception to this general statement is Germany; but even this
country had cultivated bigness only in certain lines and had not allowed it to expand beyond the limits imposed by the desire on the part
of the elite to continue to dominate over the rest of the population.
The army, the bureaucracy, big industry, and large landed estates were
used for this purpose, with the educational system and the political
system both suffering from class restrictions imposed upon them, with
trade unions struggling to become accepted as legitimate parts of the
society, and with other social organizations of the potentially free and
initiating type (e.g., League of Women Voters) conspicuous by their
absence or so specialized in function as to have little or no influence
upon the whole society. As a body of institutions enabling a total
society to work freely together, bigness did not exist in Germany.
In many areas of life bigness cannot function effectively. These
have to do with the highly subjective aspects of man's life, the regions
in which man cultivates his personality or maintains his dignity and
sense of value of himself. They concern direct inter-personal relations,
and involve one in the intimacies of the many face-to-face situations of
life. The most striking example may be offered by artistic creativeness.
No amount of bigness, of mass production, of bureaucratism can do
other than introduce and maintain conditions most suitable for individual self-expression; for, Stalin notwithstanding, the creative act
is a personal, subjective one, and cannot be coerced or ordered from
above. Intellectual activity requires a large degree of freedom for the
individual: the material must be shaped in one mind or by the common action of a congenial, cooperative group, each member on the
alert to be creative. The intimacy and joy of family life can be
furthered by bigness, but they are not subject to its beck and call and
can easily be destroyed by it.
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The greatest problem arising out of bigness so far has to do with
these inter-personal relations. How can one retain the qualities of
humanness, of neighborliness, in a corporation, a government, or any
other large institution? How can one make certain that inducements
and channels for advancement remain numerous and open, and that
personal ability is esteemed? While we have by no means found the
answer, it does appear that bigness stimulates an awareness of these
problems and by way of the study of personnel administration and
other kindred subjects seeks to solve them. In doing so it receives
assistance from other instruments in our society. As long as educational opportunities remain open, as long as taxation prevents fortunes
from becoming too hereditary and providing the basis for a caste
organization of society, we shall remain what one author has called
an "open society." The nature of bigness seems to incline in this
direction. It imposes such responsibility upon its leaders and diffuses
responsibility at so many levels that it must have ability at its disposal. If one organization falters and inclines to stagnate, others will
take its place. If business does not perform up to standard, government,
trade unions, cooperatives and the like will take over. And behind
them all is the spur of knowledge.
Herein lies the greatest source of hope for society. The existence
of big organizations in all aspects of life assures the continuation of
competition and the spur to individual initiative and creativeness.
As we have seen, each has an interest in all aspects, and is therefore
in a position from its standpoint to stir up the others and threaten
them with new competitive action. None has the same interests
exactly as the others; each has a different social basis for its strength,
and therefore would have difficulty in aligning tightly with others to
establish a new rigidity. If corporation and trade union form a
monopoly, the government backed by all the voters, the educational
institutions backed by knowledge, the church, may join forces to disrupt it. A system of checks and balances is established within an interdependent society, a society that realizes the essential value of both
competition and cooperation, and that utilizes both to preserve freedom. Once the full array of large organizations exists, the possibility
of authoritarianism declines to insignificance.
In a developed soicety bigness is under constant pressure to cater
to the public and perform services of value. Each organization must
cultivate public relations; an entirely new subject of study springs up,
and public service becomes intellectualized and institutionalized.
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Vested interests develop to watch over the improvement of public
relations, and once again democracy is protected by formalizing the
means of its own furtherance. The multiplicity of interests which
bigness makes possible for each of its organizational units assures the
existence of things in common with many elements in society and enhances that essential sense of representation on the part of each
individual and each institution. The wider the interests, the more
diverse the kinds of organizations, especially of a private origin, the
greater is the vitality of freedom. The failure on the part of a society
to organize these many private spontaneous associations with their
multifarious purposes should be considered as a most serious symptom
of decay and a warning of the approach of the would-be panacea of
authoritarianism. The great danger from bigness to the society of
freedom lies in the possible establishment of monopoly, whether in a
business, in politics (dictatorship and one-party system), or in any other
line of activity. As long as we can maintain the conditions of competition, bigness as such is not a curse but a blessing.
Bigness should be a self-regulating system of freedom. In some
parts the government operates with most efficiency; in others, the educational system; in others, the church; in others, business. There is no
need to demand that they all conform to any single dogma about
ownership of property or the like. What is fundamental is that all
means, all organizations further the cause of freedom and personal
initiative within the limits imposed by the need among equals to cooperate, and that, above all, they aid the individuals in society to act
to the fullest of their ability. The society of bigness places responsibilities upon its members such as no other society has ever done. Tnese
responsibilities are no longer borne by an elite but have to be shared
by everyone. Bigness is creating a varied body of institutions which
will, again for the first time in history, enable us to utilize our abilities
for our own and the common good. If improperly developed bigness,
like any other regime, can degenerate into authoritarianism; if properly
used, it will make democracy a reality.

Chapter V

THE SOCIETY OF PROCESS
During the past hundred years institutions and ways have developed and spread which make it possible to eliminate both social
stagnation and cultural crises. The history of some of these institutions
reaches back to a much earlier date, but the full array covering the
important aspects of modern life did not emerge until the industrial
revolution. Taken as an integrated whole, these institutions and ways
have provided the basis for the full development of the potentiality of
bigness. This unique society may be characterized as that of process,
but our experience with it has been so limited in time that we cannot
yet grasp the wealth of its implications. The past offers no precedents,
for man has never before possessed comparable instruments for
utilizing natural and human resources. Modern industrialism has enabled us to smooth out the course of change, making it continuous
and peaceful. Both bearers of the new culture and obstacles to it are
present in our western society, and the question of which will win out
remains unanswered. It should be worthwhile, however, to identify
the institutional resources for and against the achievement of this new
culture, and this and the following chapter will be devoted to that
purpose. The separate analysis of forces present in varying degrees
in every national manifestation of our western culture is recognized
as artificial, but is employed for the sake of clarity.
Common patterns of organization and methods are evident in all
the major aspects of modern society. In the economy, the social and
occupational structure, in politics and government, in the fields of
education and knowledge, in the areas of aesthetic creativeness, one
finds a highly diversified division of function, a continuous, even
gradation and transition from one function and one area to another,
a close working relationship between theory or policy and practice,
and a strong sense of interdependence and even of social responsibility.
The indispensability in our vocabulary of concepts denoting change
reflects the extent to which we have moved from the primarily static
society of the period prior to modern industrialism. Change has occurred in every society, and terms like dynamic, function, development,
process, and expansion are employed in a cultural crisis as well. The
distinctive feature about change in the society of industrialism arises
58
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from the fact that it has been accelerated beyond all understanding
on the part of persons in earlier periods of history, except those
possibly of cultural crises, and that the structural transformations are
no longer limited to the spasmodic periods of crisis but have become
normal manifestations of adjustment of institutions and habits to
changing conditions of life. Instead of having recourse to chance and
violence, we are able to predict and plan, to anticipate and avoid, to
utilize consciously our many resources for creating a good society.
Man has at last found a way of life in keeping with his own growing
and developing character.
The basic factor in making possible the society of process has been
the machine driven by mechanical power. This instrument has given
man control which he never before possessed over his natural environment. It has enabled him to produce goods almost at will, undeterred
by weather or other natural phenomena. In contrast with agriculture,
where production has been limited by climate, soil, and seasonal
rhythm, the machine has made production continuous. The material
basis and the actual method of production have become characterized
by process. The difference between an agricultural, localistic economy,
static in character within the seasonal cycle and limited in potentiality,
on the one hand, and the uninterrupted, almost limitless productivity
of the machine on the other, has changed our way of life. We think
and act in terms of process. We expect the machine to supply us
with opportunities not merely for earning a living but for getting
ahead. We have taken from it the conception of society and the
economy as dynamic and expanding, as subject to human control.
The vested interests and the habits created by virtue of the machine
do not allow us to withdraw from this dynamic activity. We follow
the forms of behavior which the machine has made possible. The machine requires rational, systematic handling; it is orderly, and it works
in calculated relations with other machines. The gear symbolizes its
coordination and cooperation and interdependence with others. The
operations of the complex of interdependent machines in the economic
process have to be continuous and functional; they avoid extremes;
they require smooth and easy transitions from one mechanical act to
the next. The machine enables and encourages the practices of prediction and planning. It provides the opportunity and inducement to
individuals to set rational objectives and formulate policies for the
future. It stimulates the development of these qualities of character
in individuals and society, and thereby tends to overcome the habits of
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dependence upon accident and fate which the limited economy of
the Old Regime encouraged people to accept. It enhances the sense
of human power and importance with respect to the present and the
future.
The vast increase in wealth has augmented the individual's selfconfidence to an unprecedented degree. Mystical or supernatural
stimuli and sources of power have declined in social significance; the
individual and society can check the validity of belief by reference
to accomplished fact. They may fear war and disease, and be shaky
in their confidence about being able to distribute the goods which
they produce; but basically they have a deep conviction that man can
overcome these obstacles to a good life, and they search for ways of
. doing so.
The increase in wealth has expanded those functions in society
which serve the individual and which thereby cultivate the ways of
social welfare. Of these functions, the two most important for the
preservation of freedom are commerce and distribution, on the one
hand, and the professions, on the other. Commerce and distribution
have inherently a tendency toward individualism, for they act at the
points at which industry has to adapt itself to society. They bring the
industrial and other products to the individuals for their selection, and
come into immediate relation with the ultimate consumer. The reaction of the consumer to the goods offered him determines the future
of the industry: the consumer as an individual must be satisfied; otherwise the industry must change its product or go under. Commerce and
distribution, therefore, constitute the social antennae of production,
and keep industry in close and constant relation with the individuals
of which society is composed. By enabling the individual to choose
among the goods offered, they create conditions necessary for him to
develop .personal tastes and habits. He has freedom to choose what
he eats, what he wears, in what kind of a house he lives. For the first
time in world history, the numerous and varied opportunities enable
him to cultivate his own special interests. He can express his personality by the way in which he lives.
The freedom of the individual as consumer provides an indispensable foundation for liberty in all other spheres of life. The
degree of freedom of choice in an industrial economy indicates the
extent to which liberty is allowed in general in that society. Since
commerce and distribution, by catering to individual tastes, stimulate
the general practice of freedom, one would rightly expect that authori-
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tarian societies would reduce the importance of these economic functions. "Where some ideology, Nazism or communism, is ranked
superior to the welfare of the individuals, commerce and distribution
will be used, not as means to enhance individualism and freedom, but
as instruments of control and guidance. They will occupy a much
lesser position than industry, for the latter produces goods which the
authoritarian powers need in achieving the goal of their "ism." If
production served the individuals, neither could be controlled in the
interest of the "ism"; production would supply commerce and distribution with materials to satisfy individual wants, and freedom would
result.
Commerce and distribution provide much of the economic basis
of the middle class, the class which most nearly lives in accordance
with the conception of process. The name itself indicates that function; the middle class occupied in the Old Regime the middle position
between the peasantry and the nobility, and served as the middle man
for goods and services. Each of the other two classes had in the Old
Regime a primary relationship to human beings on one side, but on
the other was the earth and the supernatural powers. In each of
these two cases the class tended to develop habits and standards of
social rigidity. In contrast, the primary relations of the middle class
were all with human beings. This class lived by dealing with other
people, by buying and selling, by performing services for others. It
had to cultivate social attitudes of rationality, calculation, and planning; it had constantly to consider the standpoint and interests of
others. Each member had to depend on his wits; each had to think
of the effect of his action upon others, for each felt himself to be
dependent upon the good will of others. Credit had to be established, and credit, which is basically a moral achievement, indicates
the measure of one's position in the total, functioning society. A
middle class individual had to be fully acquainted with the personalities composing his market. He had to know what these individuals
did, what their credit rating was, what they had to sell and to buy,
what were their tastes, their strong points and weaknesses. His success
depended upon the clientele with which he dealt or might deal. He
had to be alive to opportunities and to take risks, petty or large, depending upon the degree of his own initiative. He had to be selfdependent within a setting of social interdependence, and he came to
feel self-confidence and self-importance as he moved ahead in his work.
His position in society kept alive the sense of individualism, entre-
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preneurship, and freedom; and, since the middle class was so numerous
and the range of possible independent enterprises so wide, both as to
the amount of initial capital involved and as to the skills required,
this class provided the basis for the society of process. The blending of
self-interest and social interest, the dependence of social mobility upon
the individual's own action, enabled the members to keep alive those
indispensable social qualities of reasonableness, hopefulness, and
cheerfulness. As industrialism developed these middle-class qualities
supplied the basic characteristics of the new society.
In the middle class, the professions serve as a special kind of middle
men. They mediate between man and man, as lawyer or labor expert,
and between man and nature by guiding him in the utilization of
nature for social advantage. They institutionalize easy and smooth
change; if crises occur they act as experts to resolve them quickly and
efficiently. They are the instruments of social and individual improvement; it is their function to 'serve at the social frontier. They deal with
people or concern themselves with things for the benefit of people;
and they bring to these tasks over and above the profit motive a strong
sense of professional responsibility to society. As such, they act as the
bearers of practical humanism. One need only consider a society without them to appreciate the extent to which they eliminate ignorance,
neglect, irrationality, and brutality as means of dealing with social
problems. One can gauge the extent to which a society has accepted
the ways of process by the number and coverage of the professions.
An authoritarian society does not care for them except as instruments
for increase of power and social control. A society with much of the
Old Regime extant institutionalizes social welfare only to the extent
that it is forced to. The achievement of the Welfare State depends
upon the free development and use of the professions.
Industrialism has enabled a complex society to emerge which offers
the individuals the opportunity to cultivate their special abilities and
to realize their potentialities on a scale unprecedented in history. The
division of function makes possible and necessary the utilization of
individual gifts. Even apart from the economy of specialization it
permits individuals to fulfill themselves and thereby to be content
with their accomplishment. The great diversity of occupations reflecting the functional interrelationship of the machine process creates
·easy gradations from one occupational and social level to another. An
individual can see opportunities for improvement in his position just
ahead and within reach. He perceives an orderly process of social
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mobility around him, and knows that his achievement depends substantially upon his own efforts. While extremes of wealth and power
are present, they are cushioned by an integrated system of intermediate
roles which prevent them from being sharply contrasted. The individual is encouraged by the situation to keep his reason in close relation to actuality: the more he does so, the better for him. He is not
inclined to act in despair and resort to violence. He is schooled in the
machine process and the resulting integrated society to curb excessive
emotionalism in favor of calculated ways of gaining an attainable,
practical objective. The dynamic society of industrialism, in which
the individual has the opportunity to reach a position commensurate
with his ability, has replaced the society of status, of sharply separated
extremes, of immobility. We live in a society in which potentiality
forms a part of actuality, and the individual is constantly led to consider the significance of moving into the future.
The society of industrialism has stimulated the growth of institutions appropriate to the dynamic processes. Three such institutions
have proved to be especially capable of the elaboration which is needed
in this kind of culture; the corporation, the parliamentary government, and the political party. All of them originated in an agrarian
society, where their presence attests to the fact that dynamic ways have
not been created by the modern economy alone but had politics and
economics as parents before the days of the machine process. These
three institutions have solved common problems of providing a form
within which the process of change can occur without revolutionary
destruction of the form. They offer a set of commonly accepted rules
in accordance with which the enormously varied life can move. In
their most complete stage of development they have enabled fundamental problems of social organization to be solved for the first time
in history, the problems of succession, continuity and change, efficiency
and flexibility, leadership, policy-making, and initiative. They have
enabled the individual and society to live in freedom.
Government shares the common characteristics of the society of process by employing the principle of representation. Everyone and every
organization, irrespective of whether it operates chiefly in politics or
not, feels and claims that it has some representative qualities, that it
stands for something apart from itself. Representation acts as one
of the basic mores in a democratic society: without this ideal in each
member, democracy would soon be supplanted by an authoritarian
creed. The institutions of political parties in a multiple-party society
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and of frequent and regular free elections make certain that the
initiative of private individuals and organizations will be stimulated
and given an opportunity for expressing their views. The competition
for leadership will enable the public to choose among candidates for
its favor. In this way the relations between governing and governed
are kept close. The former must renew its sanction and stand the test
of keeping up with changing conditions of society and of knowing
and satisfying the wishes of the voters. The election enables stock to
be taken, grievances to be aired, new policies to be formulated and
tested. It enables each person to participate in public affairs in a
responsible way by working within the political party and by voting.
In the society of pluralism, government has to emphasize certain
responsibilities which under autocracy playa minor role. Both it and
the political parties within their limits have to arbitrate among competing interests; they have to set norms for the whole; they must formulate policies, secure their approval and execute them. They must
watch after the welfare of the whole and make certain that in a society
of multiple interests the fact of interdependence is not lost from sight
in the competitive scramble for advantage. Government has the major
responsibility of making certain that no one interest gains control to
the detriment of society and ultimately of itself, that the interests all
function together, and that the ideal of process guides the operations
of the whole. In order to do so it has expanded its structure to keep
pace with the elaboration of the social, economic, and cultural life.
The question has become acute, as it did in the eighteenth century,
of how to meet the need for a vast bureaucracy while preserving
popular government. The problem has not actually been solved, as
anyone can see from the inability of a representative assembly in
any large state to exercise intelligent and effective control over the
budget of the war department. Nonetheless, certain measures have
been taken to prevent the bureaucracy from becoming addicted to
bureaucratism, to government as an end instead of a means. Training
programs have been developed to instill in officials and prospects for
official positions a sense of social responsibility. Democratic ways of
public administration are constantly being sought and improved so
that the hierarchical relationship of superior-inferior within the
bureaucracy does not become rigid and prevent ability from arising to
a higher position. The study and practice of public relations have
been widely expanded; professional personnel for that purpose has
been introduced into the bureaucracy, and a conscious endeavor made
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to institutionalize the ideal of keeping the bureaucracy in close touch
with the public, responsive to its wishes, and helpful with expert
knowledge. The creation of advisory bodies of laymen for each major
bureaucratic agency, either of a continuing character or on an ad hoc
basis, attests to the seriousness of these endeavors; and experiments
have been tried, and will no doubt continue, to relate advisory organizations of this kind to the legislative assembly itself. Thereby the latter
may be able to obtain expert advice on proposals or activities of the
professional bureaucrats and be in a position to judge the relative
merits of the latters' proposals. It will have an instrument, even though
not one of continuing activity, with which to counterbalance the
bureaucracy. Nonetheless, in spite of this development, the weakest
point in popular government remains that of the failure of the legislative branch to devise means for controlling the vast executive organs.
The political institutions have advanced further along the road
toward realizing the objective of constitutional freedom than the
corporation. Apart from a few outstanding progressive exceptions, the
corporation seems to have reached that stage in constitutional development which in the field of government was attained, for example, in
France under Louis Philippe. A few thousand voters elect a council
which advises the executive and passes on policy matters and budget,
but is essentially dependent upon the leadership of the executive and
does not exercise much authority. The analogy is not quite accurate,
and proponents of laissez-faire deny that the administration of a
corporation can ever become subject to constitutional control after
the model of popular government. These proponents assert that the
exercise of such control will wreck the freely functioning market,
destroy the possibility of making a profit, and undermine our political
and social along with our economic freedom. In spite of this criticism,
the amount of experimentation being carried on at the present time
with forms of constitutionality and responsible government in a
corporation shows that not even the distribution of power within the
corporation is free from the dynamic, experimental habits of thinking
and acting of the society in which the corporation has achieved a
leading role. The introduction of public ownership, the creation of
semi-public corporations, and the elaboration of public control over
many branches of business have signified the intention of the political
voters to try to subject at least certain corporations to the ways of
democratic government, whether by means of subordinating them to
the general control of a popularly elected parliament, by putting repre-
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sentatives of the employees, government, and public on the policyformulating board of directors, or by setting up legal standards of
behavior and creating a body of inspectors. One does not know at
present whether these methods will succeed; but one can say with
assurance that the experimentation will continue and that the corporation shares the fundamental characteristics of its institutional form
with the parliamentary government and the political party. The three
are all big, they have a bureaucracy, and they institutionalize change.
Each of the three institutions has a legal personality which enables
it to survive the death of any particular individual leader. It operates
as a super-individual, anonymous form into which the individuals fit
and out of which they go to be replaced by others. In each of the institutions, the question of succession has been solved by peaceful
means. The leaders emerge through competition, first to enter the
system and then to rise within it. They gain their position after a
severe apprenticeship; they must learn how to lead it to operate within
the total society. This process of social and occupational solution
particularizes the give-and-take between the society within the institutions and that outside. The institution and society are kept in general
agreement on standards of behavior and objectives. The variety of
tasks in each institution allows for the use of a diversity of ability, with
efficiency even if slowly achieved being the ultimate criterion. Competition in the exercise of initiative on the part of individuals seeking
to rise to leadership is supplemented by competition among policies
offered by these individuals. The formulation and choice of policies
is thereby kept in close relation to the public. A proposal will lose
out, if not reasonable, feasible, and clearly formulated, and its sponsors, the individuals aspiring to leadership, will give way to persons
of more efficiency. Continuity of policy and leadership is assured if
the public approves; change is introduced if the public wishes. In each
case the institution provides the abiding framework within which the
process takes place.
The institutions possess the characteristics of a complicated division
of function, a high degree of interrelatedness among the parts, and
an ever-widening range of relations with institutions and social forces
outside them. Each institution has the quality of flexibility and
adaptability. The allocation of power among the organs in each can
vary according to circumstances and needs without breaking up the
whole. At one time it may be advisable for the executive to have more
than usual authority, whether he be the president of a corporation, the
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president or prime minister of a country, or the chairman of the
executive committee of a political party. At another time the legislative: the board of directors, Congress, the National Committee may
be of most significance; at another time, the judicial function, at another, the electorate. Each institution is constantly set for action in a
mobile society; it has to keep responsive, creative, and free, or competition from others will set up similarly organized, successful rivals.
In a society of complex process, politics acquires a meaning which
it lacks under authoritarianism. The methods of parliamentary government and of elections suit the needs of trade unions, a corporation, a
school class, in fact, of any organization involving directly a large
number of persons. The ways of political discussion, decision, and
action are used in so varied a range of activities that one may literally
describe ours as a political society. With the growing interdependence
of all elements in society it is difficult to find anyone part or anyone
act which does not have political significance.
Power has become widely distributed. It resides no longer solely
or mainly in formal government, but is exercised by any individuals
organizing themselves for action. The ways of influencing society and
shaping the future are so numerous that each individual and each
group, irrespective of occupation or social position, wields a certain
degree of power. The degree depends upon the significance of the
institution through which one works, the efficiency of the performance
of one's function in society, and the free acceptance of one's action by
others. The term political pluralism describes this condition of decentralization of power, and indicates why political ways have come
to be commonplace in the inter-personal, inter-group, and institutional
relations of our society.
The significance of the political factor may be best perceived by
means of contrast with the Old Regime or with an authoritarian
system. In the traditional and in the totalitarian sense, politics means
concentrated power at the disposal of superiors over inferiors. It implies inequality and the habit of employing extreme force ultimately to
resolve problems. It assumes that those in authority know best and
that their word should obtain. It eliminates the use of negotiation and
compromise in favor of issuing commands. In the practice of the
bureaucracy it develops strong habits of legalism and literalness, as
against free interpretation by an intelligent person of the meaning of
the order and of the best way to execute it. It creates sharp and abrupt
gradations in a hierarchy of those who give and execute orders, thus
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destroying the flexibility, mobility and adaptability of the democratic
process. It makes for social, intellectual, and moral rigidity, whereby
individuals are reduced to automatons under the absolute power of one
individual supported by an elite. In international affairs, the same
habits of rigid, authoritarian thinking and acting are applied. The
ruler and the state are noted for the power they wield. They go to
war as the accepted way of solving all issues. Their social organization
is based on the exercise of ultimate, physical power, hallowed by
tradition.
In our society politics has become a way of solving social problems.
It implies the use of free discussion, reasonableness, enlightened selfinterest, equality among the participants, adaptability, and the willingness, if it seems best, to accept a compromise. It recognizes the value
of employing power in the negotiations, but understands that in this
complex culture power has a varied content and that the use of
physical force culminating in human destruction may be the least
efficient display of power. Too much concentration of power, whether
it be in the political, economic, intellectual, or other sphere of activity,
diminishes the initiative of the other participating individuals and induces decline. In the relatively simple society of the Old Regime where
authority consisted primarily of the ability to manipulate human beings, and when material resources were few in number and the economy
not yet very interdependent, one person could monopolize the governing function without direct injury to the welfare of others. The society
of industrialism requires the voluntary contribution of his best talent
by each individual, irrespective of his occupation; and dereliction of
duty by anyone person affects the welfare of all the others. Elected
representatives may and often do possess power in negotiations which
persons in the Old Regime never had; but confronting others of comparable strength and being schooled in the ways of the society of
process, they recognize the value of exercising power in a reasonable
way.
The disinclination to use physical force is evident in the conduct
of international affairs. The free democracies with an industrial
economy and culture of long standing do not like to go to war. Their
tradition of private initiative has led them to distrust the power-state
and to recognize the essential identity of individuals as social beings,
irrespective of nationality. Private international relations have acquired such widespread significance that students of international
affairs have taken them for granted and have scarcely begun to treat
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them as part of their formal subject. Bringing peoples together with
peoples has become the ideal and the objective; the question of how
it can be accomplished has tended to solve itself as the multitude of
private organizations in free countries have taken the step beyond the
borders of their own states and come together in international organizations without reference to power politics. Educators, dentists, potatogrowers, scientists, and trade unionists have developed their own international relations. Pluralism has gained hold in this field, and the
foundations of a new international society have been laid. The complexity and fluidity of dynamic industrialism have rendered the conduct of old-style international relations too wasteful to be efficient, too
simple to be realistic; the privatization of international relations has
taken place as the natural expression of the variegated composition
of the society of process. The ·government, in turn, has taken the role
of arbiter among and general guide to these private interests, whenever necessary, and of providing the international machinery for enabling them to function; it leaves a wide scope to private international
relations.
The growing significance of the concept of national income offers
evidence of our sense of interdependence. Although mainly developing out of the need in wartime to know the actual and potential
amount of resources available for the conduct of society under those
critical conditions, the concept has proved to be of essential value in
peacetime as well. The government, private business, and major social
organizations like trade unions all find it of increasing value. Labor
uses it as the basis for estimating how much of the national income it
is receiving or should receive. Business, especially big business, but
even small business organized into associations capable of calculating
such data, finds it essential for planning production; it must know the
size of the total income in order to be able to estimate how much of
that income will or can be made available for the purchase of its
products. Others in the private sector regard it as equally useful. The
government is coming to employ the information as the basis for its
fiscal policy, in the consideration and planning of both its national
and its international economic policy.
As the conception of the welfare state has become accepted in both
practice and theory, the government has had to plan its fiscal policy in
terms of the total social situation. It is expected to use public finance
as the major means of preventing booms and depressions and of maintaining the economy on an even keel. Full employment has come to
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be regarded as eminently desirable and realizable, and fiscal policy
must provide whatever resources over and above those in the private
sector of the economy are necessary to achieve that condition. The
experience of full employment and maximum production in war has
set the standard for peacetime, and planning for that objective has become accepted. Fiscal policy therefore has acquired social purpose.
Taxation has become increasingly progressive: that is, it varies according to the ability to pay, according to income or turnover. In a society
of process, so-called regressive taxes, like a fixed land tax, decline in
importance. Fiscal policy knows how to seek revenue where taxation
does least injury to the economy by retarding private initiative to the
least extent commensurate with general welfare; but by such means as
inheritance taxes it also aims at equalizing economic and social opportunities and preventing new castes based on hereditary wealth from
arising. Through such means it seeks to maintain equality of opportunity and to prevent large capital power from falling into the
hands of incompetence. It helps thereby to keep alive competition.
In developing a tax policy by which everyone, rich and poor, pays taxes
in accordance with his ability, it preserves the sense of dignity of even
the poorest citizen; it enables him to share in the maintenance of the
whole. All participate alike, even if in different financial amounts, in
supporting the state; but all do not share alike in receiving benefits
from the state. The poor and low-income tax-payers may receive an increase in their real income from government services far greater than
the amount of taxes they pay. The public finance system thereby contributes to the preservation of democratic equality, self-respect and
mutual aid. It does so on the basis of an analysis of the national income. Without tyranny or rigidity it plans the flexible use of the
government income and expenditure for the greatest advantage to the
whole society.
Similar objectives are evident in government ownership or other
forms of participation in business. Government ownership or regulation of business has proved beneficial to society in those cases in which
private initiative has failed or has been unable to develop facilities,
such as power resources, essential for a wide expansion of private
enterprise. It has also intervened to prevent monopolies from developing or from abusing their power. It has sought to safeguard public interest against the failure of capitalism to take the initiative. It
has done so in accordance not with any dogma about the blessings of
nationalization or collectivism but with social welfare.
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Undoubtedly the heart of the society of process is the free market.
Since the criterion of the society of process consists of the maximum
creative activity of its members, it follows that the kind of society
which evokes the greatest initiative and effort on the part of individuals
will be the most efficient. The economic system which measures the
long-run efficiency of private initiative in terms of service to society
affords a practical example of that utilitarian identity or at least close
kinship of private interest and public interest which has characterised
the society of industrial development in its most creative period. The
terms employed to describe the free market economy could be equally
applied to the system of political freedom. It is an old saying that
democracy must be won anew every day; so must profit. The individual
must serve his own interest by serving the public interest in both
democratic politics and the free market. He has to assume the initiative
and work with others on a free and cooperative basis, or democracy
and free enterprise economy both fail. The habits of self-reliance and
initiative, of consideration of others and cooperation, are essential
to the one as to the other. In politics the democrat organizes institutions which assist the private person in association with others to solve
the problems of government in a condition of freedom. In business
he organizes the market through the establishment of banks, exchanges,
and other institutions of comparable free character. He can participate
in these in varying degrees or withdraw without suffering physical
violence. He has helped set up the rules governing each, and if he can
win enough support he can bring about a change in these rules. In
both political and economic organization he has to act as a free and
responsible member of a society with common interests and purposes
and standards of behavior. Whether the institutions work or not depends in the last analysis upon him. Handicaps to individual influence
become greater as bigness develops in either government or business;
but they have been compensated for by the increase in the variety and
power of the instruments at one's disposal to overcome them. Since
the individual has the vote, he and others can turn their political
power against economic abuses; they can direct their economic interests
against political acts which they dislike. They have at least a double
weapon at their disposal, whereas almost all people, especially of the
lower classes, in the past have had only one: they were devoid of
political power. When one recalls that similar behavior is useful in
each field, one appreciates the supplementary nature of democratic
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politics and free-market economics _in maintaining our society of
process_
The social position of the individual has come to depend not upon
caste or class but upon one's training and occupation, upon the degree
of social power one possesses_ Sharply defined class distinctions have
given away to social mobility_ Birth counts for far less than what one
does_ Middle-class standards are accepted by all and widely separated
extremes are absent. The social structure expresses the richly varied
and highly integrated range of occupations and skills. The dynamic
society puts all the classes of the Old Regime and of early industrialism
into its mould, and prints upon them common characteristics. Royalty
becomes superfluous and disappears, or if unusually adaptable it
assumes the role of a symbol or ceremonial object. The autocrat by
divine right has no place in a society of rationality, efficiency, and
science. The aristocrat shares a similar fate. The qualities that made
him useful in the Old Regime have to give way to those of a bourgeois.
If he refuses to change, he is sooner or later eliminated for incompetence; if he accepts the ways of the industrial society, he soon ceases
to be a nobleman and becomes in his interests and habits a bourgeois.
With the peasant the same process of cultural change occurs. His contacts with the urban market require him to learn to deal with the
bourgeoisie on their own terms; he must take on their ways, and he
has a strong economic inducement to do so. The more he becomes like
the bourgeois, the better he is able to maintain himself in a capitalistic economy. His development from a serf to a subject to a citizen
within a century and a half or less has been most rapid after industrialism began to impose its tempo upon him. Nor has the proletariat fared very differently. This class, the creation of industrialism,
has had to fight its way to recognition as citizens of equal worth with
those of the upper classes. In the society of process it has achieved this
goal; it has gained a high degree of equality of economic power by
way of trade unions. It has ceased to think and plan exclusively in
terms of its own group interest and has come to consider itself a responsible part of a whole society. It has ceased to be a class-conscious proletariat and has become a member of the common society of industrialism, with patterns of behavior and cultural objectives similar to those
of the rest of the society and with opportunities for ability to rise in
the occupational and social scale. Economically, politically and culturally, these social groups tend to conform to patterns of life of in-
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dustrial society. They enter politics, become ministers of state, seek
profits, vote, pay taxes, go to school, aim at a higher income and a
better life than at present, strive to rise in society. They behave like
the bougeoisie, the leaders and pattern-setters of this culture.
During the merging of the old classes into the new functional
society, the essential instruments of the change have developed in the
form of numerous private organizations. The number and variety of
these organizations express the vigor of initiative and creativeness
among individuals and reflect the character of the society as a whole.
The private organizations enable the members who singly would wield
little influence in society to exert the power of numbers and to maintain their interests against institutions which by virtue of the nature of
their organization have ready at hand the instruments of power. The
value of organization in creating the conditions of mutual respect in
a condition of freedom should be contrasted with the social troubles
that arise out of a relationship of strong versus weak, of superior versus
inferior. A wealth of organizations enables groups of dissimilar functions to negotiate as peers and to come together for a common purpose.
Large numbers of otherwise unimportant persons and groups thereby
develop the means to express their common wishes, to formulate
policies, and to exert pressure toward realizing these policies. Since
they live in a society of organizations, they learn to compromise, to act
rationally, and to value general agreement arrived at by free discussion.
Organization has, for the first time in history, enabled propertyless
individuals to wield political power, the foundation of freedom and
democracy. It has supplied the basis for extending from government
to the whole of society that system of checks and balances which has
proved to be so useful in the preservation of liberty. A society with a
multiplicity of organizations, private and public, shows thereby the
healthy state of its activity. It has institutionalized liberty, equality,
and fraternity.
Leadership in the society of industrialism tends to develop common
qualities, irrespective of whether it functions in politics, trade unions,
corporations, education, or any other part of society. It is not selected
on the basis of family or cultural background and training; it may
come from any of the traditional classes and may have gone through
anyone of a number of types of training. The essential characteristics
of leaders in this industrial society consist of the ability to lay down
and to execute policies, to take calculated risks, to organize and handle
people in relation to things and for action, to have the self-confidence
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to exploit opportunities. Leadership, therefore, goes to those who
control most power in society. This power may be social, economic,
political, or cultural; but in any case since these areas merge into each
other, the individuals exercising power in one of them must have the
general knowledge and insight for acting in several. They may move
from business to politics to education without having to change the
basic forms of their behavior. The organizations through which they
work are so large and so dependent on public good will that they impose these common qualities upon their leaders. The amount of social
power varies with the occupation. The banker or the steel manufacturer possesses the prestige and authority in the community which
result from the importance to the entire economy and therefore to the
entire community of his business. The candy-bar manufacturer could
expect to attain no such social power. One would hardly expect a
popular novelist to be powerful politically or economically by virtue
solely of his ability as novelist. Nonetheless, even the successful ball
player or novelist has to have a sense of public relations, or know
enough to employ someone to have it for him. The personnel with
the most power constantly varies in origin and occupation; but it must
maintain itself by constantly being efficient in its work. In a society of
such extraordinary mobility as that of industrialism the competitive
pressure from below is heavy and continuous.
The culture of industrialism is built upon knowledge. At no time
in the history of the world has knowledge carried as much prestige as at
present. The twentieth century may be accurately described as the
century of education, for knowledge and research have come to
permeate the entire society. Industry, commerce, banking, agriculture,
and government depend upon knowledge to provide the indispensable
means of handling problems. The standard of living and the level of
activity in a country can be gauged by observing the value attached
to and the use being made of knowledge. Rumania has far richer
natural resources than Switzerland, but no one could assert that it
compares with the latter in efficiency of utilization. The difference
lies in the failure of the Rumanians to apply intelligence in the exploitation of the natural resources for the benefit of the whole society.
Knowledge has become a social venture of a highly individualized
character. It can be developed solely by way of individual persons,
but to achieve its bests results for many purposes it must be cooperative.
So far the limits of personal ability to develop knowledge have not
been reached. The more education is made available, the greater the

THE SOCIETY OF PROCESS

75

emancipation of individual energy and ability and the richer becomes
society. Education shares the same qualities as democratic politics and
the free-market economy. It prospers most in a state of freedom and
of self-disciplined individualism, and it teaches self-discipline by. its
requirement of objective analysis. It is cumulative in its impact, for
wherever the level of culture is highest and the economy is most complex, the demands made upon knowledge will be greatest. In such a
society, knowledge acquires a regulator: it must stand the test of practical application. In a pre-industrial society learning was mainly concerned with holy matters or served as a mark of social prestige. In
neither case could its social value be tested, for apart from offering
religious consolation and guidance it had little social utility. Its high
prestige depended upon its mysteriousness, its general inapplicability
to life. The reputed decline in prestige of the educator in the society
of industrialism actually proves the contrary: it provides a sign of the
growing usefulness of knowledge. The man of knowledge has become accepted as an indispensable co-worker, as practical in his job as
the steel manufacturer in his and bearing a large amount of social
power. He has become accepted as an essential force in our culture and
subjected to standards of efficiency comparable to those of other occupations. Far from losing prestige, the educator and man of knowledge
have risen in general esteem to a peak which they never reached before.
The evidence is seen in a contrast between the superiority felt toward
knowledge by the aristocrat, with his emphasis upon an all-round
elegant personality unencumbered by learning, and the great respect
paid it by the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the proletariat, the
ingredients of the society of modern industrialism.
Education has become a main means by which the individual gains
his place in the social scale. Intellectual ability opens the way to advancement, irrespective of birth; and the lack of that ability leads to
decline. In a dynamic culture which requires efficiency in leadership
and in adaptation intellectual training is necessary to enable one to
keep up the pace. The ideal of economy in the 'use of natural resources has from necessity been transferred to the area of education:
a society cannot afford to waste the human talent at its disposal by not
allowing its people to receive an education. General, free schooling
therefore becomes a social necessity, with the state helping the talented
on occasion by additional funds. Class education has given way in the
welfare state to democratic education.
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The interdependence of all forms of knowledge and of knowledge
and life has tended to increase in direct proportion to the interdependence of the branches of industrial culture. General education has
gained recognition as indispensable to enable the individual to be a
good citizen and to relate his expert knowledge to the whole of knowledge and its application. The distinction between pure and applied
science has become not one of kind but of degree. Practicality cannot
be used as a standard solely for the one and not the other; it applies
to both. Moving from the educational field of activity to that of business to that of government to that of trade unionism and back again,
the expert or professional person employs his knowledge alike in each
of them, and gains in perspective. He subjects his ideas to such a rich
diversity of practical tests that he profits intellectually from the experience and is able to serve each institution better than he otherwise would
have. The increasing interrelatedness of society is evident in the
similarity of the problems which he is called upon to handle in each
position, whether private or public.
The person of knowledge becomes the balance-wheel of society. He
is trained in objectivity and sees the whole. He stands above special
interests of the worker or business man, and being primarily concerned
with efficiency and social welfare rather than private profit he acts as a
creative and a stabilizing force for the benefit of all. His training in
objective analysis of the whole prepares him to be the formulator of
policies. The worker or business man may think it useful to gain a
private advantage at the expense of the general welfare. The expert
knows that his own welfare depends upon that of the entire community. He is the living expression of the functional interdependence
of our society.
In the experimental method the society of process has developed an
instrument which is useful in every aspect of life and sums up the
characteristics of our culture. The method shares with democracy the
necessity for team-work among individuals under leadership, each one
participating with his full knowledge and initiative in the achievement
of a common, agreed-upon objective. The experimental method requires for efficiency the equalitarian participation in a common enterprise of theoretical expert and of tool-making expert, of original designer of new instruments to test a theory, and of expert in the application of the new knowledge in practical life. Like representative government it includes in its range of usefulness the most abstract, theoretical,
or policy, matters, and the most concrete problems of execution.

THE SOCIETY OF PROCESS

77

While building upon existing knowledge it aims to improve upon the
current situation by providing guidance for the future. It therefore
combines past, present, and future and supplies continuity and
sequence. While concerned with the present, it is interested not merely
in the what but in the how, in action. Like the free market economy
it provides a means for the integration of individual effort and initiative and interest and the social process for the furtherance of both
individual and social welfare. By nature it can prosper only under
freedom where it can test theories by facts, and check facts against
policies. Dogmatism destroys its effectiveness as thoroughly as despotism or hyper-subjectivity.
The social sciences offer an example of the extension of the experimental method from science and technology to social problems. Our
culture has become so complex in its social structure that experts on
social relations have had to be developed. In a society as mobile as
ours it was to be expected that human beings would devise new programs of training and action to take care of new social needs. If all
the problems with public implications were left for power politics to
settle, our society would be in a constant state of near or actual civil
war. The solution of as many problems as possible by objective,
private means has become essential, and the social sciences have offered
the methods of doing so. After the facts of a social problem are studied
objectively, a reasonable and acceptable policy for the solution of the
problem is formulated and, if accepted, is executed.
The humanities have participated in the achievement of the society
of process and have benefited from the gains. Aesthetic creativeness
depends as much upon freedom as scientific creativeness. While
literature, art, music, and the other humanities serve as the bearers
of enduring individual and social values, they have also sought to
improve upon these values, to find new ones and new ways of expressing them. The experimental method has received as widespread application in these fields as in any other; but since aesthetic creativeness
is more individualistic than the sciences or the social sciences, experimentation has been more restricted to the utilization of forms and
materials in portraying the varied subject matter of our culture. That
the humanities have been aware of the important role which they play
in our society can be seen from the diversity of their efforts to interpret
and evaluate our common experience. In this society of industrialism
the aesthetic products are full of social meaning; they criticize the
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ideals in vogue, issue warnings against ways which are detrimental to
humanity, and offer guidance into the future. They seek to preserve
aesthetic values in a culture which is inclined to over·emphasize materialism and practicality. Thereby they help to make the ideal of
process a reality.
The society of process provides practical outlets and functions for
intellectuals who in past ages became the theorists and leaders of
radical movements. The great increase in the number of opportunities
for reformers to be socially useful and the reality of social interdependence have disciplined reformers to think, not about destroying
the existing culture and starting anew, but about working in a practical way within the present culture. They tend to accept the ethics of
the experimental method, to keep theory and fact in working relationship, and to recognize the importance of the time factor. They have
accepted the social discipline of industrialism, the emphasis upon
method, upon the how as well as the what. A dynamic society has constantly to check its values, to test their applicability and use, and to
choose among competing ideals. Policy-making is fundamental and
continuous. Reform has taken so central a place in our thinking and
acting that the type of radical of the pre-industrial regime is an
anachronism. His function has become normal and subjected to experimental control.
The culture of process appears to have broadened and deepened
man's moral sense. The evidence in favor of this view may seem casual
and unconvincing; but when compared with that about conditions
prior to modern industrialism it is impressive. In our society of interdependence individuals have upon them the pressure of self-interest
as well as of social interest to behave in a moral way. In an age largely
or purely agrarian the inducements to good behavior had to be
primarily personal, for self-sufficiency precluded the applicability of
much economic or social pressure. With the coming of industrialism
the area of personal responsibility greatly enlarged. The individual
is expected to conform to common standards irrespective of the law:
if he fails to do so, he as well as others will suffer. Traffic signals exist
for the benefit of all, and few can be watched by the police. In a
factory or office the reliable performance of his task by each person is
in large measure necessitated by the fact that one's colleagues working
on other parts of the same project exercise a check on what one is doing
and create an esprit de corps. The efficacy of modern taxation mainly
depends upon the inner controls of conscience developed by the ex-
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perience of common responsibility and benefit, by the awareness that
dereliction of duty will lead to the breakdown of social organization
and hurt each and every person. In the case of modern science one can
imagine that experts might without ever being caught spread disease
germs enough to eliminate their opponents; but the great increase in
the power of these experts must have been accompanied by the
augmentation of their self-discipline. Wherever the ways of process
obtain, there seems to evolve this awarenes,s on the part of the individuals of their increased moral responsibility. If further evidence
were required, it could be found by referring to the absence of this
feeling among not all but many persons living under an authoritarian
regime. The willingness of Nazi doctors to experiment on human
beings, the indifference of communists to morality, the tendency among
people under an authoritarian regime to abide by the letter, not the
spirit, of the law and to revere and fear a policeman-all these are signs
of a difference in the extent to which moral standards permeate the
society. Of course one must speak in broad terms, for the incidence of
violations of legal and moral codes remains high in our society as
well. The point of difference is that our culture of process imposes
upon the individuals a greater degree of personal responsibility and
offers a wider range of free social checks and controls than any other
culture has ever done. It holds out the promise of unprecedented im, provement in our general moral standards.
The centers of the society of process have been the cities; for the
presence of large numbers of people living in a small space entails a
wide division of function and a highly developed system of interrelatedness, or the society cannot exist. The richest diversity of occupations, personalities, and groups can be supported where experience
is richly varied and the velocity of social as well as economic circulation is high. The urban situation tolerates few rigidities other than
those institutional forms through which change is channeled. The
imposition of rigidity means ultimate decay, for it slows down the
tempo and deprives the individuals of the opportunities for improvement which they see everywhere around them. In this man-made city,
the most social of all man's creations, institutionalized freedom is
essential; society has acquired too great a fluidity to be subject to
absolute control. Relations are so varied that dictatorship meets
obstruction in the long run in asserting its domination against the will
of the participants. Diversity of views, interests, and intentions will
occur in spite of controls; heresy is natural to this environment.
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Tolerance and a high degree of equality become practiced as realistic
acceptance of the inordinate difficulty of enforcing dogmatic uniformity. Social and intellectual mobility reaches its greatest speed,
and individualism becomes standard. A basic personality structure
develops which is quite different from that of the pre-industrial regime.
It calls for an all-round personality who is also a specialist, an individual well established in the sense of his own importance and in his
respect for the importance of others, an entrepreneur, a cooperator and
policy-maker, an equalitarian individualist, independent and socially
interdependent. The type of personality of industrialism carries within itself all the basic qualities of democratic government, the free
market economy, the experimental method. It personifies urbanism
functioning at its richest simultaneously for individual and society. It
personifies the society of instrumentalism, the society of process.

Chapter VI

REPRESENTATION
The essence of representation in society consists of the fact that
some one represents other persons or things. The term does not imply
identity of the representative with that which he represents, for in
social life such identity is contrary to nature. It carries, rather, the
sense of democratic equality at its best, of commonalty in the midst of
rich diversity. It infers that sufficient common interests and ways prevail to make representation pos/iible, and that enough variety exists
to prevent it from ever becoming ossified.
Since nature and society are subject to constant change, it follows
that the principle of representation conforms to the character of life,
and expresses one of the basic values. Interests and ways need some
instrument by which the facts of change can be reflected in the total
organization and conduct of society. They require an institution
through which they can be channelled without disrupting the totality.
Representation provides the answer.
Any organization which is not built upon brute force must to some
extent practice the idea of representation. The mere fact of organization means that except in the case of small and relatively simple
societies a few must be selected to attend to many items of business
for all the members. Even simple associations like that of the citizens
of a Swiss forest canton or that of the estate of the nobility in a
Pruss ian county of the Old Regime had to select some one to call meetings, preside, and attend to necessary business during the intervals
between the assemblies. The question thus becomes one, not of
whether representation is worthwhile, for on that issue we have no
choice, but one of how to make this natural principle of social organization as effective and efficient as possible.
Every system of organization claims that its leaders in some way
and to some degree represent the will of the people. Hitler was certain
that he understood intuitively the wishes of the Germans and carried
them out; and the communists claim that they express the interests of
the public even though the latter may be forced to accept that view.
It is possible that for a short time during a crisis a dictator may feel and
act as the people wish; but the contradiction between the meaning of
the term as used by authoritarian regimes and that used in the regime
81
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of a free people need not cause confusion. Representation to be
genuine entails free elections held at frequent, regular intervals in
which individuals or parties compete for the right to represent the
society. It requires that freedom of speech, press and assembly must
obtain in order for the candidates to campaign for support, and for
the electorate to have an intelligent basis on which to choose. In its
fullest form it means equal, universal suffrage for men and women
and the abolition of any special privileges for office-holding. In other
words, it implies the existence of those conditions which in part or
whole we have had in western society for decades. The type of representation employed in totalitarian regimes violates all these standards,
is a sham, and in this essay will not be considered. Representation
means what the term implies, and no mysticism or intuition either of
Nazi or Marxian origin should detract from the fact that we possess
institutions which make representation an objective reality and provide a clear-cut check on whether or not it actually exists.
It used to be asserted that under the representative system a dictatorship of a majority may be established which is as bad as that of an
absolute monarch. This view developed in the agrarian, pre-industrial
society with a static conception of interests: namely, that interests do
not change for long periods of time, that facilities for enlightenment
are deficient or entirely lacking and that people will have little or no
occasion or opportunity to modify their views. It must be evident that
in the age of industrialism this conception can no longer hold. The
shift of interests and the spread of information and ideas are occurring constantly, and the composition of a majority soon changes.
While certain interests and groups have a more stationary and conservative character than others, marginal forces which wish change
always exist even among these, and interests have such a complex character that they are in a continuous state of modification. A majority
could not remain stable long enough to establish a dictatorship of
numbers.
The value of representation to society may be clarified by an
analysis of the extent to which the principle was employed in the Old
Regime. The most cumbersome and inefficient organization in that
order was the Polish diet, a body of feudal, sovereign nobles, each
armed with an absolute veto over any piece of legislation. Representation was reduced to the minimum responsibility of calling the diet together and presiding over its sessions until violence stopped the proceedings. Legislation of any consequence could not emerge from
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this aristocratic rabble, for the members would not give up any of
their absolute power and rejected any suggestion that they might all
have enough interests in common to justify the delegation of powers
to certain chosen leaders. By no stretch of the imagination could these
nobles be considered to represent the country. From the standpoint
of both efficiency and representation they ranked far below the contemporary institution of the absolute monarchy to be found in other
countries.
The monarch developed instruments of organization by the aid
of which he claimed to represent the entire people. Irrespective of
whether he regarded his power as derived from the people or directly
from God, or from both, he exercised authority at least to some extent
for the sake of all social groups and was able to perform some services
of common interest. The need for actual direct representation of the
population in the Old Regime did not appear to be pressing, for social
alignment and interests remained about the same from year to year,
and change took place so slowly that people were scarcely aware of it.
The physical handicaps upon transportation and communication and
the narrow margin of subsistence prevented the lower classes from being much concerned with other than local affairs.
In spite of its improvement over feudalism as a principle of organization, absolutism failed to keep up with the requirements of changing
society. It largely wrecked the institutions like the town council and
the county and other assemblies built at least in part on the elective
system, and it developed no facilities for preserving the efficiency of
absolutism as a representative of developing interests. The term itself signifies a strong if not overpowering drive toward ossification,
for it tolerates the presence of no stimulating, competitive force which
would keep it alive and responsive to new conditions of society. It
could have dealt with this problem by introducing new and efficient
institutions of representation; but in doing so it would have destroyed
itself. Absolutism seems to have faced an inescapable dilemma: if it
endeavored to preserve its authority, it would be eliminated as a handicap to social change; if it acquiesced in the demand for a more responsive government and organization of society, it would disappear. In
either way it seemed doomed to be supplanted by some new institutions
and ways for enabling people to work together. It succumbed to the
far more efficient system of representation.
As the need for organization expands, representation becomes increasingly important. In the Old Regime the only large organization
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had to do with government. All the other areas of society, with few
exceptions like joint stock companies, remained small in social composition and in scope of operation. Consequently, the representative
principle was first found useful in government and the rest of society
remained organized on simple, local foundations. With the coming of
bigness and interdependence the significance of this principle has
grown in proportion, until in our modern industrial culture representation has become a basic characteristic. Not merely government
and political activity but economic, social and cultural aspects of our
society have grown large and elaborate, and unless other ideals than
social efficiency have predominated we have found it essential to develop the institutions of representation in all these lines. A trade
union cannot be organized .like the old Polish diet any more than an
educational institution, an industry, a church, or a women's club. The
fact of bigness has inclined each, irrespective of purpose, to institute
means of allowing and encouraging the maximum participation in its
affairs of all individuals or interests. It has led to the creation of an
instrument that will draw together the common interests in the organization and enable them to function without the imposition of any
monopoly. Recognizing that the diversity of interests of each individual or organization will lead each to participate in a variety of associations, modern society has utilized this extraordinarily flexible and
adaptable principle of representation as a unifying instrument in a
culture of maximum diversity. Membership and loyalty have become
pluralistic, to the benefit of both individuals and society.
Since the concept representation signifies that some one represents
someone else or some thing, it can only be used on a wide scale in a
society of individuals intellectually capable of recognizing the similarity
of interests among numerous groups of varied purpose. It requires a
high level of education such as our advanced cultures have been developing. The peasant of the Old Regime grasped the general meaning
of the principle and applied it in his own local sphere; but to comprehend the complex ways in which it can and must be successfully
employed at present, depends upon a degree of education and a kind
of practical experience which the peasant could not have had. It
entails an understanding of other interests and of total situations, of
flexible means and adaptable ways, which no localistic, agrarian society
could have provided.
Where the individual has a high regard for himself and is in turn
highly regarded by others, where he feels that he represents something
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of consequence, the ideal of representation can be generally executed
in all aspects of a society. The peasant of the Old Regime could be
proud of his work and knew that the welfare of society depended upon
him; but he never had the means to make his importance count in the
direction of the affairs of the whole society. His successor in our age
can do so, and for that purpose he utilizes the principle and practice
of representation.
Irrespective of the nature and purpose of the organization in
which it is applied, the concept of representation in its fullest form
imposes a common procedure and common characteristics upon those
who use it. The organization may be a political party, a school class,
a trade union, a women's club, a church society, a parliamentary body,
a civic association: whenever it employs the principle of representation
it has with greater or lesser degree of ceremony to go through a common process. Some one must be a candidate for leadership; someone
must nominate him as candidate; others must react to his candidacy
by supporting or opposing it or remaining neutral; the candidate and
his supporters must campaign for office; an orderly system of election
must be abided by; the winner must look after the welfare of both
supporters and opponents and the indifferent, and the loser must
acquiesce in the verdict and loyally cooperate with his opponents.
Each step in the process must conform to the ideal of standing for
something in addition to one's own immediate and personal interests.
The intellectual and moral implications of the representational
procedure can be felt throughout society. They conform to the fundamental mores. Becoming a candidate, either on one's own initiative
or on that of others, can only occur as an expression of individual
private initiative. The same act of initiative for leadership is demanded as in the economic sphere. Others must assume the responsibility of
organizing support for the candidate, thus encouraging the moral
habit of voluntary cooperation. The candidates compete for votes by
offering proposals for public service, as business and professional men
compete for customers. The acceptance of the verdict of the election
by winner and loser puts into practice the ideal of good sportsmanship;
and the recognition on the part of the winner that he must look after
the general interest and not that of his party alone enhances the spirit
of fair play and the appreciation of the existence of common, public
welfare. The fact that neither side relaxes its vigilance and competitive zeal for the leading position, and that the contest for the public
favor must be renewed keeps acute the demand for efficiency. The
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process can and intrinsically does call forth and preserve the western
ideals of individualism, competition, cooperation, and public-mindedness. It brings about increased awareness on the part of the individual
of his own and of social interests and values. It requires both toughness
and fair play, disagreement and toleration. It is based on a sense of
mutual respect and acceptance of common ideals of society in the
midst of controversy over means and policies to further those ideals.
It serves as the main spring for our culture: without it we should have
to go the way of authoritarianism; with it, we can continue to be free
and creative.
Once the representative is elected, he must perform functions which
again are similar in any type of organization. The primary one pertains to the making of policy, and since he has had to gain office in
competition with others he will have gone through a process of learning what the public wants and of thinking through the question of
what the public needs and of what it will tolerate. As new problems
are constantly emerging, in order to be re-elected he must keep in
touch with his constituency. Because of the multiplicity of interests
seeking his aid he must cultivate the habit of judiciousness, an essential element in making policy. His second major responsibility involves the supervision of the executive agencies. In a small organization this consists mainly of guiding and checking the activity of a few
employees; to assure efficient operation in a large one requires proportionately more time and energy.
The representative system provides the means for enjoying the
benefits of bigness without having to suffer the disadvantages of
authoritarianism. It enables us to keep bigness responsible to the public or rather to the variety of publics according to the purpose of the
particular organization. Persons in positions of authority are subject
to the popular control of the voters, citizens, members of a trade
union, stockholders in a corporation, at regular intervals and thereby
are prevented from entrenching themselves and forming a caste.
Rigidity and incompetence are excluded by the-necessity of leadership's
having to submit to criticism and competition from interested rivals.
The presence of these checks and balances assures that no one person
obtains permanent control and that no dictatorial regime is established. The system is auto-stimulating to activity on the part of private
individuals in behalf of both personal and general interests. It develops a standard for public service which affects the bureaucracy, and
turns the minds of the members of that awkward institution toward
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thinking of means to improve relations with the public and to make
itself representative. As long as the bureaucracy is subject to the
direction and critical review of a representative body functioning in a
culture the unifying principle of which is representational, it will have
to respect the ideal of responsible governance. The system of representation therefore provides the greatest assurance that free and democratic ways will be preserved.
The successful employment of the principle of representation depends upon whether among a diversity of interests a common denominator is present. This common denominator may be called the
national, the public or the general interest, the trade union or corporation interest, or by the name of any other organization in question.
In any case it creates the basis for that which we normally associate
solely with the state, namely politics. The reason for the exclusive use
of this term in relation to the state is clear. Since politics refers to the
means of dealing with the area of common concern among a multiplicity of interests, the word has been employed to refer primarily to
that organization of the largest common denominator, the state. It
seems evident, however, that this monopolization is unjustified. Common interests are present in all other associations of people, and members differ about the interpretation of these interests. In doing so
they engage in politics, and one can legitimately refer to political
activity in any and all of the organizations of society. The inner
affairs of a church require the use of political means as much as do
the problems of a state, although certainly not in the same proportion.
An economic organization may be considered a form of special interest;
but any corporation consists of the diverse interests of workers and employees, managers and owners, and one might well add of the producers
of its raw materials and the consumers of its goods. In the inter-action
of these interests within the corporation there occurs the equivalent of
political activity within the state. The case is even clearer when one
studies how the corporation is related to other economic interests in
society. We normally think of its being connected by the direct line of
cost and profit; but when the lines of connection become general, when
the corporation perceives its dependence upon the total cultural situation outside its immediate control, it turns to the use of politics in the
state sense. It recognizes the supplementary nature of economics and
politics, and employs in state affairs the same methods of handling the
public aspects of private issues that are used on matters within the
lesser but nevertheless complete public of the corporation. Politics
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supplies the means of dealing with those problems that arise in the
region where private affairs take on or reveal their general character
and are subject to controversial interpretation and judgment about
advisable policies.
The presence of the area of common concern among diverse interests within any organization necessitates the discussion by the
participants of the general issues. Private interest has to be related to
public interest, and each individual must gauge the connection between
them. In this way each person is led to think not merely in selfish or
private terms but to consider the interest of the whole. The quality of
his character will be revealed in the manner in which he relates these
two interests, but even in an extremely egocentric case he must at least
be aware of the general welfare.
The question has often been asked whether by turning man's attention away from moral and aesthetic affairs to the stuff of current
public activity political discussion tends to lower intellectual standards.
There appears to be every reason for answering in the negative. The
consideration of the practical problem of relating private and public
interests imposes upon each person the necessity of thinking about
the fundamentals of organized life. Depending upon ability and turn
of mind, the individual may probe all the problems that concerned
Plato and Aristotle. He may be led into theoretical considerations of
the public good and of how the individual is involved in it. He has to
some degree to understand the nature of process, the importance of
timing, the appropriateness of methods to purpose. He gains an appreciation of character in action, of the value of a nice combination of
objective and subjective standards. Each individual is forced by the
situation to take a stand in public on general affairs, and each is thereby trained to become, if he has the temperament and inclination, a
public leader. This is the area of civic education of the most practical
kind because it has a personal basis. It encourages open discussion, the
testing of mind against mind, respect for the views of others, and the
willingness to compromise. It stimulates self-confidence, self-expression, private initiative in public affairs. It throws the ultimate responsibility for general conditions back upon the private individual. It imposes duties upon him, and keeps as many matters of public import as
possible within the voluntary area of activity. It is difficult to understand why anyone should regard this kind of experience and training
as intellectually stultifying. Never before in history has man enjoyed
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such opportunItIes and such stimuli to the development of all his
faculties. Never before have all organizations tended to cultivate the
same pattern of public-private, general-particular, social-individual
thinking as they do at present.
Moral and aesthetic experience and values permeate our lives. We
tend to comprehend the moral ones, but not the others. Nevertheless,
the habits of thought of representation should help us equally in the
case of both. An appreciation of the relevance of means to ends affords
a fundamental criterion for insight not merely into a political act but
into a work of art. Admiration for political techniques, for the ability
to get things done, should open one's eyes to the appreciation of craftsmanship even in the carving of a statue. The sense of the importance
of form which must be cultivated in order to cooperate with others in
public life can readily be transferred to the sphere of music. Representation should not be confused with identity in art (where it is
erroneously called "realism") any more than in politics. If some
senators can lay claim to be representative of their states, why cannot a
painting by Picasso be regarded as a representation of reality? The
former express certain views and interests held by their constituencies;
the other, certain things and reactions to life. Neither expresses or
represents the totality. The practice of representation should encourage
society to be as tolerant of experimentation and novelty in art as it is
in science and politics. It should enable society to accept the portrayal
of the diversity of objects and factors in art as in other activities of life,
to comprehend the rights of art to be not photographic but representational in the same way as politics.
Social training in freedom is so pertinent to aesthetic training that
one is astonished at the absence of carry-over from the one to the other.
Unfortunately, the humanities have not as yet been related with much
effectiveness to the actual experience of non-aesthetics. This relationship largely remains to be accomplished; but the representational pattern of our culture provides the intellectual and spiritual criteria which
could readily be adapted to this purpose.
Since finding the principle of representation to be the most efficient
and economical form of organization, the society of industrialism has
experimented with possible bases for it. Numbers have been most
commonly used-numbers of citizens in state elections, numbers of
workers in trade union elections, numbers of tons of coal or steel in
distribution or production quotas by a cartel, numbers of workers,
numbers of stocks, numbers of associations, size of capitalization, size
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of payroll, and so on. The quantitative. unit seems to afford the most
clear-cut and equitable means of measuring and comparing degrees
of power; but others, such as expert knowledge and typicalness, are
likewise employed. The bases vary in accordance with the character
and purpose of the organization, and an understanding of the adaptability of the concept of representation to different situations and needs
requires an analysis of each.
The simplest and purest basis of representation is that of being
human. The absolute equality of biological and spiritual units of
society receives recognition in those associations which owe their existence to the need on the part of all humans alike in them for certain
common services. The outstanding example is offered by the modern
state. This institution is expected to supply to all citizens without
partiality the essentials of protection, civic rights and guidance in
common affairs. It depends in turn upon the support of each citizen.
The equalitarian trend of the modern state as seen in the use of universal, equal suffrage rests upon the presence of actual needs and actual
functions. As the state is organized in this way, the political party has
likewise to be, and the civic association follows suit. In the latter a
common purpose or objective may hold together a highly diversified
number of persons and interests; and the equal vote may be the main
means of expressing that common concern. The butcher, the pastor,
the manufacturer, the worker may all desire the development of a
park and other civic improvements; 'they may reveal their equal concern about these matters by giving the civic association an equalitarian
constitution. In the case of other organizations built upon human
equality a situation obtains similar to that of the state, but they accept
the principle for different reasons. The church regards each individual
as important as every other because of the equality of souls in the
eyes of God and the tradition of brotherly love. In many associations,
especially those of a voluntary character, a school class, for example,
the matters in hand may be sufficiently inconsequential to permit the
general pattern of equal suffrage to be applied merely as an act of
training in social conformity. The trade union has from the beginning
been organized in accordance with the fact that its personnel, actual
and potential, owns little or no other than personal property and sells
its physical, human skill to the employer. Each member is therefore
unencumbered by outside property interests, and stands on an equal
material basis with the others. Each member earns a living in the same
manner as every other one, through the use by an employer of his
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personal biological and intellectual resources. Although the existing
members may try to exclude potential ones from full participation for
a time, the trade union has tended to utilize the numerical, equalitarian, human basis for representation in the same way as the state,
and because of its size it approaches the inclusive model of the state as
nearly as any other association.
The problem becomes complicated as soon as the factor of property
and the necessity to make a profit become involved. Property can be
used as the foundation of representation only with the sacrifice of
human equality. One share in a corporation may carry the right to
one vote, but the number of shares owned and thus the influence
exercised by individuals will differ. One may argue that equality is
preserved by means of the equality of the shares; but the fact remains
that shares, property and the corporation exist for the sake of human
beings, and that the most elemental kind of equality is that of persons.
Since the amount of property rights held by individuals varies, it follows that the use of property as a basis of representation renders a
situation of social equality impossible.
The second factor; namely, that of having to earn a profit, creates
even more difficulty for the application of the idea of representation
than the fact of property. The necessity to show a profit is used to
justify the statement that power must be commensurate with responsibility, that a person in charge of the corporation's welfare cannot wait
for, or necessarily abide by, the will of a majority. Representative
government may work in the conduct of state affairs, it is said, where
the executive does not have to assure the earning of a profit and at
best has merely to maintain conditions in which private interest can do
so. It may act in leisurely fashion, the argument continues, and unlike
a business is not compelled by competition to make quick decisions.
The conclusion is then drawn that the idea of representation can be
applied in business only in a conditional sense.
If the line of reasoning were entirely correct, a conflict would exist
between the constitutional organization of business and of government,
and one would be forced to fear that the authoritarian form might win
over the democratic in the entire society. Fortunately, the case is
neither so simple nor the difference so pronounced. The constitutions
of business and government appear to be developing in the same
general direction. The authoritarian argument was formulated in the
period when property largely took a tangible form and business
organizations were small. With the rise of bigness and its concomitants,
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tangible rights in property and intangible property, the conditions
have been created which render representation both possible and
necessary for efficiency. The change from ownership of tangible property to that of intangible forms, from immediate personal relations of
small-scale operations to the impersonal managerial relations of bigness, has forced business to begin to use the principle of representation in much the same way and for the same reason that its large-scale
predecessor, government, did. The replacing of owners by managers as
the heads of big enterprises has meant the substitution of pluralism for
absolutism. The manager, the employees, labor, the owners of the
stocks and bonds, the public, all have interests in the business. Some
are property interests, others like those of labor or the public are rights
or interests, like the right to work, or the right to service. One interest
may be mainly financial, another personal, another social, another
that of prestige; very likely, each participant has a combination of
these interests. They all wish to share in the conduct of affairs. Just
as the increase in the circulation of money helped to undermine caste
distinctions in the Old Regime, so in our culture the expansion of the
institutions of interests and of intangible property has brought social
and occupational groups together. Each provides a common denominator; each has an equalitarian influence. Thus, not merely individual
persons but property units as well are being organized in accordance
with the principle of representation.
It may be that in spite of the advantage of bigness the effective use
of the representative system is augmented by the preservation of
tangible property in areas of the economy over and above those of
agriculture and trade. The psychological impact of each property
relation supplements and balances that of the other: the intangible
stresses interdependence and mutualness; the tangible emphasizes
personal responsibility. The latter provides an ultimate source of
initiative and creativeness: the individual in intimate relation to something material within his immediate grasp and possession. The former
encourages the practice of considering individual activity from the
viewpoint of the social good. Representation affords the means for
bringing the two into cooperation.
The elaboration of the concept of representation may be seen in
the structure of joint-production boards. Differences in forms of
ownership hardly affect the outcome: the board operates on the same
principle whether the business is privately owned, that is, by private
stockholders, or is owned by the state. These boards are a product

REPRESENTATION

93

primarily of the two world wars of this century, when management,
labor, and the public realized that in order to assure victory over the
enemy all must cooperate to the maximum. Labor and management
therefore organized the boards to improve production. Labor was
recognized formally as having an interest in the welfare not merely
of the state but of the particular corporation in which it worked. The
question of ownership of stocks did not need to be raised. In so far as
consumers' representatives or representatives of the public selected by
the government participated in over-all boards for an entire industry,
and they usually did, the affairs of business became subject to supervision by even more widespread interests.
The recognition of labor's concern with a business by the addition
of several of its representatives to the board of directors has not advanced much beyond the stage of experimentation. As education grows
and expert knowledge in many fields develops among labor and employees and a sense of responsibility not merely for the interests of
labor but for the general welfare continues to expand, it is entirely
probable that the legislature of a bigness will seek to improve upon
its guidance of the enterprise by representing more interests than it
does at present.
Bigness has created the need for one kind of representation which
at first view may seem inconsistent with the general principle. The
institution of the foreign service arose in modern times with the national monarchy. The practice of not electing but appointing representatives of this sort has continued and expanded as other organizations of life have grown large. Today we have many examples of this
practice, state representatives abroad, representatives of the public on
the board of directors of public corporations, representatives of management on joint-production committees, representatives of the public
on labor relations boards, representatives of trade unions on national
or international committees, representatives of a profession on a board,
and so on. All are called and claim to be representatives, and all are
appointed. Do they fulfill the functions and satisfy the conditions of
representation, or are they examples of creeping authoritarianism?
The practice of appointment may be genuinely representational or
not, depending upon who exercises the power, who is selected, what is
accomplished. The same conditions could be listed for any other act in
our complex society. An advisory board may be appointed by some
organization head merely as a cover; the board mayor may not permit
itself to be abused in this way. If the appointer is subject to control
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by an authentically representative group, the delegate may be regarded
as a genuine expression of his function. Certain of the appointed
representatives, like the members of the foreign service, administer
policies which, usually with their help, are set for them. If the appointee possesses expert knowledge which enables him to act on behalf of the best interests of the group, he may also be considered to be
genuine. He keeps the ideal and the practical in close cooperation,
and sets standards for the group involved. A labor representative on a
labor relations panel will express the views of the milieu out of which
he comes and into which he will return. His expert knowledge, enhanced by the experience on the panel, will enable him to do more
than represent the status quo; it will enable him to represent that
which should be. In this sense any expert acts the part of educator
and leader in transforming the social conditions. He helps to create
new situations to be represented, and as a leader of his group he does
much of the thinking for it. He may do so while remaining merely
an expert or he may try to gain support for his ideas by becoming an
elected leader. If he remains merely an expert his position will be
different from that of an elected representative. While he has functions
similar to those of the latter, he does so by virtue not of election but
of his expert knowledge, and his position as representative is derivative.
If the system of election were abolished, the expert would quickly adapt
himself to the new form of governance.
The conception of functional representation has emerged in recent
decades as a possible substitute for numerical representation. It may
be considered an extension into the sphere of the state of the system
which has been developing in large corporations. Functional interests
are represented, not primarily as collections of equal individuals but
as separate even though interdependent interests. This kind of representation is subject to the same limitation as that of some appointed
experts: each represents a special part, not the commonalty, not the
human being as such. The action of a functionally representative assembly just as that of the expert should in the public sphere not be
decisive, for such bodies can only act on the basis of compro¥lise and
the general welfare will suffer. The advice of functional assemblies
and of experts may be sought, and the more clearly institutionalized
this expression of interests becomes the better for everyone; but on
issues of general, public policy the practice of representation requires
that the decision rest with those selected on the basis of numerical
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equality in frequent, periodic elections. This is the heart of the representative system.
Society has had to achieve a means of balancing responsibility with
authority. It has sought and found instruments for maintaining
structure and continuity in the midst of change. For that purpose it
has taken the system of checks and balances and cooperation of representative governance developed in the sphere of state and is successfully
introducing it into every aspect of organized life. A bureaucracy composed of permanent or relatively permanent employees and imbued
with a representational feeling, an executive staff or management
selected by and responsible for guiding and supervising the work of
the others-this complicated machinery enables representative government to work in a society of bigness. It seems doubtful whether prior
to our machine age it could have functioned. Conditions of large-scale
interdependence have made it possible.
Any big organization of varied interests may be abused by one or
all of the participants. Each interest may demand more than its fair
share of the product and in the competitive fight may be willing to
run'the risk of crippling or wrecking the regime. Whether it does so,
whether the representative system is a success or failure, depends
ultimately upon the moral standards of the participants. The institution tends to cultivate habits of consideration of the general interest;
but neither it nor any institution affords an absolute assurance against
wilful violation of its purpose. It will help to achieve the society of
process, if human beings employ it to that end. It will become either
an arena for fighting interests or a means of social cooperation and freedom according to the behavior of the individual participants.

Chapter Vll

OBSTACLES TO PROCESS WITHIN THE SOCIETY
OF INDUSTRIALISM
It is evident to anyone living in a free industrial society that the
achievement of the ideals of process confronts formidable obstacles.
The most important of these are characterized by authoritarianism, and
are so different in structure that they will be analyzed at some length
in the next chapter. Others arise out of the situation of bigness and
process, and although not intrinsically hostile to freedom they may
become so. The presence of each indicates the manifold complexity
of this culture, the capacity of an institution or a way of doing things
to be creative or destructive. In the society of process the fact of continuous change in an interdependent whole requires constant attention
to the efficiency of the parts and constant exercise of imagination for
devising means to counter the destructive elements and to guide the
process in the right direction. If we do not recognize the risk involved
and take precautionary measures, we may permit our culture to be
damaged or even destroyed.
The sources of danger range from institutions to social groups to
policies. The bureaucracy has still to be subjected to full popular
control. The welfare state may create its own destroyer in the form
of collectivization or public ownership. The problem of monopoly
continues to plague us. Even more important is the question whether
personalities can be developed which are stable, reasonable and
judicious, and capable of operating our complicated and dangerous
system of life. The tempo of change may be too great for us to construct the educational resources for coping with it. We have not yet
succeeded in solving fundamental social problems, one of which, the
security of the middle class, has proved of disastrous effect. Will these
difficulties prevent the achievement of the society of process?
While the bureaucracy offers no great menace to the survival of a
free society, it must be regarded as an instrument for either good or
evil, depending upon how it is used. Nec.essary in any large organization, including the military, the bureaucracy shares the fate of its master. If bigness is subordinated to the general good, either by representative control or by competition or some other means, its administrative
machinery will serve the same objective, or the entire organization may
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go under. The chance exists, however, especially in government, that
the bureaucracy may gain control and exploit the organization for the
sake of the administration. In that case, the means becomes the end;
vitality is reduced to the amount necessary to continue the functioning
of the bureaucracy; expansion consists merely of increasing the number
of officials or of agencies, the new ones to perform duties which the
old ones should have attended to or in a police state to watch over the
loyalty of the existing ones. The process of bureaucratic proliferation
can theoretically reach no conclusion until everyone has become an
official, each controlling the other. But bureaucratism may become a
disease long before this state of saturation has been reached.
The difficulty which representative assemblies and the executive
authority, whether in government or in large private organizations,
have in controlling their administrative agency seems to be inherent
in the nature of the bureaucracy. Not merely the cumbersomeness
of a vast organization may prevent adequate checking on operations:
it takes a bureaucrat to catch a bureaucrat; but likewise the officials are
subject to the desire for power, the desire to take on more and more
functions and expand the number of personnel in their agencies. They
face the constant temptation of p:rofessional experts to abuse their expert knowledge for the increase of their power. If the agency of control, whether legislative or executive, refuses to agree to the expansion,
it may be correct in its judgment but by rejecting the advice of its experts it also runs the risk of injuring the public. If it accepts the advice,
it may be acting wisely, but it may to the detriment of the public be
the victim of a bureaucratic empire-builder. If it sets up a body of
experts to scrutinize the proposals of the existing ones, it will have
started a chain reaction and bureaucratism will be well under way. It
would be exaggerating to label the bureaucracy an anti-democratic
institution. It mayor it may not be. Although its hierarchical structure
resembles that of the military, and the tendency of the institution lies
in the direction of authoritarianism, society can control it and make it
serve the cause of democracy. The free culture of industrialism has
plenty of resources to prevent this bureaucratic ossification; but any
major variation from the society of process, let us say in the direction of
totalitarianism or communism, will lead to such elaboration of bureaucratism as to reduce or even cripple the functioning of industrialism
itself.
It is a well established fact that collectivism under communism
means the end of freedom and the transfer of all power to the dictator.
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Whether nationalization in a socialist society of free elections, civil
liberties, and free government bears the same tendency poses one of the
most disputed questions of our time. It seems to be recognized that
nationalization increases the costs of operation of an enterprise, but
that for certain economic functions public welfare in general may profit
from transfer of responsibility to the state. The argument arises over
the point at which the disadvantages outweigh the benefits. The
formula, "freedom under planning," does not solve the question of
how much of one is compatible with how much of the other. The most
convincing answer that has been given is that government ownership
and control should be extended only in so far as they assist private
enterprise, that nationalization as such solves no problems but merely
transfers these problems to the sphere of government. Thus nationalization withdraws economic enterprises from the discipline of the competitive, free market and involves them in politics. The standards of
business activity no longer are set by economics, but are formulated
in political controversy and lose their objectivity. Political expediency
instead of profit becomes the criterion; and as costs of production and
distribution thereby increase, the political demand will be made to
extend control or ownership to additional economic resources in order
to protect the existing public investment. Since political interest decides the matter, who can say whether the entire economy will not fall
under its power?
The opponents of collectivism argue that the supplanting of economic by political standards will mean the reversal of the social process of industrialism. Bureaucrats will replace entrepreneurs; public
political risk will assume the functions of private risk; the government
will decide what is to be produced and distributed, to whom, and at
what price. The entire responsibility for efficiency and economy will
pass from the multitude of private individuals, each with his economic
enterprise, whether it be store or farm or industry, to the single
authority of the government. The power of the executive branch and
its bureaucratic agency will be so enormous that popular control, the
governmental system of checks and balances, will prove to be impossible. Individual freedom will succumb to political expediency
and it in turn to outright authoritarianism. Administrative decrees will
take the place of free and responsible policy-making; efficiency will be
measured in terms of political popularity rather than according to the
objective standards of profit and loss; bureaucratism will supplant
private initiative. The government will wrap its economic organs in
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red tape and file them in cabinets. Thus run the arguments of the
critics of nationalization, and so far no convincing refutation has been
offered. The society of process would again be threatened with destruction by dogma and its instruments of social and intellectual rigidity.
Since bigness characterizes our economic organization, it has
aroused the question of whether it can be subjected to popular control. With its tendency toward monopoly, it cannot be socially disciplined by the free market to the extent that its small predecessors
were. The presence of a powerful government may not suffice as
counter-balance in the long run, for the constitutional organization
of business may be antithetic to that of government, and undermine it.
In government popular control has been exerted by means of representation based on equal suffrage. Each human being by virtue of the
fact that he is a human being possesses the same voting power as every
other. The elemental fact of humanness is thereby recognized as basic
in running the elemental institution of social organization, the government. As one approaches the area of business, however, the institutions
are organized on the basis of property rights and not of human ones.
At present, the system of representation in business seems to be antithetic to that in free government, and whether the two systems can exist
alongside each other, whether the one will undermine the other, or
whether some compromise by way of an amalgamation of the two will
occur, cannot as yet be stated. Present evidence points toward compromise, for trade unions are steadily forcing on big business organization the recognition of the rights of numbers of equal human beings,
and business is pressing upon government the claims of property to be
represented. Furthermore, the twentieth century offers no important
instance of the revival of the practice of the first part of the preceding
century of basing political voting power upon property rights. Vestiges
of that practice have been eliminated, and the corporative state has so
far had little success. The major additions to the art of governance in
this century have been the introduction of equal, universal suffrage and
of the one-party system. Even in the latter case, the popular political
organizations have tended to assert control over the institutions representing property.
A second dilemma arising out of the fact of bigness may assume
greater significance than that concerning governance. Industrialism
has created conditions favorable to the development of monopolies.
Science and technology have encouraged this trend, and the social
sciences have assisted in the creation of administrative and policy-
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making institutions for transforming potentialities into facts. The
inducements to organize monopolies have been so strong that antitrust and anti-monopoly legislation has so far failed to be effective,
and government control or regulation of legally accepted monopolies,
as in Germany, has scarcely been more successful in defending the
public interest. Monopolies are subject to the major criticism that they
easily slip into a state of relative inefficiency because of the lack of
competition, but that they are nonetheless able to command a larger
share of the national income than their economy of production justifies.
They therefore may benefit at the expense of others, and in times of
economic crisis they may maintain their own profit to the detriment of
general welfare. They tend toward rigidity in a type of economy requiring flexibility and constant adjustment. The most promising solution to this problem has developed in Sweden, where the cooperatives
or other private organizations have curbed monopoly by assuring the
conditions of competition.
Bigness can be used for the general good if people understand issues
and are competent to work out solutions. In the society of process,
success or failure depends upon the ability of human beings to an
unprecedented extent. Democratic methods and instruments are present or can be developed in abundance if people know how and will
do so. The great problem arises as to whether society has enough
general intelligence to comprehend the issues which it faces. Are
these too complex for the public to understand before it is too late?
So much expert knowledge is required before one can pass judgment
on the basic issues in the military, economic, social, political, cultural
fields, that democracy in government as well as in society may fail.
The responsibility put upon education at all levels from kindergarten
to graduate school is enormous. If education does not enable the public to understand the problems, our society will fall into the hands of
experts subject to control by persons with power but devoid of
intelligence about how to use it. In that case, either an authoritarian
rule will have to be set up or our civilization will be destroyed. Either
alternative is repulsive.
Even in the case of experts, danger to society may arise from individuals who have enormous power as scientists but are emotionally
unstable or hostile to the free society in which they live or are social
robots willing to serve any master. When experts worked with gunpowder or dynamite, they could be dangerous to merely a handful
of people; at the present day, in a society accustomed to total war, an
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unstable expert may possess the power to destroy thousands or millions.
One may reply that scientists, for example, biologists, in the past had
similar means of destruction and did not use them, that mankind has
proved that it can be trusted, that scientific devotion also cultivates
the ideal of service and responsibility to society. These arguments undoubtedly have weight, and the weight can be increased by proper
education. It seems to remain true, however, that at no age in the past
has knowledge possessed such potential danger to society as at present
and has the need to understand and control it on the part of the
general public been as great. If the public fails to keep up, it may unwittingly tum the responsibility of control over to a secret police,
which may in time become masters of us all. The police state will then
have supplanted democracy by serfdom.
The danger might not appear so real if industrialism did not work
with such speed. Issues of fundamental importance arise so fast that
the public may not even know of their existence before it is too late
to act. Representative government tends to function slowly; it waits
for the public to understand problems and crystallize its judgment before the representatives pass the necessary laws. This process may require several years for completion, and by that time the matters in
both internal and international affairs may have been decided by default. Will the public prefer to maintain its ease, its intellectual sloth,
rather than to keep alert on these issues and preserve its democratic
way of life? The times seem to require a fine combination of high
intelligence on the part of the general public, a pervading sense of
public service on the part of the experts, and an extraordinarily
resourceful and conscientious leadership by the elected representatives
to keep the two others in close cooperation. Basic values of freedom
must be preserved in a culture so dependent upon change that society
may regard change as an end instead of a means and so lose its liberty.
Again the key seems to be found in education.
The most frequent criticism leveled at industrialism has been that
of having accentuated insecurity. Booms and depressions, excesses in
each direction, are regarded as inevitable manifestations, with great
inducements to spend beyond one's means in prosperous times and
with the certainty of mass unemployment at others. The most severe
critics have even discovered a law about this phenomenon, and have
derived further solace in assuring themselves thereby of the collapse
of free industrialism in favor of communism. The claim of the existence of any such law may be dismissed as unsupported by objective
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evidence; but it is undoubtedly true that as contrasted with an agrarian,
localistic economy, industrialism has augmented the degree of uncertainty about the future. Entrepreneurial risk plays an integral part in
keeping industrialism alive and vigorous, and risk implies insecurity.
At the same time this society has developed means, again on an unprecedented scale, for coping successfully with the problem. One may
say that for the first time in history democracy has become possible.
The economy of abundance has supplanted the economy of want, and
has placed the responsibility for organizing these resources for the
benefit of all squarely upon man himself. In recent decades students of
society have worked out methods of reducing insecurity to a minimum.
Their proposals are associated with the ideal of the welfare state, and
include the cooperation of private and public enterprise for a common
objective, in which private enterprise becomes conscious of its social
duties and plans to meet them, and where the state assumes the
role of balance wheel. Each performs those functions essential for
social security and welfare consistent with its character; the government
assumes those which private enterprise is unable or unwilling to handle.
It does so as the popularly-controlled instrument of the general public.
There remains no excuse for permitting large-scale unemployment to
occur; we know how to avoid this calamity, if we will.
In this century the group most unstable in its social and political
ideals has been not the workers but the salaried middle class. The
workers have learned to organize themselves into powerful trade unions
able to defend their interests and effectively to express their views on
public affairs. They have recognized their stake in industrialism and
have been seeking ways of participating constructively in the conduct
of the economy. The salaried middle class has on the whole so far
been unable to develop comparable occupational organizations. In
contrast to the workers, it has lacked the strength of numbers and has
not acquired the habits of protecting its interests by any such instrument as a strike. It has cherished pretensions to social position for
which it has lacked the economic foundation; and instead of developing
its own instruments for establishing that foundation, it has sought to
gain its end through politics. Lacking other than some personal
property and related to industrialism less in an economic sense than
in a cultural one, it has become a staunch advocate of the welfare state.
In some cases it has done so under a nationalistic guise, in others, by
way of a kind of middle-class socialism, in others, by following the lead
of conservative critics of laissez-faire. In all instances, wherever
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pinched it has turned to politics to secure it against unemployment and
to supplement its real income, and on many occasions it has been willing to sacrifice its liberty for these material ends. Of all the social
groups it has constituted the least dependable support of freedom
under industrialism and has been the boldest and most reckless
experimenter in governmental, social, and political organization.
Whether it will continue to be a source of insecurity or whether it will
fulfill the indispensable function in a free society indicated by its
name will continue to depend upon the effectiveness of industrialism
in providing full employment and maintaining social and occupational
mobility according to proved ability. In spite of its behavior in fascism,
Nazism, and similar forms of totalitarianism, the salaried middle class
possesses the qualities for being an essential support of the society of
freedom.

Chapter VIII

THE SOCIETIES OF POWER AND RIGIDITY
The realization of the culture of industrialism cannot be regarded
as inevitable. Apart from the obstacles of its own making industrialism
confronts three others, each of major significance: namely, institutions
and forces which have survived from the Old Regime, and the ideologies of nationalism and communism, which were shaped prior to or
at the beginning of industrialism and up to the present have expanded
their power. Alien to free society, these forces have violated the nature
of industrialism by demanding the concentration of power and imposing rigidity upon its processes. In the degree of concentration of
authority and the resulting rigidity the three differ among themselves
according to the differences in their objectives; but by virtue of their
authoritarianism they have fundamental qualities in common, and
need to be analyzed both on an individual basis and as a common
phenomenon.
Reduced to its essential elements the concept of power contains
two kinds, social and physical power. Social power may be called that
which employs intellectual and spiritual means, and respects the rational and moral nature of man. Physical power implies the use of
physical or material force toward human beings. Both are normally
present in society to some degree, for each tends to supplement the
other. The character of a society depends upon the degree to which
each is used. If social power predominates, the regime is organized in
accordance with the ideals of freedom and democracy; if physical power
has the superior role, freedom will have succumbed to authoritarianism.
In this study the concept power will be used to refer to the regime in
which the exercise of physical power has been extended to the farthest
point in modern times and has thereby supplied a standard against
which we can judge the nature of various types of social organization.
We have already discussed in the chapter on the society of process the
kind of culture characterized by social power; we shall now concentrate
upon the analysis of the situation in which physical force is employed
to handle social problems, and shall note the kind of institutions and
ways which conform to the needs of the full use of power.
A power regime means that authority is concentrated in the hands
of one or a few persons as a monopoly group. If this were not the case,
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the power would soon be distributed in the course of action among
many groups, interests and individuals, and emphasis would shift to
social and away from physical power. There can be centralization
of power even in a democracy for certain purposes; but it is limited
by the milieu of freedom and by the actuality or possibility of control
by the legislative or other popular body at any time. To concentrate
authority means exactly what it says. It creates conditions in which
the institutions and methods are mutually consistent and supplementary. The regime has a basic character structure of its own, a
structure the antithesis of that of freedom, one best denoted by the
concept rigidity.
Power is a function of the nature of the situation. If things are
going well in society, the emphasis can be placed upon the widest possible spread of authority on an equalitarian basis. Of course power can
never be equally distributed among individuals and groups, for individuals differ in ability and the social significance of occupations is
subject to wide variations. Nevertheless, as long as power is distributed
according to the rules of efficiency and economy with relatively equal
opportunities for all, one may say that it is being utilized in a social
and not in a physical sense. In those circumstances it sets up its own
checks and balances and provides its own channels and forces for
smooth change.
As soon as power begins to be concentrated, one can tell that difficulties are arising, that rigidities are being built up, that some kind of
situation is being created which calls for emergency measures. Hence
the introduction of authoritarianism betrays the existence of exceptional problems which stimulate certain social groups to believe that
they can be solved by force and to try to act on that assumption.
Voluntary effort within free organizations is eliminated in favor of the
concentration of power to meet an emergency. Some social power remains present, for otherwise the authorities would lack any support
and be unable to maintain themselves; but most reliance is placed
upon the actuality or threat of physical coercion. It may be that those
who advocate the use of physical force are the creators of the situation
seeming to require the concentration of power. It may be that they
refuse to accept the need for change, for peaceful, reasonable reform,
and prefer to protect their interest by coercion rather than to make
the necessary effort to achieve in a developing, changing society about
the same position and function that they had in the old or the existing
one. The call for the concentration of power thus comes from one of
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two groups, either from the group which is trying to preserve the position and function that are no longer efficient in society and can be
saved only by the exercise of force (like the Junkers in Prussia in the
present century or the militarists in Spain), or from the group which
holds to some ideal of such an extreme nature that it can only be imposed upon society by force. The use of power therefore means that
one is trying to coerce time. One group, that of the conservatives or
reactionaries, wishes to force time to stand still or to go backward; the
other group, that of the radicals, wishes to make time rush into the
future over the murdered body of the present. Neither trusts the
normal change or rate of change of a peaceful, reasonable society.
The attitude which individuals and groups take toward power reveals their ethical values. Irrespective of the nature of their verbal
assertions, the individuals and groups who demand and seek to acquire
physical power over others show thereby their low estimate of people.
They may try to justify their attitude by pious phrases about the future.
The fact remains that they trust neither their fellow men nor the
steady course of social development. They want to coerce their fellows
into one line of action at a speed set by themselves. If they did not despise and mistrust their fellow men, they would not seek extraordinary
power over men. They would have faith in the general decency of
human beings and in the natural process of social change. Instead, they
feel a hatred toward all who do not agree with them and set up dogmas
as standards of loyalty. All who adhere to the dogmas are of the elect
and saved; all who oppose them are enemies either to be controlled
and exploited for the sake of the dogmas or to be destroyed. The
formulation of dogma constitutes one aspect of the general situation of
power just as do mistrust toward and hatred of one's fellow men. Given
the desire for power, hostility toward society, adherence to a dogma,
the other manifestations will follow. They are all parts of that which
we may call a power situation.
Power may be said to impose a kind of psychological logic upon its
practitioners, a logic whose ultimate force is curbed only to the extent
that feelings of humanity may continue to function. As power becomes
more concentrated, these feelings decline in significance. Whether
there exists a zero point for them seems to be doubtful, for in that state
the power individual would be utterly incapable of working with anyone and would have to be dispatched as a maniac; but the willingness
to sacrifice millions of lives for a dogma and the creation of machinery
organized on the basis of mistrust reveal the extreme of action to which
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power may lead its wielders. The fact that one's relations with others
are marked by mistrust indicates that one attributes to others the same
hostility that one feels toward them. The devotees of power realize
that the preservation or achievement of their dogmas will require
fundamental retardation of change or fundamental change in society
and that this can be accomplished only by coercion. They expect the
hostility of others to be manifested and they recognize that they can
only maintain themselves or achieve their future objectives by the employment of physical force. They therefore set up or plan to set up
the institutions and to introduce the methods necessary to achieve
their purpose.
Some of these institutions and methods are basically different from
the ones found in a free society, while others are similar but occupy
an entirely different place and serve a different purpose. All act as
means for the concentration of power and thus are enemies to that
social pluralism found in a free society. In a power situation the
executive side of government predominates; the legislative and judicial
serve as its tools. The existence of the command·obey relationship
follows from the fact of concentration of authority; if cooperation and
mutual respect prevailed, there would be no such need. Orders are
issued from above because most of society cannot be trusted. If society
were willing to accept the measures, force would not be necessary;
therefore the centralization of power would not be needed; therefore
the executive would not predominate over the other parts of government, and the ways of functioning of a free government in a free society
would obtain. Discussion could be engaged in and general agreement
reached among equals. Once a power situation is created, the shift
from these institutions and ways of freedom to those of coercion becomes inevitable. What are the means which an authoritarian regime
employs?
Certain distinctions must be made between three kinds of authoritarian societies, that which endeavors to preserve or restore the Old
Regime, that which devotes its energies to nationalism, and that which
seeks to achieve communism. The common features already pointed
out are balanced by a few basic differences that grow out of the difference in purpose. The analysis of these is essential for gauging the extent to which power is concentrated in each regime and the extent
therefore to which instruments are necessary to achieve that concentration.
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The culture with least concentration of authority is that dominated
by the social structure and ideals of the Old Regime. Interest in maintaining the st~tus quo kept this society from seeking to centralize
power beyond that point necessary to preserve the existing order. The
authoritarianism depended upon many instruments of control and
left them considerable leeway in keeping the rest of society in order.
The system may be called a sort of pluralistic authoritarianism, an endeavor to hold back the hands of the clock with a small expenditure
of energy. That it was authoritarian in nature became evident whenever circumstances weakened it and encouraged the suppressed social
elements to try to introduce liberal, equalitarian reforms.
From the Old Regime have survived institutions and ways in every
aspect of life-the power state, war, authoritarian governance, class
structure, the military, and the vestiges of localism. On the European
continent they have remained dominant in most countries well into the
present century. Two world wars and the accompanying revolutions
have practically eliminated the social and political structure, and industrialization has increasingly overcome the economic localism; nonetheless, the impact of the forces from the Old Regime has been fundamental in bringing about our present situation. It has been greater in
much of Europe than that of the ideologies of nationalism and communism, which gained their opportunity for violent domination primarily because of the non-acquiescence of the elements of the Old
Regime in the emergence of the new culture of industrialism.
The vestiges of the Old Regime placed the preservation of the social,
political, and cultural forms of the past above the use of the developing instruments of industrialism for social improvement. Being conservative the members of the old order were inclined to accept anything new only to the extent that they thought it would preserve their
power. They did so not because of any excessive degree of selfishness
but in the conviction that social order was equivalent to the preservation of the status quo. They believed in and practiced authoritarianism, social inequality, and social orderliness amounting to rigidity,
ideals which were contrary to those of industrialism. Authoritarianism
meant the exclusion of the lower classes from responsible participation
in government. It implied the monopoly of political wisdom by the
hereditary elite, the disbelief in the ability of the masses to understand
and decide political issues. It relegated the overwhelming majority
of the members of the state to the role of citizens of a lower order,
with gradations even among these. Those citizens who acquiesced in
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the authority of the elite were accepted as followers worthy of trust;
those who refused were treated as actual or potential enemies of
society. The middle class belonged to the former group, the Socialist
proletariat to the latter. They were all expected to acquiesce in the
fact of social inequality as a concomitant of authoritarianism. Without it one could not be certain who might compose the elite; one
could not count on the continued value of established contacts and
alignments. Equality would force continuous adjustment to new faces
and groups, to new situations. One would have to learn new methods
of leadership and rule, and might find oneself inferior in ability to the
new man who had risen through competition. Even the peasants might
think equality of opportunity attractive and learn to favor popular
education, popular and responsible government, and other means of
sharing in the whole social process. The elite would encounter criticism of and open objection to the use of political power for the social
and economic gain of the few. It might have to employ physical force
to maintain its hold, and since its fate would be at stake it would be
willing to do so.
Economically the social forces of the Old Regime usually adapted
themselves sufficiently to modern industrialism to take advantage of
the opportunities for increased wealth and power. They joined the
capitalistic process and attempted to control it. In that case, they soon
had to accept the capitalistic personnel in the elite and sought to impose their standards of authoritarianism, inequality, and orderliness
upon the new members. The task did not prove difficult, for capitalists
tended to regard their own rise to affluence as proof of the validity of
inequality and to consider full authority as essential for the conduct
of their business. They might hedge at acknowledging the appropriateness of the term "absolute monarchs in business," and prefer some
softer expression, like "power commensurate with responsibility"; but
since efficient businessmen considered it advisable to be adjustable,
they were inclined to adopt the mores of the society in which they
operated. If they lived in a democracy, they conformed as nearly as a
powerful entrepreneur or manager could to its standards, and sought
to develop some system in which an appropriate amount of authority
and inequality of achievement would be recognized as in keeping with
a free society. If they lived in an authoritarian society of inequality
they easily accepted these norms from the Old Regime.
In this century Europe has had many national societies in which
the economy failed to keep up with industrialism. It does not matter
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whether the society depended mainly upon agriculture or industry.
A country like Denmark may be aptly called an agricultural factory:
it imports feed and processes bacon, butter, cheese, and eggs for sale
in the industrial markets of England and Germany. It offers a model
of the new industrial society. Investment is high, economic turnover
is speedy, savings are large, education and knowledge are considered
indispensable, social and political equality is standard, health is excellent, and the society is progressive, peaceful, efficient, and well
organized. The contrast between Denmark and most other countries
of the continent is striking. One might use Poland or Rumania as
examples; but since these are relatively new states it might be fairer
to select a country like France. This nation has by and large refused
to adjust to industrialism. In the early nineteenth century it began to
keep its birth-rate low and to prefer to preserve the existing forms of
French culture rather than to imitate the British and later the Germans
in becoming highly industrialized. The French peope have retained a
much larger percentage of the population in agriculture than with
modernization of methods and machinery was necessary. They have
accumulated large amounts of savings but have preferred to make
foreign loans rather than to invest the savings in their own economy.
The peasants and the middle class shopkeepers have used their great
political power to keep down taxation and to prevent the government
from taking the initiative in encouraging the expansion of economic
productivity. The result has been low productivity, low turnover, inadequate home investment, and, in fact, an almost stagnant economy
and society, retaining the cultural characteristics of the first half of
the nineteenth century, a pre-industrial society. Social services are
few; the labor movement tends to be retarded in growth and radical in
objectives; organization is haphazard and inchoate in political parties,
labor unions, in fact in every popular line. The elite in business are
few in number but are organized efficiently for wielding power; their
social and political views continue to be authoritarian and uncompromising like those of the early stage of industrialism. Continuity and
consistency of policy and the institutional basis for equality, compromise, and cooperation are lacking. Politics are erratic and action
tends toward extremes. In spite of the French Revolution much of the
Old Regime has persisted.
Even within a country of a high degree of industrialization there
remain areas which should be characterized as static. A small town
may stagnate for lack of stimuli coming from industry. Humanistic
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interest may remain at a minimum. Opportunities for spiritual and
intellectual activity may be limited to the church, the movie and the
beer parlor, and the school will primarily serve the purpose of transmitting the mores and maintaining social discipline. In a country like
Germany, highly industrial as it is, education even if more efficient
than before has preserved a class character about as rigid as it had
been under absolutism. In France class structure of education has persisted along with emphasis upon a verbal type of training. Pupils and
students have been taught to think and to express themselves fluently
on traditional literary historical subjects, with little regard being paid
to checking the validity of ideas against realities of life. Education has
failed to cultivate those habits of individual responsibility for action
and social behavior which develop with the application of the experimental method in all areas of knowledge. The absence of attention to sports in the schools reveals the retention of pre-industrial
standards and the failure to appreciate the need for a well-rounded,
independent personality and social being. Under such conditions the
bases of authoritarianism survived.
Since a monopolistic system requires an exclusive basis of operation, both nationalism and communism preserved the power state
from the Old Regime, and, except as far as possible on their own
terms, refused to make concessions to inter-state cooperation. Thereby
they have proved to be two of the greatest obstacles in the present
century to the achievement of the society of industrialism. A consideration of the political map of Europe will reveal how detrimental
to economic efficiency has been the division of the continent into
many small or medium-sized independent states. The only state
which has sufficient size to support a well-developed society on the
basis of its own resources is' Russia, and potentiality has not become
actuality even there. If one could lift the political boundaries and
make Europe an economic and cultural unit, one would have sufficient space, people, and resources for a flourishing economy. Division of function would then accord with natural advantage. Largescale production could occur with savings in costs and efficiency in
output; a wide diversity of occupations could be supported; the number of professional personnel could increase; the surplus population
could be put to work; with improved economy of production and
distribution the standard of living would rise; more services could
be provided for the people; private organizations as well as public
ones could develop on a large scale and would be able to exert mutual
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stimulation and control in favor of equality and self-government. The
contrast with the rigid, isolationist structure of either nationalistic or
communist society is apparent. How can a state of two million, ten
million or even fifty million people afford a complex division of function? It lacks an adequate market within its own borders and dares
not depend too heavily upon foreign markets for fear of suddenly
having none and being forced to support a large unemployed. Not
even Germany with its sixty-five million or so has been able to afford
the large-scale mass production of the United States. Every state
that has tried to improve its economy has suffered from lack of means
to earn funds for investment. The wastage from small-scale duplication of industry and even agriculture in each national state for the
sake of self-defence has been enormous; and in the communist states,
even apart from the inefficiency of communism as a form of cultural
enterprise, the attempt to transform a peasant, agricultural economy
into a highly industrialized one within a few years on the basis of
local resources alone has necessitated an appalling reduction in the
standard of living and exploitation of the population. The effect of
communist exclusiveness toward the non-communist world has been
contrary to the nature of industrialism. In the case of both nationalism and communism one perceives the deleterious effects of a closed
political system upon the potentiality of industrialism for human
betterment.
The conduct of international relations, which has proved in this
century to be the greatest source for the increase of power and
rigidity, differs with the kind of society. The difference in the methods
employed has both justified our feeling some hope for the future
and enhanced the difficulties in the present. Small states which enjoy
a high standard of living under industrialism tend to be pacific.
Their social structure is adjusted to industrialism. They know that
they possess little opportunity for initiating decisive action in international power politics, and they neither try nor wish to do so. They
adhere to other standards of conduct. If the small state suffers from
cultural backwardness and is accustomed to violent action in internal
affairs, it follows the same pattern of violent behavior in the conduct
of international relations. A similar difference in behavior characterizes the big states endowed with a large population, an extensive
land mass, a flourishing industry, and a high standard of living. Bigness does not necessarily cause them to use violence or become bullies.
The evidence seems to show that the willingness to employ violence
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depends upon the cultural habits and ideals of the people involved.
The big state has behaved according to the pattern set by its elite.
Where the leaders have come from the society of authoritarianism
and privilege or from the society of the dogmas of nationalism or
communism, power politics on a grandiose scale with war defined
as "an extension of diplomacy into action" has been normal. In contrast with the small state, the power of the big state has proved to be
too tempting for these social elements to resist exploiting it, and their
mores have called for their doing so. In other big states the standards
have been different. In a large country with all the potential elements
of military strength, the society may be so pluralistic that the state
cannot control the resources sufficiently to utilize them for power
politics. The action of the government may be checked and balanced,
and the citizens may be entirely hostile to militarism and war and to
the concentration of power in the hands of any group. They may
prefer the ideals of good living, reasonableness, and cooperation to
those of the conspicuous display of power; in fact, they may despise
the latter as contrary to the nature of human beings and society.
They will go to war solely if confronted with a big power state under
the control of groups with entirely different cultural ways and ideals,
accustomed to the use of physical power and taking the aggressive.
The principle of balance of power then comes into action, bringing
in its wake competition in armaments and a condition of international
tension, and producing the usual course of events culminating in war.
In that case the free, pluralistic large state will have already lost its
freedom in international affairs and will have been reduced to the
level of international behavior of the big power state. Economics,
culture, food, everything will be used as instruments of international
competitiveness; the period of total warfare, whether cold or shooting,
will have begun.
The continuation of the use of war as a proposed means of solving
problems has been more antithetic and caused more harm to the
developing society of process than any other factor. The outbreak
of war has resulted from the action of all those forces which are
hostile to the society of freedom; for war implies that rigidity in
thought and action has taken the place of imaginative, flexible
creativeness, that reasonable solutions could not be found, that adjustments could not be made, that a dogmatic impasse has been
reached which could be overcome solely by killing, that destruction
has supplanted process.
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The impact of war upon the society of industrialism has varied
according to the degree of involvement among the participants. Nonetheless, while some may be able to profit temporarily at the expense
of others, in the long run all participants suffer. Even those who seem
to have gained will have to aid the others to recover, for in an interdependent industrial world war has proved that autarchy is impossible: it has become dangerous in all respects for one people to be
affluent and the others poor.
War forces structural changes upon the involved countries at such
a fast tempo that subsequent difficulties appear to be inevitable. The
capital resources destroyed during the conflict must subsequently be
replaced. Since each major participant will have become poorer, it
will most likely need outside aid in order to prevent the standard of
living from declining sharply. Imports will be essential; but the
supply of foreign exchange may have been exhausted or radically
reduced to pay for the war, and foreign loans may be required. During hostilities the country will have been unable to raise enough taxes
in so short a time to cover expenses; it will have had to borrow vast
sums from its citizens and will have put in circulation large amounts
of credit instruments. After the war when the pressure of military
action has ceased and the public wishes to spend its savings for consumer's goods, the threat of inflation will arise-too few goods in
proportion to the available amount of money. Such radical changes
within so short a span of time in the size and distribution of national
income, in the character and purpose of production, in the use of
man-power, in the functions of government, create crucial structural
difficulties for years to come.
The pressure for action on a large scale to cope with the vast
problem forces the government to assume responsibilities which are
new in kind and scope. Among them the problem of investment has
fundamental significance as the key to economic recovery from the
war damages; and since the private investors are in the main poorer
than before the war and unable to supply enough funds, the government speedily and increasingly assumes responsibility for investment.
To do so, it has to make certain that sufficient sums are placed at its
disposal. It becomes the main instrument for capital accumulation
and thereby for savings. With reduced real income just after a period
of war-time sacrifice for the state, the citizens demand social security
and increased services from the government, and force it to take
further responsibilities for which it has not been intended or
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equipped. Although the war may have weakened or even destroyed
the structure of society, the population may have drawn one conclusion from the war experience which was crucial for the future. It
may have inferred from the fact of full employment and maximum
productivity in time of war that the same conditions could be achieved
in peace, that general welfare was attainable. It demands that the
government, the instrument of the people, make this expectation real.
On top of the profound transformation during the war is added this
equally profound change in social standard and objective. Reforms
are expected within a few years which normally would possibly have
been achieved over decades. The tension of war is continued in social,
economic, and political terms long after the fighting has ceased, and
militates against the creation of a new social order. The old society
is past; the new one has to be nurtured in the most difficult conditions.
Experience has proved that a modern war can be fought most
effectively by that society which in its nature is most hostile to war.
The society of free industrialism with self-government, individual
initiative and responsibility, high standard of living and culture, can
most successfully bear the strain and provide the essential psychological as well as material resources. It can adjust quickly to the
emergency, for it can tap the resources of all its citizens and does not
have to depend entirely upon initiative from above. It is acmstomed
to the free, competitive elimination of incompetence irrespective of
birth, rank, dogma, or party affiliation. The same characteristics that
enable a people to carryon the war effectively have proved equally
valuable in the post-war period. They make possible the peaceful
adjustment without revolution or civil war. The characteristics of
the society of process once again prove superior in achieving positive
results to those of dogmatic social and other forms of rigidity. The
tragedy of this situation arises out of the fact that the peoples of
process averse to war are confronted by almost super-human tasks
which may incline them toward pessimism and fatalism and diminish
their initiative. It requires a society with strong intellectual and
spiritual reserves to utilize the institutions of process in government
and other fields of activity for overcoming the structural difficulties
created by an unwanted war.
It is usually stated that the constitution of the military was set
in the age of absolutism and that we have unwittingly preserved in
the age of liberty a pattern of behavior from an alien culture. The
assertion may be historically correct, but scarcely supplies an adequate
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explanation. The fact is that the nature of the society bears little
relationship to the fundamental structure of the military. Under
any regime the military has one purpose, to win wars, to win by being
prepared to kill the enemy. To act with force in the gravest crisis,
the military must be drilled to absolute obedience; it must do that
which is contrary to the nature of man, namely, to kill his fellowmen.
The military exists for crises; it is moulded to a rigid pattern of behavior and organization. The hierarchicaJ structure of commandobey relationship rendered necessary for the performance of its duty
makes it an authoritarian, anti-democratic force even in the most
free society. If international conditions require a great expansion of
the military element, it may be that even in a democracy the character
of the military will come to impress itself upon the entire society.
In an age of total war, the military expenditure exerts upon the
economy the greatest influence of any part of the public budget; the
military control may become dominant over scientific and technological research; the military spirit may enter schools and shape social
behavior by way of compulsory military training; the officer may be
esteemed as the elite of society in position and conduct; the military
form of relationship may prevail over the equalitarian, civilian one
in handling labor disputes or any other purely civil problems. The
military way of life may dominate over the civil to such an extent
that the instrument supposed to safeguard the good life may become
the monopolist of life. The military has shown itself, slowly to be
sure, capable of adapting the achievements of industry, science, administration, and education to its needs. Will it end by absorbing
them all and permeating them with its rigid spirit? Nazism and
communism have sought to prevent this outcome by purges of the
officers' corps, especially the top ranks, and by preserving control
through the monopoly party. Democracy has its traditional social
organization as defense against militarism. But, in a highly competitive international system with the threat of total war in the offing,
will either or any of these forms of society be able to keep militarism
within bounds? The answer can only be in the form of a conjecture.
While both Nazism and communism have inherited from the Old
Regime the power state and utilize it to the fullest of their ability, they
differ in their attitude toward other institutions and forces of the
former society. Nazism claimed to be most devoted to the nation; it
placed the nation above all other forms of existence, and subordinated all elements in the country and outside, if possible, to the
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welfare of that social group. In doing so it was torn between the desire to realize the ideal of nationalism and to respect that which the
nation had achieved and was at present. Thus Nazism would not be
as radical as communism in its effort to replace the status quo by
something of the future. Also it would not deny the members of the
adored nation all rights of initiative in serving the nation. Communism could sharply separate the trustworthy from the others, and handle
the latter with ruthlessness. Nazism could not be quite so simple and
crude, for all Germans belonged to the glorious band of the socially
elect and were potentially good. Nazism was prevented by its ideology
from imposing as complete an authoritarian structure upon its people
as communism did on its. Nazism shared with the advocates of the
Old Regime the will to preserve the forces of social organization and
individual initiative which it thought could serve its objective. It
kept such institutions as private property and tried to utilize them for
the interest of the nation. Its nationalism inclined it to retain some
connections with present and past while it drove madly toward the
future. Communism had no past and, prior to coming to power in
1917, no present; it had, it felt, only a future, and it sought to destroy
the past and present in order to achieve the future. Thus the plans
of social organization of communism were much more radical than
those of Nazism, just as those of Nazism were greater than the ones
of the surviving elements of the Old Regime. Nazism resembled its
more extreme competitor most clearly in its handling of internal
enemies and especially of non-German peoples, for in these cases
nationalism called for an attitude of superiority, therefore of scorn,
therefore of hatred and mistrust, and led easily and directly to exploitation. Anti-Nazis and non-Germans were outsiders, just as noncommunists were to the communists, and had no rights. They should
be treated in any manner which would benefit the ism.
We shall concentrate upon an analysis of the organization of
power under the communists, but it should be remembered that much
of the analysis applies with equal force to the German effort for world
domination. The communists required a greater concentration of
power because they wanted to destroy more and to create a completely
new kind of society. They have achieved the most complete institutionalization of power of modern times.
The desire to reform radically or to transform society in a hurry
can be implemented only by a dictatorship, the institution meant for
ruthless action. A dictator can act quickly and decisively because he
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is uncontrolled by any outside force. Discussion and negotiation are
reduced to the minimum needed to enable the dictator to arrive at
a decision and to work out the implementation of his order. The
dictator confers with a small group for the sake of speed and of preserving power, for consultation with a large group might lead to delay
in decision and open a way to organized opposition. The fact of
dictatorship thus restricts the extent to which consultation may be
allowed.
The dictator requires instruments of execution which are directly
subject to his command. He cannot use voluntary associations for fear
that these might object to his orders, wish to negotiate, delay action,
and even sabotage the regime by developing a strong opposition.
Therefore dictatorship expands the bureaucracy as the ready instrument of operations accustomed to carrying out orders from above.
The bureaucracy has a kind of a-moral attitude toward its work; it
tends to feel no responsibility other than that of executing orders,
and leaves to superiors the questions of policy, of right and wrong,
of whether a measure will benefit society. The dictator extends the
domain of the bureaucracy to all aspects of life, for he knows that in
order to preserve his authority he must control all phases. The
exercise of private initiative in one area might quickly spur other
groups to request the same right, to argue and complain, and the
dictator's power might crumble away. In that case he could not introduce the social changes that he desires and might soon find himself
superfluous. Thus the bureaucracy takes over more and more functions, until in the Soviet Union one may without exaggeration label
every person a state official. Some have to perform those functions
which are assigned to a bureaucracy in any big society; but the rest of
the population belongs essentially to the government and can at any
time be called to perform some additional direct services for the state.
The dictator must be able at will to utilize the social elements for
the furtherance of the dogma. The ever-expanding bureaucracy is
his instrument.
Unfortunately for the dictator, reliance upon a bureaucracy involves him in a dilemma. How can he make certain that the bureaucracy is reliable? Since he has deprived himself of popular means of
checking on his agencies, he must create new bureaucratic organs to
watch over existing ones. This chain-like process appears to be endless, for who will watch the watchers? The answer is found in several
ways. First and foremost are the instruments for exerting physical
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fort::e, the army and the police, and among the branches of the latter
especially the secret police. These are the institutions of mistrust,
the cardinal psychological feature of a dictatorship. The army provides the background of reassurance that the regime can maintain
itself; but, except in the one capacity of training personnel in the
command-obey relationship which a dictatorship requires, it enters
very little into internal affairs. The army serves the purpose that it
has in any society with universal military training, namely, defense of
the realm against foreign opponents and civic training in accordance
with the ideals of the regime, in these cases the ideals of communism
or Nazism. Since the dictator has to force his will upon his own
people, his major concern is to hold his power and accomplish his objectives within his own country. The secret police become indispensable and are multiplied in number and diversified in function until
they watch over all aspects of life. The process culminates in the
organization of secret police to spy upon the other secret police. They
provide the main means of dictatorial check and balance.
Since no dictatorial system can rely solely upon physical force to
keep it in power, instruments are needed to supply a degree of
popular leadership and participation in the regime. These are found
in the creation of a monopoly party and in the adaptation of representative institutions to dictatorial ways. Thereby the dictator has
an organization for gauging the state of opinion and for guiding the
people in the desired direction. He cannot allow the free play of
discussion and popular decision, for in that case he would no longer
be a dictator and in a position to accomplish his own objective. The
monopoly party answers his needs; for it is supposedly popular, it
reaches into all branches of society, it is composed of natural leaders
as they arise and are absorbed into the system, and it is subject to
control from the top. This is a model instrument of what the communists call centralized democracy.
The retention of representative institutions based on popular
elections is used to supplement the work of the monopoly party. It
might seem to be sufficient evidence of poplar support for the regime;
but the facts do not bear out this view. A dictatorship renders it impossible to determine whether the people advocate, tolerate, or hate
the regime. Nor can the dictator himself be sure on this point; hence
he takes no chances and preserves the full apparatus of control. In
this array of apparatus belongs the system of representation. Candidates for office are officially or unofficially selected from above and
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are altogether reliable. The use of a single list assures that as a rule
no competitors will appear. It may be that at the lowest level of
social organization in places of slight power significance rival candidacies may be tolerated; but the practice is not encouraged, for it
might develop habits of discussion and popular settlement of problems and might tend to undermine the foundations of dictatorship.
In case of need voting may be open, whereas counting may be secret
and subject to arbitrary decision about the public will. Then the
representative assemblies are used to support the dictatorship in
two major ways. First, they express what appears to be public approval, indeed enthusiastic approval, for the bills proposed by the
dictator (the assembly, except on local affairs at a low governmental
level, has little or no power of initiating bills) and supply a carte
blanche for all the acts of the regime. Secondly, they provide an outlet for public criticism of the manner in which the policies and laws
of the regime are executed. They do not criticize these policies and
laws; they discuss merely the manner in which these are implemented.
In this way they avoid criticizing the dictator and his immediate staff
of policy-makers; rather, they afford a release for some popular
grievances and act as a check and balance with respect to the bureaucracy. Thus the dictator can employ an entirely docile body of carefully chosen representatives of the public to help him keep watch
over the bureaucracy and assure the loyalty and improve the operations of that organization. Like the monopoly party, the representatives act as useful means of control over the public and the bureaucracy and of loyal support to the regime.
Since dictatorship means that all social elements are mistrusted,
that problems are handled by force, it follows that the system will include the institutionalization of the blood purge. Insecurity of life
and tenure on the part of the dictator and his supporters means insecurity of life and tenure for everyone else. The stakes are the
highest, the objective the most exalted, the dogma the most rigid.
Therefore anyone who opposes or even seems to oppose the regime
in word, deed, or thought must be eliminated by physical force. He
has not merely committed a misdemeanor or a crime; he has committed sacrilege; he has endangered the regime; he has established a
source of infection for others; he must be destroyed; both actual and
potential opposition must be blotted out. The extreme of dictatorship entails the extreme of docility. The pattern of violence permeates the behavior of the entire regime.
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The impact of dictatorship upon society brings about atomization.
The natural associations of human beings that spring up in the
normal course of events are broken. Not even the family is spared;
some members may favor the regime while others dislike it. In this
case they will be unable to trust each other. The general atmosphere
of mistrust pervades the entire culture. The individual must stand
alone and be organized in groups artificially created by the dictatorship. Want of outlets for individual initiative leads to reliance upon
directives from above. Private initiative carries too great danger of
offending the dictator and losing one's life. The system of representation allows so little influence to the voters and those elected that
artificial stimulants have to be administered to assure participation.
The functions devolve more and more upon the monopoly party.
Experience advises against one's taking an active part in affairs; and,
since all affairs are public, the citizens tend to remain quiescent, to
wait for strict orders from above and to preserve their lives and what
passes in such a regime as liberty. The purge proves to be an inefficient and uneconomical means for controlling opponents; but it
is no more so than dictatorship is as an instrument of social organization. Since all normal relations of mutual confidence and natural
association are excluded, it serves the purpose well enough of keeping
the dictator in power. If the latter used gentler, persuasive means,
he would no longer be a dictator.
The atomization of society is enhanced by the introduction of
caste and privilege. The absolute monarchy of the Old Regime was
built upon the foundation of sharp class differentiation. One social
group was set off against another, each had a place in the hierarchy,
and each helped to control the other. Absolutism depended upon the
inequality among the groups and the inability to cooperate for common ends. The phrase "Divide and rule" describes not merely the
Hapsburg policy, but that of any authoritarian regime, including
Nazism and communism. In these two systems the original dogma
was equalitarian, and the individuals from all groups and occupations
were encouraged to join the movement and rise in it according to
their ability. After the systems came into power it became evident
that they utilized the principle of equality of opportunity in order to
select an able few as members of the monopoly party. The party
members formed the new elite, a new caste, with privileges, rights
and responsibilities different from those of the rest of society. Within
the party the privileges varied according to position in the hierarchy.
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The resulting sharp separation of the chosen few party members
from the masses has provided the basis of social atomization. The
regime rests upon this foundation of division into two parts of unequal importance, the one to lead, the other to follow. Inequality
spells the exclusion of mutual trust and natural organization among
the entire population. Dictatorship necessitates inequality just as it
does hierarchy, the purge, mistrust, in fact all the manifestations of
a disintegrated society held together by coercion.
Since an authoritarian regime is endeavoring to accomplish an
objective which at least a potentially dangerous part of its public
does not wish, the dictator must utilize every means at his disposal
for the purposes of propaganda. Physical coercion must be supplemented by intellectual and spiritual coercion. No dictatorship dares
to introduce toleration; for, if it did, it might soon find itself eliminated. The propaganda must be directed exclusively toward the one
objective: it must arouse passionate hatred of enemies and elevated
love of the ism and its supporters. Art, music, science, literature,
every form of expression in life must be subjected to the superior
judgment of whether it furthers the propagation of the regime. It
serves in its way the same function as the monopoly party, the
bureaucracy and the secret police; they are all used to control behavior. Every artist or composer is thus a state official, a tool of the
dictator. He has no private capacity; he cannot express himself in
his work; he must express the ideas of the dictator. The obverse side
of propaganda consists of censorship. The society must be controlled
not merely in what it can read, see or listen to, but in what it cannot
read, see or listen to. The control of thought has both the positive
and the negative aspects, and both mean blinders and intolerance.
The regime may theoretically advocate the creation of a society
of personalities; but since it wishes these individuals always to agree
with the will of the dictator, it succeeds only in achieving an automaton. The opportunities for individual initiative are eliminated
altogether or are so restricted that a person of independent and particular character cannot develop. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the
regime has much interest in personality. All the evidence points to
the conclusion that it finds most useful a mass of rather nondescript
human units ready to be moved at the order of the dictator and
responding with human enthusiasm and machine-like precision. The
criteria which history has provided for judging the attitude of a
regime toward individual personality are subject to such arbitrary
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handling in the Nazi and communist regimes that one may speak of
their total psychological if not of their total physical absence. The
result upon human behavior is about the same in either case. Such
criteria as due process of law, civil rights, emphasis upon professional
services and consumers' goods industries, upon the distributive functions of an economy-these and similar benefits for the public are
found wherever a high respect for the individual determines the
functions of governance. They are present in the authoritarian systems solely to the extent necessary to enhance the authoritarian
power. The public must receive some material consideration, lest
the regime be weakened by too great indifference or even opposition;
but the main purpose even of social aid continues to be the augmenting of that which in a normal society is not an end but a means,
namely, power.
In a power regime human life is cheap. The fact that power is
concentrated in the hands of a dictator reveals an attitude of scorn
and aversion toward human beings as such; otherwise, the dictator
would cease to claim and assert his degree of authority and accept
the free judgment of his fellows. He rates the ism superior in im·
portance to the people who live under it, the method or organization
of living more significant than the living. Liquidation of life is made
easy; exploitation of personality is reduced to the simplicity of eitheror. The adage, "To err is human, to forgive, divine," does not hold,
for a dictator demands rigid behavior. He fears that to err once may
be a harbinger of further trouble, and prefers to take no risks. Judging
others by his own motives, he eliminates risks by the educational
corrective of hard labor until early death. Since the elders will
have all lived under a different regime, he cannot fully trust them.
Some may be loyal party workers, but the possession of another possible standard than that of the ism renders them suspect. The regime
justifies its authoritarian character by this fact; and, while eliminating
physically many of the mature people and controlling the rest, it
bases its main hope upon the youth, that is, always upon those who
are not yet developed personalities. Will the regime be satisfied with
them, once they become adults? The evidence seems to show that a
dictatorship cannot be satisfied, that it lives on mistrust, that its
exercise of total power is anti-social, and that under it human life
will remain cheap.
A power situation leads to the reference of all affairs to the top
for decision. Even under communism the natural tendency of a
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dictatorship to become more centralized has revealed itself. The
concentration of power in the hands of a monopoly party might
seem to permit discussion and some method of popular decision
within the ranks of that party; but the logic of circumstances opposes
any such solution. The members are accustomed to thinking in terms
of power. They would not be content with a majority decision, for
such a procedure would imply respect for the views of the weaker
group, the minority, and might contaminate all participants with
the liberal ideals of a free man in a free society. For a party devoted
to action discussions take up too much time; they may confuse and
slow down action or deprive the members of the will to do.
If the decisions affect questions of dogma, the minority may assert
that its ideas are correct and may refuse to accept the views of the
majority. In this case physical force alone can render a decision, and
such a crude and inefficient method for solving controversies may endanger the party's control. From the start, therefore, a monopoly
party dictatorship tends to become a monopoly one-man dictatorship.
It is advisable for all matters to be referred to one person for solution, and for all other participants to keep an open mind until the
one man speaks. Dictatorship, the concentration of power, then
reaches its ultimate form. There can be no more complete authority
on earth than that of a single individual. This individual seems undivided and final. The weakening effects of discussion are prevented.
The finality of authority is achieved, and persons now know what is
the truth, what is wisdom. The dynamics of power have created a
figure in the image of power. If an individual with the necessary
qualities of character does not exist, he would have to be created; for
the system demands a ruler by divine right, even if the term divine
has to be interpreted in a Marxian sense. The leader-principle asserts its inevitability in communism as in Nazism.
Power limits the understanding of other people and situations.
It is based on psychological restrictions and causes a narrowing of the
imagination and a fixing of interpretations. It warps the minds of
those who wield it, and permits them no new, contrary, or conditioning experience which may educate them along other lines. Their
experience is always that of power. They think solely in terms of
exercising power or of being subjected to the menace of power and
the loss of authority to others. They tend to simplify and misunderstand motives. Their dogma, as in communism, may incline them
toward a cool, rational analysis of a situation and caution in policy-
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decisions and execution; but if they deem it necessary to take chances,
as in the seizure of power, the industrialization of industry and the
collectivization of agriculture, they will do so with the full exercise
of ruthlessness. One can expect communists in other countries upon
occasion to act in a similar manner. The Nazis took extreme chances
continuously, for their type of personality and ideal placed far less
restriction on action and emphasized the necessity of violent daring.
They were emotional, whereas the communists stress calculation. In
the final analysis, however, both have led to intellectual and emotional rigidity and the loss of efficiency. Their lack of freedom has
precluded them from understanding any regime except one like
theiI; own. In fact, the evidence supports the view that in the years
1939 to 1941 the communists were too calculating even to understand
the thinking of their fellow dictators, the Nazis, and that the Nazis
reciprocated by being incapable of comprehending the tenacious
power of the Soviet Union.
The concentration of authority leads to inter-personal relations
that may be rough and harsh. One must show power; and if one has
it, one may easily become short of temper and blunt in manner. A
negotiator inclines toward rigidity, for he has to abide precisely by
instructions from above and a slip in following the prescribed line
may be fatal to him. He is not trusted; he has no leeway; when one
is dealing with dogmas or is acting on the instructions from a divineright dictator, mistakes are not tolerated or forgiven. The negotiator
has no right to ad just the line of policy in accordance with the needs
of new circumstances which he may encounter. If he veers away from
the written letter his superiors, limited in their experience and unable to understand the new situation, mayor will see evidence of
deliberate sabotage or unconscious deviation. So manners in negotiations have to be inflexible and rude, first because the other side to
the discussion may be hostile, and second because one must leave the
impression with superiors of absolute trustworthiness. If negotiations
are being carried on with representatives of a foreign country, the
need for brusqueness is even greater. For these representatives are
actual enemies, and to get along personally with them, to agree with
them on any point, may lead the authorities at home to doubt one's
loyalty. The preservation of an attitude of hardness, intolerance and
defiance becomes standard for anyone negotiating with foreigners,
just as the adherence to the literal meaning of instructions and a hard-
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headed defiant attitude become standard in negotiations with one's
fellow countrymen at home. Orders are orders and must be carried
out.
Where power is concentrated, changes in policy are sudden and
unpredictable. No particular need is felt to explain them to anyone,
for the public cannot object even if it wished to. The incentive to
prepare the public for a change, except in grave emergencies when
the decision for action lies with some other power (Nazi attack on
the Soviet Union in 1941, for example), is lacking. In international
affairs the result is grave distrust on the part of others, which the
dictator is incapable of understanding. In internal affairs the regime
appears to be equally arbitrary, but the dictator can ignore the reaction of the public even if he is aware of any surprise and uncertainty. He has lost the ability to comprehend the effect of his actions
upon others. When his sudden acts are not understood, he becomes
angry and suspicious and fears deliberate, planned hostility. Then
he becomes even harder to deal with than before, and more inclined
to use the instrument he knows best, physical power. The regime
shows the tragic effects upon inter-personal and inter-national relations of the absence of freedom, the lack of mutual trust and respect
and of intellectual and emotional balance. It goes from one extreme
to the other.
A dictatorial regime appears to have an affinity for bigness and
to regard it as essential. The dictator's role as that of the largest
force in the society leads him to hold in the highest regard all those
factors which augment power, and physical dimensions claim a major
place in his attention. Bigness provides the dictator with more instruments for action in both internal and international affairs, more
shoes and cloth, more steel for weapons. It enables him to exercise
more control over the people by affording centralized administrative
agencies with actual power stretching by way of a bureaucracy to the
bottom of the occupational hierarchy. A large mass of small social
and economic units would be difficult to control, as the communists
perceived in the case of the peasantry; the solution was bigness in
industry and agriculture. The ideals of the regime, equality in the
case of the communists, the protection of the little man in the case
of the Nazis, have to be sacrificed; the real need for power far outweighs the interest in theoretical consistency. The industry, agriculture, the bureaucracy, the army, everything must be on a sufficient
,scale to overwhelm any opponents, to accomplish any task. Although
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the relation claimed to exist has yet to be proved, the communists
assert a special reason for bigness; namely, that it provides the psychological basis for communism by organizing all in inter-dependent
.groups in the factory around the machine or on the large farm around
.the tractor station. The Nazis wished the same kind of conditions to
obtain as one of the bases of their creed. The interest in bigness on
the part of both dictatorships arose from the desire for more and
more power.
In the long run the problem of change causes the dictator more
trouble than any other factor. The definite tendency of a monopoly
toward rigidity conflicts with the natural fact of movement and development. Each change may seem like a threat to the authoritarian
structure; and since conditions of society cannot be absolutely controlled even by the communists the latter are persistently compelled
to deal with ever-new situations. The dictator therefore confronts a
number of fundamental dilemmas from most of which he has so far
been unable to escape, indeed from which he cannot escape without the
loss of his dictatorial power. The first is that of exercising monopoly
authority for the achievement of a cultural objective, vague as it may
be, in which that authority will not exist. Whether the ideal be
communism or national socialism, the problem facing the dictator
is that of how to make his power position superfluous. Do the psychological and institutional effects of power render him incapable of both
guiding and submitting to this transformation? The evidence seems
to lead to the conclusion that he will sacrifice the objective or put
off its realization indefinitely and will hold on to his power. He will
not allow society to become stablized and normal for the same reason:
he would eliminate himself as the dominant force, and he dare not
trust his fate to people over whom he rules. The dictator is his own
captive.
A second dilemma arises from the fact that the dogma must be
regarded as perfect and sacrosanct even though situations develop
for which it offers no guidance or in which it can be applied solely
by arbitrary compulsion. To this dilemma the dictatorships have
apparently found a solution, a variant on the one that the church
'perfected centuries ago. They create a succession of earthly demigods, each one of whom has the power to interpret the original dogma
and to express new absolute truth. After Marx and Engels came
Lenin, after Lenin came Stalin, after Stalin some one else will have
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to assume his functions, just as would have had to be the case after
Hitler. The process may be awkward, but so far it works.
The crucial dilemma continues to be that of preserving the authoritarian control while maintaining the individual initiative necessary to enable the regime to be efficient and powerful. The dictator
cannot organize society under his rigid control and expect individuals
to be voluntarily enterprising. If he relaxes his power and the
absolutism of the dogma, he ceases to have the authority to execute
the dogma; if he does not concede some freedom to his people, he
cannot expect them to show the vigor and enthusiasm necessary for
the regime to develop its maximum force. He is caught between the
need to retain his physical power and the need to increase the general
power of the regime by encouraging the exercise of social power. He
faces the difficult fact that an authoritarian government does not
dare utilize the full resources, especially the intellectual and spiritual
ones, of the society over which it rules.
It should be clear that authoritarian regimes tend toward foreign
conquest. The leaders are constantly thinking along the lines of
imperialism, and fear induces them to endeavor to crush competitors
outside their control. They play the politics of balance of power
whenever they must (the emotional Nazis far less than the calculating
communists); but they always strive to destroy the balance and bring
all elements in life under their control. Their aversion to opposition
and their mistrust of everyone, especially of those beyond their reach,
induce them constantly to be pushing outward in the international
arena with all kinds of forces at their disposal. Since they do not
understand foreign peoples or those living under free conditions, they
tend to make mistakes, especially in this field, and to bring on
conflicts.
The shortcoming of a dictatorship for the development of power is
most clearly revealed in international relations, where the dictator
cannot exercise control and must submit to competition. Here he
faces the crucial test of the efficiency of his system, and the evidence
of history argues against him. Since the French Revolution at least
history has shown that a country is made strong in the long run by
the vigor and enterprise of all its citizens and that any kind of dictatorial system weakens the will of the citizens to fight. They are so
accustomed to having things done for them that they lose interest in
the question of who issues the orders. Like the soldiers of the
eighteenth century, they will fight in war because they have to, but
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in their hearts they will wish for peace and freedom. Since the French
Revolution every authoritarian regime in the western world except
communism has been overthrown in international wars. The power
monopolists have made enough mistakes to stir up forces which bring
about their downfall. They could not develop the strength among
peoples held in subjection necessary to defeat others who lived in
freedom. The one area outside their control has proved to be the
source of their undoing.
Since a power regime cannot allow normal conditions to obtain
without rendering itself superfluous, it follows that it must either preserve a condition of atrophy among its people or assure the occurrence of a regular succession of crises. As long as it adheres to the
ideals of its dogma, it cannot cease the endeavor to achieve them.
It may be that in time persons will gain control who are content
merely with the exercise of power for its own sake; but among the
communists that stage has not been reached and it seems improbable
that it will be for many years. The actuality seems to be as follows:
communism is an unnatural, forced, unworkable system of social
organization, and the attempts to make it work assure the occurrence
of crises at fairly regular intervals. The people have to be stirred out
of their apathy; and since the leaders admit no flaw in the system
or its dogma, they find scapegoats among the personnel. Then a great
purge takes place, the wicked are destroyed, the dictatorship has
proved once more the necessity for its continuation, and matters revert to the usual state of apathy until the next crisis. The communist
system thus contains all the elements within itself for assuring the
steady repetition of crises to justify the retention of the dictatorship.
What may be the outcome? It is difficult to foretell, but an attempt
must be made to do so. In order to be efficient, bigness in modern
industrial society requires individual initiative and freedom. Perhaps
sufficient social elements in the USSR will learn to recognize how
much more could be achieved under other conditions than communism. Perhaps the elements of a new society will develop as they
did in France in the eighteenth century and will in time overthrow
the existing regime in favor of a new one of freedom. The difficulty
about accepting this view arises from the fact that the industrial
society of Germany did accept dictatorship. It does not seem likely
that industrialism alone will suffice to stimulate to action the believers in freedom. As long as censorship, control of thought and
speech and all of the significant activities of life remain in the hands
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of the dictatorship, it may be impossible for any alternative ideals
to be formulated and spread widely enough to create a common basis
for action. The dictatorship will therefore most likely be able to
maintain itself indefinitely, provided it does not become involved in
an international conflict with free peoples. In this case the inferiority
of its internal strength in comparison with that of societies enjoying
the fruits of voluntary individual and group action should be apparent. If or when foreign forces of emancipation are able to join
with internal forces seeking the same objective, the outcome should
be the creation of a peaceful and free society. But the hard fact remains that, as far as one can judge from history, power can be eliminated solely by power. Physical power with little support from society
must be overthrown by physical power with full support from society.
The opposition must come both from within the country and from
outside, and the more complete it is the shorter the struggle. Absolute power will then have compassed its own downfall. The emphasis upon the physical aspect of power will have been supplanted
by that upon the social, and man will have gained conditions in
harmony with his own nature.

Chapter IX

CONCLUSION
The analysis of the types of cultural situations given in these ch<1pters would be incomplete without an estimate of the values which
each offers for the welfare of the individual and of society_ Intellectual and spiritual factors must be considered as well as material
ones, for man's nature requires that physical conditions facilitate
psychological development. The organism must receive encouragement to grow in the fullest sense of the term, or personal and social
difficulties will arise.
From this point of view the cultural crisis is seen both to emancipate and to repress social energy. It is certainly a hard and severe
time in which to live. In the past the cultural crisis has shown a
balance in favor of emancipation. In our century it has come to mean
primarily destruction. The purposes for which the individuals were
supposedly freed during these recent upheavals are contrary to the
finest human ideals. A cultural crisis has become a situation of tragic
waste and grave risks; and since ways have been developed for achieving structural change in a normal and peaceful manner, it is justifiable to assert that in our industrial society a cultural crisis is an
extravagance.
The other cultural situations dealt with are sharply divided into
two groups, one characterized by bigness and process, the other by
power and rigidity. To the former belongs the society of industrialism, to the latter the vestiges of the Old Regime and the societies of
nationalism and communism. The groups have a sufficient number of
qualities in common to enable one to perceive the degree to which
they are all affected by the experience of living together in the same
world at the same time. Industrialism underlies them all except
localism and provides the material wealth by which they exist. Nonetheless, each differs from the other in the organization and in the
efficiency of utilization of these resources. The society of process
realizes the intrinsic qualities of industrialism most fully, for it has
introduced into all aspects of life the method of process developed
in completest form by modern industry. Freedom, functionalism,
cooperative interdependence, private initiative in all parts of society,
self-government, these and other similar conditions are most con131
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ducive to both. In contrast, the other cultures sharply restrict or even
forbid the exercise of these ways. Bigness may also be said to exist in
each kind of regime. Certainly both Nazism and communism and
for the sake of power politics even the remnants of the Old Regime
wish to encourage the establishment of big industry, a big bureaucracy and a big army. All three, however, seek to prevent bigness
from spreading to other areas of society. They fear especially the
formation of large-scale social organizations which express the interest
of the diverse elements in the population in taking an active part in
shaping the course of their own lives. As in the case of industrialism,
the fullest realization of the qualities of bigness therefore occurs in
the society of process. Power may also be said to be generated whereever human beings organize in society, for the mere fact of numbers
imposes the necessity of allocating authority to a few. The dogmatic
regimes seek to concentrate power to a far greater extent than any
free society; [or they aim to force their dogma upon the people. Again,
one may conclude that the distinction in the degree of power sought
manifests a difference in the kind of society. That of freedom actually
possesses more power than the others; but it is a kind of power which
is highly decentralized and can only with difficulty be brought to a
focus for physical use.
The distinction between the two types of culture may be seen
from the attitude of each toward the fundamental social ideals and
practice of freedom and change. It may be claimed that the existence
of institutions imposes definite limitations upon the exercise of freedom and that therefore liberty does not and cannot exist. If Nazism
and communism had not put forth their spurious arguments, it would
scarcely be worth replying that institutions may also create the conditions essential for freedom to operate and for anarchy on the one hand
and dictatorship on the other to be avoided. A society that lives
under the banner of freedom may be expected to accept the natural
fact of change in all parts of life and to establish the organizations for
enabling change to serve the best interests of man. The question becomes one of the extent to which the two kinds of regimes assure the
permanence of these ideals by way of institutions and the development of habits of behavior.
The society of process operates in freedom; the others can exist
only in its partial or total absence. Freedom of opportunity characterizes the one, but in the others preference is given to those who
conform most carefully to the dominant mores or dogmas. The one
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practices equality before the law and equality of opportunity according to ability and achievement; the others build society upon status
or similar fixed forms. Inequality is to be found in each; but in one
it varies according to the showing of the free individual and in the
others according to birth, party affiliation or some other suprahuman
standard. One places its primary emphasis upon the individual and
makes institutions and ideas subordinate to his welfare; the others
elevate a dogma or a social system to a place of superiority, and force
the individual to serve standards imposed upon him from outside.
In the society of process creativeness is open to all and is encouraged,
whereas in the others it is restricted to the reliable few and, in addition, its results must conform to the letter of the dogmas. The one
accepts the implications of the experimental method, whereas the
others impose the limitation of service in behalf of the dogma.
In any culture social extremes exist which will be in some kind
of functional relationship. But in the society of process the extremes
will be united in a mobile complexity of social and occupational
groups that merge easily and smoothly into one another and permit
no sharp breaks in the functioning continuity of the social structure.
The society of rigidity manifests the contrary kind of organization.
In that of the Old Regime status and privilege divide the castes or
classes into precise compartments. Under communism and Nazism,
party membership creates an ,elite as severely distinct from the rest of
society as the aristocracy was in the Old Regime. Even though in
diverse ways, hierarchical status characterizes the societies of rigidity.
In that of the Old Regime birth determines one's position; in that of
nationalism membership in a particular nation sets one off from people of all other nations; in that of Nazism and communism one's relation to or position in the monopoly party fixes the social position.
In the society of process whether economic, social, political or cultural
affairs are concerned, the individual can turn to that field which suits
him best; he can change as he wishes and is able to; he is his own
master, and the welfare state will assist him in having the opportunities to develop himself. In the society of rigidity, the individual's
fate is decided by the elite. While mobility may be almost entirely
lacking in the society of the Old Regime, it will be possible in
that of Nazism and of communism. But the degree and the objective of mobility will be set, not in accordance with the welfare
of the individual, but according to the advantage in furthering
the dogma as determined by the party. In the society of process
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constant peaceful adjustment will be normal, with trial and error
deciding what has lost its efficiency and what inventions should be
introduced. Efficiency, economy, individual and social welfare set
the standards for change. The society of rigidity adopts other standards and methods. The groups of the Old Regime tend to be conservative and to accept change only in so far as it helps to preserve their
power. Nazism and communism make change conform to the regime:
if it serves the interest of the dogma, it is acceptable; if not, it is prohibited. Something may be outworn, expensive, and in actuality a
handicap; but if the elite believes that the system calls for its preservation, it is retained. Process is tolerated solely within the limits set
by the dogma.
The contrast in the method of inducing change is equally pronounced. The society of the Old Regime scarcely bothers about
making changes unless forced in self-defence to do so; then the elite
divides into two main groups, one for essential reforms, the other
opposed, but both favoring the retention of power by the elite.
While differing fundamentally in the means approved, the other two
rigid types of society develop a more complicated method of change.
Each institutionalizes change; that is, each has institutions through
which and by which change is channelled. But whereas the society
of process employs peaceful, rational, careful handling of a problem
with the preservation of the right of all interested parties to be heard,
the others funnel all such activity through the monopoly party.
Since in this case any proposals for reform involve the validity of
dogmas, the sponsors are exposed to the danger of being considered
heretics and eliminated by violence. Regular purges and other
forms of brutality therefore become integral institutions of change.
The habits and methods of war are employed as normal in time of
peace. In fact, peace does not exist; its presence is not recognized.
The rigid devotion to a dogma of conquest for the spread of the
dogma precludes any possibility of living together with peoples of
other ideals except on terms of a compulsory armed truce. Voilent
contrasts are emphasized within the society itself between the believers
and the unbelievers, between the loyal and the others; the state of war
has to be maintained at home as well as abroad. Rigid ways of thinking and acting are essential to prevent the human beings from
settling into the peaceful ways of general sociability, compromise, and
individual freedom normal to a human personality. Once the insti-
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tutional and dogmatic controls of rigidity are relaxed, the society will
tend of its own accord to develop the ways of process. These ways
are the natural ones in any society; they are the only ones in which
the culture of industrialism can be fulfilled.
The analysis of the cultural situations provided in these chapters
leads one to reaffirm the validity of views expressed many times in
the past about the conditions for the good life. Since man is a developing social being, he must have the opportunities to cultivate his
abilities in freedom. Rigidity therefore in any form proves destructive, and should be eliminated in favor of institutions and ways by
which experimentation and change can take place. The history of
social development should be written in terms of the opportunities
which each culture offers for the human being to be active and creative. Whenever the opportunities are numerous and varied, man has
tended to seize the advantages offered and to function at his best.
Happiness has accompanied creativeness, and the great periods of
civilization have occurred. ''''henever instruments of rigidity have
deprived man of these opportunities, creativeness has decayed, happiness has been drugged into apathy. Even though nationalism and
communism offer some opportunities for development to some individuals, the essential rigidity of their dogmatism and the exclusiveness of their institutions of control are bound to deprive these systems of efficiency and health. They cannot compete successfully with
a freely functioning democracy endowed with institutional forms for
enabling its citizens to be creative, to become personalities, and to
take the initiative for their own and for society'S improvement. The
society of process has the natural gifts of man working in its favor.
For it to be destroyed would be a physical and a moral catastrophe.
For the first time in history man possesses the facilities to achieve
a life of freedom and creativeness. Bigness has placed the materials
at his disposal, and process has afforded the means for utilizing them
to the fullest. Every aspect of life is affected by these two characteristics; for all parts have become inter-dependent. The social, aesthetic,
and political are closely related to the economic, and vice versa.
Common kinds of organization and behavior are to be found among
them all, with a wide leeway in each for individual action. In spite
of the seeming confusion within our own culture the society of industrialism, of bigness and process is moving in a uniform direction.
In many aspects it has hardly advanced beyond the introductory
stages, but it appears to be permeating the totality with its ideals
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and ways and to be developing a unified culture. One can see the
outlines of the future in numerous respects: the institutions and
habits of cooperative interdependence, of mutual respect, of wellrounded personality, reasonableness, representation, and many others
have already been or are being started and all possess common
qualities.
We know not merely in theory but in practice what is essential
for the good life. For the first time in history methods are being
worked out continuously by which ethical ideals as old as written
records may actually be implemented. Possessing the materials and
developing the institutions for planning, we recognize the importance
of the process of policy-making and execution. Within the limits
set by nature we are independent of fate and can shape our own future.
The responsibility might seem overwhelming if we did not dispose
of such rich material and human resources. Many of these are not
yet utilized; but we are aware of their existence and we believe that
man can avail himself of them, that in the normal course of human
events the knowledge, the methods and the occasions will emerge.
Man is acutely conscious of the fact that he holds the decision about
his own destiny: he can make of it largely what he will. Was man
ever confronted with such a thrilling prospect?

